The state, capital and urban restructuring in post-reform Shanghai by Fu, Zhengji
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The state, capital and urban restructuring in post-reform Shanghai
Fu, Zhengji
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
The State, Capital and Urban
Restructuring in Post-Reform Shanghai
Zhengji Fu
A thesis submitted to the University of London in accordance with the
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in King's College





This research was sponsored by the Overseas Research Scheme (ORS) and KC
Wong Education Foundation. A number of institutions also provided financial
supports throughout the research. They were: the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
the Great Britain-China Educational Trust, King's College London (The School of
Humanities and the Department of Geography), RC2 1 and the American Association
for Chinese Studies (AACS).
Of the many individuals I owe a debt to, I am particularly grateful to my supervisor,
Professor Chris Hamnett, for guiding me through all stages of the research. His sharp
academic insights and constructive criticism enabled me to keep tackling the next
hurdle. In addition, his careful corrections of my writing made my raw English
readable (I hope that process has not harmed his eyesight too much).
I am eternally indebted to Professor Keith Hoggart. It was his extraordinary kindness
that encouraged me to move to King's in the first place, and his invaluable comments
and suggestions through careful reading of my chapters proved to be crucial in the
completion of the thesis. I would also like to thank Martin Forest and James
DeFilippis, who also provided indispensable comments in the different stages of
writing. Thanks are also due to Shatish whose computer expertise always came
timely to my rescue. Roma Beaumont kindly helped to draw all the maps.
I owe a big thanks to my fellow PhD researchers, particularly Jim, Jason, Paula,
Cristobal, Sadaf, Karen, Tom, Nandi, Peter and Priya, for their comradeship and
undying psychological support. Doing a PhD is a long journey, and I am glad to have
had their company along the way.






List of Abbreviations	 vi
List of Tables and Illustrative Materials 	 vii
INTRODUCTION
1.1	 Introduction
1.2	 Research questions	 5
1.3	 Methodology	 7
1.3.1 Historical analysis 	 7
1.3.2 Quantitative research	 8
1.3.3 Qualitative research	 11
1.3.4 Case study	 14
V' 1.4	 Thesis structure	 16
2	 URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE STATE 	 19
2.1	 Introduction	 19
2.2	 A new paradigm of urban studies	 19
2.3	 Urban Political Economy and theories of capitalism 	 23
2.3.1 Capitalism as an accumulation regime and a world system 	 23
2.3.2 Capitalist accumulation system and Urban Political Economy	 26
2.3.3 The capitalist world economy and Urban Political Economy	 28
2.4	 Urban Political Economy and the state 	 29




3.2 A brief review of state theories 	 39
3.3
	
The typo logy of nation-states 	 41
3.4
	
Nation states and foreign direct investment (FDI) 	 45
3.5
	
Globalisation and the state: the rescaling of the state 	 48
3.6
	
The state in capitalist cities	 52
3.7
	
The autonomy of the local state in capitalist cities 	 55
3.8
	
The state in socialist cities	 57
3.9
	
The state, capital and Shanghai's urban development 	 61
4 THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF SHANGHAI BEFORE 1949 65
4.1	 Introduction	 65
4.2	 The formation of modern Shanghai (1842-1895) 	 65
4.3	 The golden age of Shanghai (1895-1927)	 70
4.4	 Nationalist Shanghai (1927-1937)	 79
4.5	 The end of international status (1937-1949) 	 82
4.6	 Shanghai: key to modem China	 84








5	 POLITICAL ECONOMY AND URBAN STRUCTURE IN PRE-
REFORM SHANGHAI	 93
5.1	 Introduction	 93
5.2	 Shanghai under state socialism	 93
5.3	 Economic base	 100
5.4	 Spatial morphology	 103
5.5	 Social stratification	 109
5.6	 Key state-capital relationships in Socialist Shanghai (1949-1978)	 114







China's Reform and the new political economy	 116
6.3 Developmental state theory 	 122
6.4
	
The application of the developmental state theory to China 	 125
6.5
	
Reform as the redefmition of the Chinese state 	 128
6.6
	
Decentralisation and the new role of the provincial/municipal
government	 137
6.6.1 Fiscal reforms	 137
6.6.2 The new central-local relationship 	 139
6.6.3 Shanghai's shifting relationship with the Centre 	 141
6.6.4 A socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai 	 144
6.7
	
The impact of reform on the mechanism of urban development	 149
6.7.1 Diversification of investment source 	 149
6.7.2 Reorganisation of urban land development	 151
6.7.3 The new role of urban planning	 156
6.7.4 The impact of international capital on the mechanism of urban
development	 157
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND URBAN RESTRUCTURING
IN POST-REFORM SHANGHAI	 160
Introduction	 160
Shanghai's economic development since 1978: links with the world
economy	 160
7.2.1 GDP growth	 160
7.2.2 External trade 	 164
7.2.3 Foreign workers and visitors	 166
7.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment 	 167
Changes in Shanghai's economic base 	 176
7.3.1 Ownership structure	 176
7.3.2 Sectoral structure	 179
Transformation of Shanghai's spatial morphology	 188
7.4.1 Housing commercialisation 	 188
7.4.2 The establishment of the quasi-land market and leased-land
based urban redevelopment	 193
7.4.3 The emergence of new urban patterns 	 195
Social restratification of Shanghai 	 201




DEVELOPMENT OF LUJIAZUI CENTRAL FINANCE DISTRICT:







Pudong and the Lujiazui Central Finance District	 212
8.3
	
The role of the state and international capital in the development of
Pudong	 215
8.3.1 The changing attitude of the central government 	 215
8.3.2 The enthusiastic local government 	 217
8.3.3 Inflow of international capital	 219




The development of Lujiazui Central Finance District (LCFD) 	 234
8.5.1 World class planning	 235
8.5.2 The establishment of Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone
Development Company (SLDC)	 238
8.5.3 The relocation of the existing occupants in LCFD 	 239
8.5.4 The rapid development of LCFD
	
244
8.6 The case of Shanghai World Financial Centre 	 253
8.7
	
The project-based, implicit pro-growth coalition	 257
9	 CONCLUSION	 259
9.1	 Main findings	 259
9.2	 Implications for future research 	 271














CCP - Chinese Communist Party
CEOs -- Collectively Owned Enterprises
CPC - Central Planning Commission
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
FFEs - Foreign Funded Enterprises
MOF - Ministry of Finance
LCFD - Lujiazui Central Finance District
NIDL -- New International Division of Labour
PNAA - Pudong New Area Administration
RRS -- revenue-sharing system
SEYEPA -- Shanghai Economic Yearbook Editorial and Publishing Agency
SEZs -- Special Economic Zones
SFIC -- Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission
SLDC - Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Development (Group) Co., Ltd.
SMC -- Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement
SMG -- Shanghai Municipal Government
SOEs -- State Owned Enterprises
SSB - Shanghai Statistical Bureau
SYC - Statistical Yearbook of China
SYG - Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong
SYS - Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai
TSS -- tax-sharing system
TNCs -- Transnational Corporations
WTO -- World Trade Organisation
vi
List of Tables and Illustrative Materials
Box
Box 1.1	 The Main Content of the China-US Trade Deal 	 3
Box 6.1
	 Chronology of China's Key Reforms 	 118
Box 8.1	 Major Prefeiential Policies for the Development of Pudong
Given by the Central Government 	 217
Figure
Figure 2.1	 Central Relationships in Contemporaiy Urban Political Economy 32
Figure 3.1
	 A Typology of National Economic-Political Systems
	 44
Figure 3.2	 Major Types of Foreign Direct Investment Policy
	 46
Figure 3.3
	 Interests of the National and Local States in Cities
	 55
Figure 4.1	 The Yangtze River System 	 66
Figure 4.2	 East Asia	 67
Figure 4.3	 Shanghai circa 1919	 68
Figure 5.1
	 Urban Growth of Shanghai during the Period 1947-1994
	 99
Figure 5.2
	 New Workers' Villages in Shanghai, 1952 	 105
Figure 5.3	 Land Use in Shanghai circa 1990
	 108
Figure 6.1
	 Urban Development Process in the Centrally-Planned Economy of
China Before Economic Reform in 1978
	 154
Figure 6.2	 Urban Development Process in the Transitional Economy of China
After Economic Reform in 1978
	 155
Figure 7.1	 Share of Shanghai and Guangdong in China's GDP
	 163
Figure 7.2	 The Number of Projects Funded by Fortune 500 Corporations in
Pudong: By Year 	 172
vu
Figure 7.3	 FDI Structure of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong: By
Amount of Investment (US$: million)	 174
Figure 7.4	 The Administrative Division of Shanghai
	
191
Figure 7.5	 Population Changes in Central Areas of Shanghai: 1982-1990	 197
Figure 7.6




	 The Changing Urban Skyline of Shanghai, Measured in No. of




	 The Unemployment Rate in Shanghai: 1978-1997
	
207
Figure 8.1	 The Location of Pudong in Shanghai
	
213
Figure 8.2	 The Location of the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone 	 214
Figure 8.3
	
The Location of the Key Development Subzones of
Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 	 193
Figure 8.4




Graph 4.1	 Shanghai's Trade, 1865-1935	 73
Picture
Picture 4.1	 The Bund Seen in 1853	 74
Picture 4.2	 The Bund in its Golden Time (circa 1930s)	 74
Picture 4.3	 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Building 	 76
Picture 4.4	 The Bund in 1990s	 76
Picture 5.1	 The Horse-race Course in Downtown Shanghai in 1937	 104













Pudong Seen From the Bund, 1990
Pudong Seen From the Bund, 1996
Pudong Seen From the Bund, 2000
"New York in the Making" - LCFD, 2000
Bird's-eye View of the LCFD in 1993






Super High-rising Buildings in the LCFD, 2000
un Mao Building
Site Z-1 Before the Relocation









List of Representatives of Foreign Investors Interviewed
	
14
Table 4.1	 Growth of Chinese Cotton Mills in Shanghai 1914-27
	
72
Table 4.2	 The Rise of Traditional Chi'en-Chuang Banks at the Time of the
First World War (Capital data in Chinese dollars) 	 73





Number of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in Shanghai,
1952-1978	 94
China's State Investment Patterns and Output Growth, 1952-85 97
Shares of Heavy, Light, and Textile Industries in Total Gross
Value of Industrial Output in Shanghai, Various Years 1949-1975 102
Average Annual Wages by Stmctural Variables in 1980 	 113
Table 6.1
	
Shares of Industrial Output Value by Ownership Type in China 131
Table 6.2	 Phasing out the Plan Track: Agricultural Products 	 135
Table 6.3
	
Phasing out the Plan Track: Industrial Goods	 135
Table 6.4
	
Phasing out the Plan Track: Total Retail Sales	 136
Table 7.1	 State Policy, FDI and Shanghai's Economic Development 	 161
Table 7.2	 Share of Shanghai and Guangdong in China's GDP, Industrial
Output and Value-added of the Tertiary Sector, 1978-1998 	 163
Table 7.3
	
Foreign Trade via and of Shanghai: 1985-1995 	 165
Table 7.4
	
Shanghai's GDP and Exports: 198 1-1997	 165

























Comparison Between Domestic and International Long Call in
Shanghai: 1978-1995	 167
Contractual FDI of Some Major Cities in China: 1985-1995
	 168
Contracted FDI in Shanghai by Country 	 169
Investment of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong 	 170
The Number of Projects Funded by Fortune 500 Corporations in
Pudong: By Year 	 172
Investment by Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong:
By Country	 173
FDI Structure by the Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong 	 173
FDI Structure of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong: By
Amount of Investment (US$: million)	 174
Four Mage Joint Ventures in Shanghai (US$: million)
	 174
Number of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in Shanghai,
1978-1997	 176
Comparison of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in
Shanghai, 1980-1997	 178
Efficiency Indicators of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership
Sector in Shanghai, 1997	 178
Shanghai: GDP Changes by Industry (1980,1985,1990,1997)	 180
Shanghai: Changes in Employment Structure by Industry in
1980, 1985, 1990, 1997 (unit: 10,000 persons) 	 181
Shanghai: GDP Changes in Tertiary Industry by Group
(1980, 1990, 1997) (unit: RMB 100 million)	 182
Shanghai: FDIby Sector 1985-1996 (unit: US$ million)	 184
Contracted FDI in Shanghai's Tertiary Industry, 1980-1996
(US$ million)	 186
Foreign-Funded Financial Institution at the Branch Level
in Shanghai: up to 1997	 187
Housing Commercialisation in Shanghai in 1990s	 190
Land Lease in Shanghai: 1988-1998 	 193
Population Changes in the Core and Fringe Areas of Shanghai 	 196
Housing Demolition in Shanghai: 1991-1998	 198
The Growth of Income Inequality in Shanghai: 1990-1997	 202
x
Table 7.29	 Urban Household Income Inequality and Its Sources in China	 203
Table 7.30	 Shanghai's Top Ten Highly Paid Sectors in 1997 	 205
Table 7.31	 Education Background of Economic Immigrants to Shanghai
in 1997	 209
Table 8.1	 The First Ten Major Infrastructure Projects in Pudong 	 218
Table 8.2	 The Second Round of Ten Major Infrastructure Projects
in Pudong	 219
Table 8.3
	 Fixed Asset Investment in Pudong by Resource: 1990-1996 	 220
Table 8.4	 Motives for Investment in Shanghai (n = 81) 	 221
Table 8.5	 Increase of Living Space for Displaced Households	 241
Table 8.6
	 The Big Ten Occupants Relocated in the LCFD	 243
Table 8.7
	 Thirty One Contracted Buildings in Lujiazui Central
Financial District	 247
Table 8.8





The initial idea behind this research can be traced back to the early 1990s. In 1993-
1996, I was working as a public servant in The Economic and Trade Bureau of
Shanghai Pudong New Area. Pudong was then China's hottest spot. Launched by the
Chinese government on 18 April 1990, the development of Pudong was regarded as
another strategic move of the Chinese government after the opening-up of southern
China. It was officially designated as "the focus of Chinese reform and open-door
policy in 1990s" and "the dragon head of the Yangzi River Basin" at the l4t1 Chinese
Communist Party Congress held in October 1992. By the time that a new local
authority - the Pudong New Area Administration (PNAA) was established in
January 1993, Pudong had entered the take-off period. My Bureau, a department of
the PNAA that is in charge of the foreign direct investment (FDI), was packed
everyday by investors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other countries consulting the
preferential investment policies recently announced by the central government.
My office, close to the newly completed TV tower called Oriental Pearl, was located
in Lujiazui Central Finance District (LCFD) - Shanghai's future financial centre.
Directly opposite the Bund across the Huangpu River, LCFD was the pet project of
Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG) and the showcase of the whole Pudong
project. One after another grey, 70s-style buildings were bulldozed and the height of
the new modern (or postmodern?) skyscrapers was increasing day by day. Watching
this astonishing urban redevelopment unfolding before my eye everyday, I was
amazed and one question puzzled me: "what are the forces underpinning Shanghai's
rapid urban restructuring of which the LCFD is the most illustrative case?"
My first thought was of the state. Growing up in socialist China, I could not help
attributing the cause of Shanghai's urban change to the state. The history-making
reform policies introduced by the Chinese government in the late 1978 were intended
to reform a society where the role of the state was "monolithic" (Solinger, 1992), and
where the state was the owner of the means of production, the organiser of
production and reproduction, and the initiator and regulator of any public policy.
Without a "first-push" from the central state, or more precisely, without a change of
party line in the first place, any change in the urban patterning of Shanghai, a city
viewed as a model of the socialist cities and tightly supervised by the central
government for three decades, would be incredible. The development of Pudong and
the revitalisation of Shanghai in the I 990s were the direct result of the political
decisions of the central government that tried to push northwards the wave of
economic reform from southern China by remaking Shanghai into a world-class city.
My second thought was of international capital. Most of the buildings in the LCFD
were designed, developed and financed, and will be managed and occupied by
multinational companies. China as a whole had been the second largest FDI recipient
after the USA since 1994. In 1994, China received US$ 82.7 billion which accounted
for 17% of global FDI, of which Shanghai accounted for 12.10o (Nyaw, 1996; SSB,
1995). That meant Shanghai took around 2.1% of the global FDI in 1994. How can
one understand the changes of a city which accounted for 2.l 0 o of the global FDI
while ignoring the effects of international capital?
The first thought represented a view held by most Chinese urban researchers, that is,
an approach from within - an academic tradition inherited from the pre-reform era
when China was isolated from the outside and urban changes in China were wholly
internally induced. With the progress of China's reform, an increasing number of
scholars both in Chinese and English literature have started to look at Chinese urban
changes from without, i. e., to understand urban changes in some Chinese cities in a
global context (Chu, 1996; Eng, 1997; Fung et a!, 1992; Ning, 1991; Olds, 1995a,
l995b, 1998; Sit and Yang, 1997; Wu, 1997; Xin, 1996; Xu, 1993, 1994; Yao, 1993,
1995, 1997; Yeh and Xu, 1996). Research by Eng (1997) and Sit and Yang (1997)
illustrated the rise of foreign-investment-induced exo-urbanisation in China's Pearl
River Delta. Olds' (l995a) research was probably the first to attempt to link directly
the development of Pudong to the processes of globalisation. He saw the
development of Pudong as one of urban mega-projects that were underlain by the
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complex and increasingly global processes that were mediated and funnelled by
Hannerz's (1992) four socially constructed "organisational frameworks": the form of
life, the state, the market and social movements.
However, to see Shanghai's urban transformation as simply the outcome of
globalisation is to ignore such decisive internal factors as the state. This is
particularly so when we take into account the fact that China had been isolated from
outside for 30 years and reform-induced integration into the world economy has been
a gradual government-led process. Even for countries that have been fully geared
with the world economy, the key interactions in the global-local nexus remain at the
level of the TNC and the nation-state (Dicken, 1994). The recent development of
China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) serves as an excellent
case to show the continuing importance of the nation-state in an increasingly
globalised world.
Box 1.1 - The Main Content of the China-US Trade Deal
• China will cut tariffs by an average of 23%.
• Foreign companies will be able to own up to 49% of all telecommunications
service ventures once China becomes a member of the WTO, and 5000 two years
later.
• Foreign banks can offer services in local currency to Chinese enterprises, two
years after joining the WTO, and to Chinese citizens, five years after joining.
• Foreign firms can have a stake of up to 33% in securities fund management joint
ventures, rising to 49% three years after China joins the WTO.
(Guardian 1999, "China agrees to free trade", 16 November, P. 2)
On 15 November 1999, the signing of a trade agreement between China and the USA
hit the headlines in the world press. The deal, thrashed out after 13 years of difficult
negotiations, paved the way for China's membership of the WTO, the Geneva-based
body which polices the global trading system. The inclusion of China in the WTO
has been claimed as "the most important victory for capitalism since the collapse of
the Berlin Wall; it is the crowning jewel in the process of globalisation" (Will Hutton,
28 May 2000, The Observer). However, a glance at the main contents of the deal
shows vividly the interaction of nation-states and global capital in today's world (see
Box 1.1). Although the Chinese state has made huge concessions, it is struggling to
3
control the extent and pace of integration of China's economy into the world
economy.
That I emphasise the continuing significance of the nation-state as a major influence
in the global economy does not mean, of course, that the role and functions of the
state have not changed. In fact, the process of globalisation has increasingly given
capital the upper hand in the history of capital-state relationship. The fact that
localities are competing for ever-increasingly-mobile capital means that capital can
take advantage of its increased geographical mobility to get more concessions from
the local (Peterson, 1981; Gottdiener, 1986; Logan and Molotch, 1987). The recent
case of the site selection of the Disney Theme Park in China demonstrated how
favourable the position of international capital is in its negotiation with local
authorities.
The Disney Group wanted to have a theme park in China - the third one outside
America after France and Japan. The proposal stirred up fierce competition among
Chinese cities, particularly between Shanghai and Hong Kong, which were attracted
by the promising prospects that the project will bring in: thousands of jobs, droves of
tourists, and strategic promotion of the city image, and ultimately more economic
growth. After years of bargaining, Hong Kong finally won the project in November
1999, but at a huge cost: the Hong Kong government agreed to pump HK$ 22.45
billion (approximately US$ 2.9 billion) into the project, most of which will be
invested in the building infrastructure such as highway and piers, while the Disney
company will invest HK$ 2.45 billion only about one-tenth of investment pledged
by Hong Kong government (Asia Weeldy*, 14 November 1999).
The result, however, did not put Shanghai off its dream of hosting a Disney Theme
Park. A working team was set up to continue negotiations with the Disney Group
over the possibility of building a Disney Theme Park in Pudong. The officer who
was in charge of the working team told me: "There can be more than one Disney
Theme Park in a country as big as China. We are confident. After all, Shanghai is at
A Hong Kong based Chinese news weekly.
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the centre of China's richest region with a population of 200 million." (my interview
in 2000).
In sum, it seems that the complex configuration of variables which collectively
determine Shanghai's urban structure can be eventually attributed to two key factors:
state and capital, and that the interaction between the two is crucial to understand
Shanghai's urban change. In other words, Shanghai's urban restructuring is seen as
neither internally induced as it was in the pre-reform era nor solely externally
produced by international capital, but the outcome of the interaction of the global and
the local, and of the interaction of the state (national and local) and capital. While
acknowledging that the state, both in the central and local level, still controls the
urbanisation processes, the thesis tries to explore how the mechanisms of Shanghai's
urban development have been changed by market-oriented reform as well as the
introduction of international capital since 1978, and how the three main actors,
namely, central government, municipal government and international capital have
changed their roles in the shaping of urban patterns. It is argued that China's peculiar
"half-way house" situation, which stems from China's asymmetrical reform, gave
rise to an implicit but extraordinary strong pro-growth coalition between local
government and international capital in the process of urban redevelopment. It is this
coalition that has been rapidly and relentlessly reshaping Shanghai's urban patterns.
1.2 Research questions
The dissertation analyses Shanghai's urban development in general, and post-reform
urban restructuring in particular, from the viewpoint of state-capital relationships.
Two dimensions of inquiry are involved. One is the historical dimension where
Shanghai's urban development is traced back to the 1 840s. By analysing a variety of
political economies that Shanghai has experienced, this dimension of inquiry tries to
answer a critical question: "why is the state-capital relationship the most appropriate
approach to the understanding of Shanghai's urban development?" The other
dimension of inquiry focuses on Shanghai's urban restructuring since the Chinese
government adopted its reform policy in late 1978. The three key questions to be
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addressed here are: I )"how did the new relationship of the state and capital emerge?";
2)"how did this relationship transform the dynamics of Shanghai's urban
development?"; and 3)"how does this relationship manifest itself in the concrete
process of urban restructuring?" Apart from the overall analysis of Shanghai's urban
restructuring brought in by this new state-capital relation, the last question is also
discussed through the case study of the Lujiazui Central Finance District (LCFD). By
analysing the LCFD, the thesis argues that the state-capital relationship can be seen
in terms of a specific form of pro-growth coalition in the hundreds of urban
redevelopment projects scattered across Shanghai. Those key questions are
elaborated as following:
1. Why is the state-capital relationship the most appropriate approach to the
understanding of Shanghai's urban development? Answering this question entails:
a) theoretical analysis of the importance of the state and capital in urban change;
b) critical review of different approaches to the understanding of urban
development; c) identification of the key relationships between the state and
capital and their defining impacts in different periods of Shanghai's urban
development.
2. How has the emergence of the new relationship between the state and capital
transformed the dynamic of Shanghai's urban development in the post-reform era?
Answering this question involves: a) identifying the pre-reform dynamics of
Shanghai's urban development; b) analysing the redefinition of the Chinese state
rendered by the market-oriented reforms; c) identifying the post-reform dynamics
of Shanghai's urban development
3. What aspects of Shanghai have been restructured since the new urban
development dynamics was brought in by the Chinese reforms? The thesis tries
to answer this question in terms of three interrelated aspects: a) the economic
base; b) the social structure; and c) spatial morphology.
4. How does the new state-capital relationship manifest itself in the concrete
process of Shanghai's urban redevelopment? Addressing this question entails
attempting to understand: a) the changing role of the central state in Shanghai's
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urban development; b) the changing behaviour pattern of the SMG induced by
devolution as well as the competition for external capital; c) the importance of
Shanghai in Transnational Corporations' strategies of entering Chinese markets; d)
the convergence of interests of the SMG and foreign investors in Shanghai's
urban redevelopment.
1.3 Methodology
The thesis seeks to establish an explanation of Shanghai's urban change by focusing
on the development of the underpinning relationship between the state and capital.
Although the thesis focuses on the post-reform era, the key relationship of the state
and capital is traced back historically to the beginning of modem Shanghai in the 19th
century. The analysis of Shanghai's current urban restructuring also involves three
broad areas: its economic base, its social structure and its spatial organisation. Key
questions involved in the thesis are not only those of "how many" and "what" which
demand quantitative methods, but also those of "how" and "why" where qualitative
methods are needed. Throughout the research process, therefore, a methodology that
involved four research methods was adopted. These four methods are historical
analysis, quantitative research, qualitative research and case study.
1.3.1 Historical analysis
Historical analysis is very important in the thesis both methodologically and
epistemologically. It is essential for establishing the historical context of Shanghai's
current urban restructuring. As well as providing the historical context, historical
analysis is pivotal in explaining why the state-capital relationship approach is the
most appropriate in understanding Shanghai's urban development. The historical
account of Shanghai's unique urban development path from colonialism to capitalism
(Chapter 4) to socialism (Chapter 5) to post-socialism (Chapter 6, 7, 8) is intended to
show that two underlying factors - state activities and capital dynamics have been
inextricably interrelated in shaping Shanghai's urban patterns for more than a century,
and the interaction of the state and capital and the result of this interaction - the
state-capital relationship provides an excellent perspective through which Shanghai's
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urban change in whichever historical period can be understood properly. Historical
research is conducted by using existing literature and some statistical sources,
particularly on the historical development of Shanghai both pre-socialism, under
socialism and post socialism.
13.2 Quantitative research
The general aim of the quantitative components of the research is to address the
empirical validity of the conceptual inferences that have been drawn from the
theoretical discussion and historical analysis. In other words, the quantitative
research is aimed to provide the empirical evidences for the theoretical argument --
the new state-capital relationship brought in by China's reform and open-door
policies has been underlying Shanghai's urban restructuring in the post-reform era.
Shanghai's urban restructuring is examined from three aspects - that of the economic
base, spatial morphology and social structure, and as such empirical evidence is
needed in these three areas.
For this purpose three main sources of quantitative data were targeted. Firstly,
secondary data were extracted and analysed from statistical yearbooks in Shanghai
Library and official reports from local governments. Three types of statistical
yearbooks are the main sources for secondary data: (I) Statistical Yearbook of
Shanghai - the official statistical yearbook which has been available since 1978; (2)
Shanghai Economic Yearbook -- the semi-official yearbook edited by Shanghai
Social Science Academy which provides an analysis of Shanghai's socio-economic
development every year; (3) Shanghai Real Estate Market - a yearbook on
Shanghai's land market and real estate development which has been edited by the
Shanghai Statistical Bureau since 1992. Other statistical yearbooks such as Statistical
Yearbook of Shanghai Foreign Relations and Trade, Statistical Yearbook of China
and Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong also provide necessary data. My former
Bureau -- The Economic and Trade Bureau of Pudong New Area has been the base
to obtain official documents and reports (some regular and some not) on the
development of Pudong and Shanghai as a whole including those from other
governmental departments and those from the Bureau itself.
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Secondly, in three research areas, surveys done by other researchers are adopted in
the thesis. These surveys are used because there are no official statistics available
and the surveys needed were beyond my own reach in terms of financial cost and
time required for the survey. These three areas are as following:
The motivation of foreign investors in Shanghai: The survey conducted by Nyaw
Mee-Kau in late 1994 is employed. The survey was conducted using interviews and a
questionnaire that was sent to 200 foreign-funded enterprises selected randomly from
the list of firms compiled by the Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission (SFIC)
(For detail about the survey, see Nyaw, 1996: 250-272). The survey is used in
Chapter 8 to validate the widely expected result that the huge market potential in
China is the primary motivation behind foreign direct investment in Shanghai.
The floating population (domestic migrants in Shanghai: The Shanghai Municipal
Government has so far conducted six surveys on the floating population and the last
one was conducted in September 1997. Because the floating population is excluded
from the official statistics which only collects data on the officially registered local
residents, surveys done by the SMG provide valuable information on the floating
population of over 2 millions in Shanghai.
Growing income inequality and its sources: No survey has been specially done on
Shanghai. Instead, surveys done by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1988
and 1995 on urban income distribution in China are used. An extensive survey of
20,000 urban and rural households was conducted in 1988 under the sponsorship of
the Ford Foundation, and another survey, this time of 15,000 households, was carried
out in 1995 with the support of the Ford Foundation and the Asia Development Bank
(For detail, see Zhang, 1997). These two surveys show that market-oriented reforms
have been the driving force for growing income inequality in urban China.
Finally, during my fieldwork in 1999 and 2000, primary data was collected on four
main areas: (I) the investment of the Fortune-Listed World's Largest Corporations
(FLWLCs) in Pudong, (2) the relocation of existing enterprises in the LCFD, (3) the
developers and designers of high-rise buildings in the LCFD; and (4) the occupants
of the Jin Mao Building.
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The research on the investment of FLWLCs in Pudong aimed to establish a clear and
concrete profile of FDI in Shanghai: their parent companies, the timing of investment,
investment structures and so on (Chapter 7). In China, foreign companies have to
submit a series of documents such as a project proposal and a signed contract for a
joint-venture to the governmental department concerned for approval, before they
can set up a joint-venture or a wholly foreign owned enterprise. In Pudong, my
former Bureau is the one in charge of FDI, and files of all Foreign Funded
Enterprises in Pudong including those approved by the Bureau and those by the
Shanghai Foreign Investment Commission and by the central government are kept
in the Bureau's data base. My former position helped me to get access to these data.
Given the fact that 86% of the total investment by FLWLCs in Shanghai was
invested in Pudong, an analysis of the investment of FLWLCs in Pudong would be
very illustrative of the picture in Shanghai as a whole.
The relocation of existing occupants is one of the most complicated jobs involved in
the development of LCFD. One major reason why Shanghai's urban redevelopment
can be carried out so quickly is the quick relocation of existing occupants. Directly or
indirectly, the relocation involved in Shanghai's urban redevelopment has been
carried out by the local government. The list of the "big ten" existing occupants in
the LCFD (Chapter 8) is intended to show how complicated the job of relocation is,
and how the local government handles the relocation. The list was collected from
files kept by the Shanghai Pudong Urban Construction and Development Co. Ltd.
which is in charge of the relocation in LCFD on a daily basis.
With the relocation of existing occupants, skyscrapers have sprung up. By the time of
my last fieldwork in summer 2000, eighteen high-rise buildings had been completed
and another 13 buildings were under construction. A list of these 31 buildings
including their developers, designers, usage, selling prices and so on were collected
from the Shanghai Luijiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development (Group) Co. Ltd.
The power of approval is still a major way whereby the central government controls the local
economy. With regards to FDI, the Pudong government has the privilege of same approval power as
the SMG, that is, it can approve projects with an investment of USS 30 million less. Projects with
the investment over US$ 30 million have to be submitted to the central government for approval.
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(SLDC) - the company that was set up by the SMG to manage the land leasing in the
LCFD. My former boss -- Director of the Economic and Trade Bureau of Shanghai
Pudong New Area -- Kang Huijun was appointed as the General Manager of the
SLDC in 1998. With his help, I got the access to many files including project
pmposals, introduction brochures of most of the buildings and site maps that were
kept in the company's archive office.
The list of occupants in the Jin Mao Building was collected from the un Mao
Property Management Co. Ltd. which runs the building. The 88-storey Jin Mao
Building, designed by the Skidmore, Owing&Merrill LLP (an American architect), is
the tallest building in China. The list aims to show what kind of companies had
moved into the LCFD.
1.3.3 Qualitative research
Qualitative research is intended to explore the ways in which the relationships
between state and capital were established and dynaniised in the concrete process of
Shanghai's urban redevelopment. In other words, qualitative research is employed to
address the "how" question. Interviews are adopted as the main method to fmd out
the specific patterns of engagements between the SMG and foreign investors.
Interviews were conducted during my four periods of fieldwork in Shanghai. The
preliminary fieldwork was carried out in August and September of 1998. This was
mainly concerned with my theoretical framework which I developed in my first year
in King's College London. Informal, open-ended interviews were conducted, mainly
with academics and local government officials, in an attempt to find out their views
on the role of the state and capital in Shanghai's urban development.
The second period of fieldwork was conducted for three months from June to
October 1999. The collection of data and first hand resources was mainly done
during this fieldwork. The fieldwork was concentrated on the LCFD, and mainly
involved the collection of official documents and progress reports about the LCFD,
and a series of interviews. The open-ended interviews were designed to find out the
processes whereby the project was carried out, and particularly the interaction
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between the local authority and international investors. The would-be world tallest
(World Financial Centre) building project in LCFD was chosen to show the whole
process: from negotiation to the land clearance, which spanned the period from 1993-
1995. Interviews were conducted with (all names of people I interviewed are listed in
the Appendix 1 except those who wanted to remain anonymous):
• government officials at the SMG and PNAA, mainly those in planning, land
development and economic development offices.
• managers concerned in Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Co. LTD - the
company set up by the SMG in charge of land development of the LCFD.
• major developers (foreign and Chinese) in the LCFD.
• academics in universities and research institutes who are conducting research in
this area.
The interviews mainly involved the following issues:
• the process of power devolution from the central government to the municipal
government, from the city to the sub-city government concerning urban
development since 1978.
. the process of the development of Pudong and LCFD since 1990, particularly the
influx of FDI in Pudong and LCFD.
• the development of the World Financial Centre project in the LCFD, particularly
the successive concessions made by the SMG in the negotiation and the
relocation of existing occupants.
• preferential policies given by the central government to the development of
Pudong, and the effectiveness of these policies in attracting FDI.
• the competition between Shanghai and other Chinese cities for the inflow of FDI,
and Shanghai's advantages and disadvantages in the competition.
The third period of fieldwork took place in July and August of 2000. Apart from data
that was not collected in the previous fieldwork, this fieldwork focused on the nature
of FDI in Shanghai and Pudong in particular. In order to establish a clear profile of
FDI, a complete list of investment of 98 Fortune-listed World Largest Corporations
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with a total of 181 projects in Pudong was collected. Accounts of some of the mega-
projects with the total investment over USS 1 billion such as Shanghai General
Motors were obtained through interviews with the local officials. Materials about the
further progress made in the development of the LCFD was also collected.
Interviews focusing on the interaction between the local state and international
investors were mainly conducted in the last period of fieldwork that took place in the
second half of 2001. 'While some of state representatives (government officials) were
involved, most interviews were conducted with the representatives of foreign
investors. The Shanghai Pudong New Area Association of Enteiprises With Foreign
Investment (PAEFI) helped me in choosing the interviewees. The PAEFJ is a semi-
official organisation led by The Economic and Trade Bureau of Shanghai Pudong
New Area. As the only organisation of its kind allowed by the government, the
PAEFI, though not independent from the government, has had over 3000 foreign-
funded enterprises registered as its members. One of my former colleagues, Pan
Ruihua, as the Deputy Secretary General of the PAEFI, was in charge of the PAEFI's
day to day management.
From PAEFI's database of membership, Pan helped me to choose a sample of
representatives of major overseas investors, based on country of origin, industry,
investment and availability. As overseas investments in Shanghai were mainly
originated from Hong Kong, America, Japan, West Europe and Taiwan, we chose
four FFEs from each of these five countries/regions. As a result, a total of twenty
FFEs were chose, to which my letters asking for interview and the outline of
interview both in English and Chinese were sent (see Appendix 2 for the detail). Of
these 20 FFEs, nine agreed to be interviewed. Interviews with representatives of 7
FFEs were conducted and the other 2 FFEs were not available due to subsequent
changing of their schedules. The interviewees were listed in the following Table 1.1.
Interviews were conducted in English, and taped with agreements of interviewees.
All interviewees agreed to be referred to in the thesis. Interviews show that patterns
of engagements between the SMG and foreign investors can be characterised by a
process of learning, whereby both the SMG and foreign investors have been learning








convergence in such urban redevelopment project as the development of LCFD, they
can work together and form what can be called a project-based, implicit pro-growth
coalition.
Table 1.1 List of Representatives of Foreign Investors Interviewed
Name	 Position and company
Warren Wisnewski Vice President of Eastman Kodak Company for the Greater
China Region
General Manager of Shanghai Gaoqiao-BASF Dispersions
Co. Ltd.
General Manager of The German Centre Shanghai
Deputy General Manager of Delphi Automotive Systems
(China) Holding Co. Ltd.
General Manager of Shanghai Senmao International Real
Estate Co. Ltd.
Andersen (Shanghai) Business Consulting Co., Ltd.
DTZ Debenham Tie Leung (Shanghai) Ltd.
13.4 Case study
The case study method is employed to illustrate the formation of a Chinese-style pro-
growth coalition between the municipality and international capital -- one of the core
issues in the thesis. The case study method is used because the formation of the pro-
growth coalition involves the process of the state-capital interaction - the question of
"how". According to Yin (1994:1), "case studies are the preferred strategy when
"how" or "why" questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control
over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-
life context". The investigation of the role of the state and of the interaction of the
state and capital defy the common approaches of data collections in social science
such as experiment and survey. It is not possible to investigate the role of the state
and capital by arranging experiments where conditions can be controlled and
responses or behaviours can be manipulated. Rather, the data collection relies on the
accurate and consistent observation of the subject matter within its own environment
(Yin, 1994).
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The case chosen in this thesis is the development of Lujiazui Central Finance District
(LCFD) (Chapter 8). The LCFD was selected for several reasons. First, it is the pet
project of the Shanghai Municipal Government (SMG). As such, it is a project in
which the role of the state and international capital manifest themselves in a way that
is vely illustrative of their characteristics. It is what Yin (1994) called a "critical
case" - the single case represents a critical test of a significant theory. Second, ten
years on, the physical structure of the project has clearly emerged. Most of existing
enterprises and residents have been removed and many major high-rise buildings
including some high-profile have been completed. It is an appropriate time to assess
the role of state and capital in the development of LCFD. Finally, this is the area I am
most familiar with. My office used to be located in the LCFD and I witnessed its
development in the critical period of 1993-1996. In fact, I felt that I was part of it,
because our Bureau had been involved in the project and my position (I was working
in the general office) enabled me to gain access to the relevant information on the
progress of the project. Thus, the three years that I worked in Pudong can be seen as
a period of participant observation.
Both quantitative data and qualitative methods were used in the case study research.
In terms of qualitative methods, apart from the initial "time-saving" participant
observation, the interview method is employed to get the necessary evidence. Again,
my erstwhile position helped me to conduct the interviews with officials concerned.
One major concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for scientific
generalisation. It is thus important to stress the difference between the method of
generalisation in case studies and the most commonly recognised way of generalising
known as "statistical generalisation" where an inference is made on the basis of
empirical data collected from a sample. In case studies, the method of generalisation
is "analytic generalisation" in which a previously developed theory is used as a
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 1994).
In other words, a case study analyst should try to generalise findings to "theory",
analogous to the way a scientist generalises from experimental results to theory. in
this sense, the thesis tries to generalise findings from the case of LCFD to the theory
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that the implicit pro-growth coalition between the local government and international
capital has been the underpinning foite in shaping Shanghai's urban patterns.
1.4 Thesis structure
The thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 discusses the approach of Urban
Political Economy in which the thesis broadly lies. It begins with a review of the rise
of Urban Political Economy as a new paradigm in urban studies. The understanding
of Urban Political Economy is approached by linking it to the development of
theories of capitalism in two dimensions: accumulation regimes and the world
system. It is then argued that Urban Political Economy has largely neglected the key
role of the state and state policy in the shaping of urban patterns, and an approach
combining both economic and political factors is needed in constructing an
explanation of contemporary urban change.
Chapter 3 is a substantial theoretical discussion about the role of the state in urban
change. After a discussion about the major functions of nation-states in today's world
economy, the role of the state, both at the central and the local level, in cities is
analysed respectively in capitalist and socialist countries by drawing on Gurr and
King's (1987), and Kornai's (1992) works. In capitalist countries, national and local
states have their own distinctive interests in cities and have significant autonomy in
how they pursue them. This autonomy allows the state to play an important role in
the shaping of urban patterns. The political domination of the communist party and
the centrally planned economic system makes the role of the socialist state in cities
distinctive. Compared with its capitalist counterpart, the socialist state is far more
powerful in shaping urban patterns. However, due to the highly centralised party
system, the local state in socialist countries has little autonomy over the urban
development. Urban patterns in socialist countries result mainly from policies of the
central state, or precisely of the communist party. The chapter concluded with an
attempt to put Shanghai's urban development into the theoretical context that has
been established in the previous analysis.
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Chapter 4 is concerned with the urban development of Shanghai before 1949. The
discussion is focused on the rise and fall of the "Shanghai Model" - a phenomenon
well known in the historical literature. From a feudal commercial town to one of the
largest cities in the world, Shanghai's unprecedented success is attributed to its non-
governmentalism stemming from Shanghai's international status. Imposed by
western powers, this special status gave Shanghai fifty years of maximum capital
accumulation with minimum state intervention (White, 1981). With the increasing
intervention of the Chinese state resulting from the inevitable rise of nationalism, the
Shanghai model declined gradually and was brought into end by the communist
victory in the civil war. The changing state-capital relationships in the shaping of
Shanghai's urban patterns in four historical periods are shown in diagrammatic in the
fmal section.
Chapter 5 examines Shanghai's urban structure under the political economy of state
socialism (1949-1978). The introduction of state socialism eliminated private capital,
and Shanghai's urban development was determined exclusively by the state,
particularly the central state. State policies, particularly the overriding policy of
industrialisation with minimum urbanisation, transformed Shanghai from a capitalist
city of consumption into a socialist city of production. This revolutionary change is
then analysed in terms of the economic base, spatial morphology and social structure.
Chapter 6 analyses the emergence of a new role of the Chinese state both at the
central and local level brought about by China's reform policy, and the impact of the
reform on the dynamics of Shanghai's urban development. Developmental state
theory, particularly Gordon White's works (1984, 1993) on the developmental state,
is employed in understanding China's reform as a process of redefming the Chinese
state. This redefinition is, however, gradual and partial. While it has changed the
state-capital relationship, the state-party relation remains intact. The change of the
state-capital relation, and of the central-local relation that goes with it, has led to the
rise of local state corporatism. This local state corporatism has sought to build a
partnership with the non-public sector, which led to the emergence of a socialist pro-
growth coalition between the local government and international investors in
Shanghai. The chapter then examines the impacts of China's reform on the
17
mechanism of urban development from three interrelated aspects: 1) investment
source; 2) development organisation; and 3) urban planning system.
Chapter 7 addresses the question of "what dimensions of Shanghai have been
restructured since the reform?" Twenty years on, Shanghai has been increasingly
linked to the global system of markets for capital, labour and commodities. This
fundamental shift in its mode of integration with the world economy has had a
profound impact on Shanghai's urban restructuring. With the shrinking of the role of
the state, the chapter shows that Shanghai's urban restructuring has been increasingly
fuelled by international capital in economic, spatial and social terms. The chapter is
concluded by depicting a new state-capital relationship that has been underlying
Shanghai's urban restructuring in the post-reform era.
Chapter 8 presents a case study of the LCFD. As the Chinese equivalent of
Manhattan, the LCFD is the pet project of the SMG. The chapter examines the roles
of the central government, local government and international capital in the
development of the LCFD. It focuses particularly on the interaction of local
government and international capital, and the process of formation of the implicit
pro-growth coalition between them. Drawing on interviews, the chapter shows that
patterns of engagements between the local government and foreign investors can be
characterised by a process of learning. When both learn there is an interest
convergence in such urban redevelopment project as the development of LCFD, they
can work together and form what can be called a project-based, implicit pro-growth
coalition. It is this pro-growth coalition, which underlay hundreds of redevelopment
projects across Shanghai in l990s, that has been reshaping Shanghai's urban patterns.
Finally, chapter 9 provides a brief summary of the main findings contained in the
thesis, and some implications for future research.
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Chapter 2
URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE STATE
2.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 begins with a review of the rise of Urban Political Economy as a new
paradigm in urban studies. The understanding of Urban Political Economy is
approached by linking it to the development of theories of capitalism in two
dimensions: accumulation regimes and the worLd system. It is then argued that Urban
Political Economy has largely neglected the key role of the state and state policy in
the shaping of urban patterns, and that an approach combining the economic and the
political factors is needed in constructing an explanation of contemporary urban
change.
2.2 A new paradigm of urban studies
The late 1960s were characterised by urban social upheavals in the advanced
capitalist countries. The civil-rights and antiwar movement in the US, and the left-
wing students uprising in Paris, saw urban protest become epidemic in many major
capitalist cities. Together with this social unrest, there were a series of signs of urban
decline in western cities: a declining industrial sector, falling total productivity,
decaying housing and infrastructure, shrinking population, and growing
concentrations of poverty and social stress. The emergence of urban decline has been
later referred to as the decade of urban crisis in the western countries (Hill, 1984). As
these urban social movements challenged existing institutional arrangements in the
city, they called into question existing modes of urban inquiry which were based on
the centrality of the market and the assumption of a free market system and which
were often associated with the Chicago School (Logan and Molotch, 1987). The
Chicago School sought to explain urban patterns as the consequence of ecological
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competition, invasion, and succession among groups within the city (Park, 1952).
Confronted by the urban crisis, while it may help explain the question of what, this
urban paradigm could hardly provide a satisfactory explanation of how and why.
Unsatisfied with the old mode of urban inquiry, urban researchers (most prominently,
Castells, 1977 and Harvey, 1973) turned to Marxism for an explanation. Marxism
had arisen as a leading school of thought in the western social science as a result of
social scientists responding to the social crisis in capitalist countries. As an
intellectual tradition, Marxism, although not especially focused on cities, was more
attuned than mainstream urban studies to conditions of disorder, discontinuity, social
upheaval, and economic crisis in capitalist countries. This shift of urban studies to
Marxism gave rise to a new paradigm for urban studies that has been widely known
as Urban Political Economy (Walton, l979).
Urban Political Economy, in spite of diverse strands, shares common theoretical
principles which Hill (1984) summarises as holistic, structural, historical,
interdisciplinary, critical, and change-oriented dimensions. Among those, the holistic,
structural and historical are the most important in catching the characteristics of
Urban Political Economy.
In opposition to the conventional urban researchers who viewed urban development
as being isolated in time, and limited spatially to the boundaries of such areas as
regions within nations, urban political economists attempt to relate patterns of urban
development to the development of societies and the international order as a whole
(Hill, 1984). In other words, urban political economists try to understand urban
change under larger economic, political and socio-cultural milieu. According to
urban political economists, any change in a city should be interpreted in the context
of the change in a society as a whole. The development of a city was seen as
dependent on, and reflecting wider change in the social formation of the whole
country, and the wider world (ibid.).
* Zukin (1980) has linked the origins of the Urban Political Ecouomy to the parallel evolution and
eventual mg of three lines of critical thought: French Marxism, British neo-Webianism, and
American "radical empiricism".
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Urban Political Economy has been also called a "structuralist urban theory" (Smith,
1980) because French structuralism provided the chief guiding theoretical influence
over its early development. Structuralists believe that the objective of social sciences
is to seek the hidden "rules of the game" - the causal mechanisms which underlie
empirically observable social phenomenon. For Marxism, this hidden causal force in
all social formation is the mode of production. The mode of production, the central
category of Marxism, appears "both as a relation between the individuals, and as
their specific active relation to inorganic nature" (Peet and Thrift, 1989: 9).
These relations form the economic structure of society, the foundation on
which arises 'a legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond
definite forms of social consciousness' (Marx 1970, p. 20). The type and
level of social and natural relations correspond with a 'specific stage in the
development of the productive forces of working subjects' (Marx 1973, p.
495). ... Development of the productive forces fundamentally changes the
economic structure and, through it, the entire society (Peet and Thrift, 1989:
9).
By focusing on the mode of production, Marxism is firmly based in the economic
sphere and treats other institutional areas as primarily shaped by economic
determinations. This orthodox Marxism that has been accused of economic
determinism was revised by the French philosopher Louis Aithusser. In his view,
"non-economic" elements, such as consciousness and politics, are relatively
autonomous from economic structure and, both the economic and superstructure are
determining and determined. For him, society is a complex "structure in dominance",
and in the structure-dominated society, human beings are bearers, rather than makers,
of social relations (Peet and Thrift, 1989).
Althusser's work laid the foundation for the Structural Marxism which became the
dominant version of Marxism in the west in the 1960s and for much of the 1970s.
Structural Marxism has, since its inception, faced fierce criticism in the social
science (for criticism and defence of Structural Marxism, see Beauregard, 1984). In
its application to the human geography, critics such as Duncan and Ley (1982: 30)
argue that a number of theoretical problems have not been resolved, including "the
status of individuals as a creative force in shaping events, the ontological status of
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structures, the relationship between consciousness and structure, and the tendency to
functionalism and teleology in explanation".
Despite all these criticism, Structural Marxism was quickly introduced into the urban
research, first by Manuell Caste Ils in his influential book The Urban Question (1977;
originally published in French in 1972), and then David Harvey's (1973) Social
Justice and the City written at about the same time. Their work initiated the radical
school of Urban Political Economy that would deeply influence and shape urban
scholarship up to the mid-80s. While differing in many aspects, they hold a common
basic argument that the spatial structure of the capitalist city must be theorised in
relation to the capitalist mode of production. In capitalist society the class relation
between capital and labour is the fundamental social relationship. This class relation
must be constantly reproduced, not only socially but spatially, in order to maintain
social harmony, and economic and political stability. In capitalist cities, therefore,
the urban form is the projection of society on space, perhaps more importantly, urban
form helps in turn to reproduce the key social relationships which in capitalist society
is that of class.
Urban political economists stress the importance of abstract deep structures which
determine urban development. For example, Harvey's capital switch theory (1978,
1985) is a classical political economy approach that attributes urban processes in
capitalist societies to the general law of capital accumulation. According to him,
seeking for excessive profit inevitably leads to overaccumulation crises signalled by
a falling rate of profit in capitalist countries. In response to such crises, the capital
switches from the primary cimuit, in which value and surplus value are produced, to
the secondary circuit of fixed-assets and the production of the built environment. To
create a more efficient arena for circulation, the city was built, and is continuously
being destroyed and rebuilt. The dynamics of urbanisation in capitalist societies is
thus rooted in the shift of capital from the primary to the secondary circuit.
This said, urban political economists are also aware that hidden laws such as the
mode of production are realised only in concrete social formations. The social
formation, a historically determined configuration in a geographic area, reflects an
intertwining of social, cultural, economic, and political processes, some of which
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may be common to the same type of cities, while others are specific to the locality.
For example, cities in Third World share some common characteristics due to their
peripheral location in an expansionaiy global capitalist system. Meanwhile, as
Chatterjee (1989: 130) notes,
Since there are many pre-capitalist societies, and their articulation with global
capitalism varies, this gives rise to many differing urban expressions of the
common processes underlying the incorporation of pre-capitalist societies
into the capitalist system. That is, the attributes of Third World cities are not
universal, rather they reflect the contradictions internal to a social formation
or arising from the articulation of different social formations. ... it is
important to emphasise that the general is combined with the conjunctural.
Since its inception in the early 1970s, Urban Political Economy has revolutionised
the study of cities and initiated a period of exciting and fruitful scholarship
(Friedmann, 1986). Under its influence, "the city was no longer to be interpreted as a
social ecology, subject to natural forces inherent in the dynamics of population and
space; it came to be viewed instead as a product of specially social forces set in
motion by capitalist relations of production" (Friedmann, 1986: 69). Urbanisation
processes, therefore, have to be understood in relation to the evolution of capitalist
system as a whole. The linkage of urbanisation processes to the larger historical
movement of industrial capitalism provided a new direction and morn excitingly,
new possibilities for urban studies, because the capitalist system was about to
undergo another historical restructuring.
2.3 Urban political economy and theories of capitalism
23.1 Capitalism as an accumulation regime and a world system
As a form of political economy, capitalism has evolved through a series of
overlapping yet relatively distinctive phases. Each historical phase lasts thirty to fifty
years based upon very different economic, societal and political norms. From the
mid-1970s on, advanced capitalist society entered a transition period from one
distinctive phase of capitalist development to a new one (Amin, 1995). The passing
phase, with its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s, was characterised by the intensive
23
accumulation with monopolistic regulation of the economy. It has been widely
known as "Fordism", a term coined by Regulation Theorists (Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz,
1985, 1987; Jessop, 1992) to loosely reflect the pioneering mass production methods
and rules of management applied by Henry Ford in his car factories in America
during the 1920s and 1930s. The slowdown of growth and recurrent recessions since
the mid-1970s were seen as symptoms of the crisis of Fordism. Although all
regulation theorists agree that Fordism has been in structural crisis since 1 970s, what
might emerge out of the crisis is still a very controversial issue, ranging from
between "neo-Fordism" (to stress a strong element of continuity with Fordism),
"post-Fordism" (to denote a genuine resolution to the crisis of Fordism) and "after-
Fordism" (to designate a period after Fordism rather than a new phase of capitalist
development) (Amin and Thrift, 1995). It is, however, generally agreed that there is a
tendency towards a capitalist regime of flexible accumulation in the wake of the
crisis of Fordism.
Opposing the mass-production and mass-consumption of the old system, the new
regime of flexible accumulation requires less specialised and more flexible labour
(usually accompanied by low rates of unionisation), short production runs, and high
quality production for specialised market niches (Jessop, 1995). The new regime also
brought into being a new mode of regulation. The Keynesian welfare state, which
helped legitimate redistributive policies for the deprived, was dismantled in favour of
a more decentralised entrepreneurial state deemphasising social welfare and
emphasising developmental policies in public-private partnerships with business
(Harvey, 1989b).
Inspired by the dramatic change in the structure and organisation of modern Western
economy and society, social scholars outside regulation theory came up with a
variety of discourses, trying to catch the main feature of the complex transitional
period of capitalism. Terms such as "postindustrial" (Savitch, 1988), "disorganised
capitalism" (Lash and Uriy, 1987, 1993), "postmodern" (Harvey, 1989a), and "fifth
Kondraiiev" (Freeman and Perez, 1988) have been coined by leading academics to
describe the emerging new age of capitalism.
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Capitalism has also been seen as a world system that expands spatially and will
engulf the whole world (Wallerstein, 1974,1979,1980). First trade, then marketing,
then finance evolved to span the globe. During the process of expansion, a
hierarchical division of labour among what was referred to as the core, semiperiphery
and periphery was formed, in which the periphery concentrated on agricultural
produce and raw materials while the core countries dominated manufacturing. With
the growing internationalisation of production since 1945, it has been believed that
this international division of labour based on the international core-periphery trade
has been changed (Frobel et al, 1980). As levels of skill involved in manufacturing
production were reduced sharply, more and more companies shifted their production
processes into the periphery countries where labour power is cheap to buy, abundant
and well-disciplined. As a result, a new international division of labour has emerged.
The new international division of labour (NIDL) is "a system for production on a
world scale in which even greater numbers of people are integrated into activities
carried on by large international producers of goods and by international firms which
serve these producers" (Cohen, 1981: 288).
With the intensification of NIDL, many believe that a new type of economy a
global economy has emerged since the late 1970s. A global economy involves not
merely the geographical extension of economic activity across national boundaries
but also - and more importantly - the functional integration of such internationally
dispersed activities (Dicken, 1998: 5). In other words, the global economy is
qualitatively different from the previous world economy. The globalisation of the
capitalist economy, and the intensification of political and social activities in the
global level that comes with it, have led many believe that the world around us has
entered a new era - the "era of globalisation" (Cohen and Zysman, 1987; Drucher,
1986; Reich, 1991; Ohmae, 1990). The "era of globalisation" is of course capitalist
in its nature, in fact, more so than ever before. This is another triumph of capitalism
which has virtually engulfed the whole world since the collapse of communist
regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989. From the viewpoint of political economy,
globalisation is another stretching-out of capitalist social relations over space in a
new burst of time-space compression based on informational technology (Leyshon,
1995).
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The evolution of the capitalist system, both in its accumulation regime and its spatial
organisation, provided timely opportunities for the application of the newly
established urban political economy to capitalist cities which, as the centres of global
capital accumulation, have been undergoing a dramatic urban restructuring since the
early I 970s (For the historical evolution of relationship of capitalism restructuring
and urban restructuring, see Soja, 2000). As a result of this application, urban
political economy quickly established itself as the leading paradigm of urban studies,
in which new approaches flourished.
2.3.2 Capitalist accumulation system and Urban Political Economy
Through the lens of the capitalist accumulation system, urban political economists
developed approaches that linked urban changes to the rise of flexible regimes of
capital accumulation. The "Postfordist City", "Postindustiral City" (Savitch, 1988),
"Informational City" (Castells, 1989, 1994) and "Postmodern City" (T-Iarvey, 1987,
I 989b) are the main discourses coming from this perspective. The theoretical
assumptions held by these scholars is that urban patterns are the spatial reflections of
historical capitalist development. Under fordist capitalism, we have the fordist city
which is characterised by strong agglomeration processes, the standardisation and
industrialisation of construction, the nuclearisation of the family and far-reaching
processes of social disintegration (Esser and Hirsch, 1995). By the same token, the
crisis of fordism also means the crisis of the fordist city which gives way to the post-
fordist city.
Under postfordism, cities are increasingly seen not as a place to produce but as an
arena of spectacle and play (Harvey, 1987). This can be seen through the enormous
proliferation in recent years of shopping and leisure experiences such as shopping
complexes, marinas, Chinatowns and so on - a phenomenon referred to as the
"mobilization of spectacle" by Harvey (1987). More and more high income groups
who are often young professionals working in the producer service sectors are
hunting for status-enhancing luxuiy goods. This consumption preference enhances
further the tendency towards customised products. New products - particularly
responding to quickly changing fashions -- require constant innovation from capital.
This also has cultural consequences:
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The relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism has given way to all the
ferment, instability and fleeting qualities of a post-modernist aesthetic that
celebrates difference, ephemerality, spectacle, fashion, and the
comniodification of cultural forms (Harvey, 1 989a: 156).
This postmodernism culture is extremely discriminating. It is the affluent capitalist
elite that produce, consume and control the postmodernism culture, while the poor
are excluded economically, socially and spatially. Harvey (1987) referred to this
exploitation of differentiated markets and its subsequent social implications as the
"production of symbolic capital" (see also Zukin, 1992). The third aspect of post-
Fordist urban change observed by Harvey (1987) is a sustained rise in poverty and
informal activity stemming from post-Fordist deindustrialisation and the emergence
of the flexibly organised economy. The process has created a vast underclass of low-
income or no-income communities increasingly abandoned by welfare programmes,
and isolated from areas of the city "embellished" for the well-off (Harvey, 1987).
Associated with the rise of the postfordistlpostmodern city are shifts in the ways in
which cities are run. It has frequently been asserted that Western cities are now being
managed, organised and governed in different ways, leading some to proclaim the
emergence of a "new urban politics" (Cox and Mair, 1988; Cox, 1993; Kirlin and
Marshall, 1988). Under the postfordist mode of production, capital became even
more geographically mobile and the new and more flexible labour processes could be
more easily implanted. The postfordist way of life led to a new urban economy
which is increasingly dependent on consumption priorities. Urban governments with
the ruling class alliance increasingly in favour of a growth-machine policy found
themselves in a fierce competition with other cities (Logan and Molotch, 1987). In
order to attract external capital, urban governments were forced to adopt all kinds of
measures (from wage-disciplining to public investment), trying to lessen the cost of a
change of location to the enterprise (Harvey, I 989b). To make their cities more
attractive as consumer and cultural centres, urban governments have been pushed to
a huge subsidy for affluent consumers and multinational corporations to stay in town
at the expense of local collective consumption for the working class and the
impoverished. The managerial approach in which city's main function is seen to
manage the local provision of welfare and service has thus given way to initiatory
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and entrepreneurial forms of action in the 1970s and 1980s. Local governments are
acting in a more businesslike manner, imbuing with characteristics once distinctive
to business risk-taking, inventiveness, promotion and profit-motivation. This has
led many commentators to argue that managerialism, so characteristic of urban
governance in the 1 960s, has been reoriented towards entrepreneurialism as the main
motif of urban action (Mollenkopf, 1983; Judd and Ready, 1986; Harvey, 1987,
1989b).
23.3 The capitalist world economy and Urban Political Economy
Another group of urban political economists have focused on the implications of
globalisation of the world capitalist economy for urban development. They
emphasised the significance of economic, political and social process located outside
the immediate terrain of any particular city to its internal structure. The world
city/global city perspective (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Friedmann, 1986, 1995) is
the most influential discourse among these approaches that try to link directly urban
restructuring to the world economy. The basic argument of the world city thesis put
forward by Friedmann and Wolff (1982: 309) is that "the character of the urbamsing
processes -- economic, social and spatial -- which define life in these cities reflect, to
a considerable context, the mode of their integration into the world economy". They
argue that with the development of world economy, a new type of city -- world cities
has emerged in the core and semi-periphery countries. Those cities are the command
centres of world economy, the spatial manifestation of the dominant role of
transnational capital in the world economy. The cities' position in the world urban
hierarchy are decided by the extent and the ways in which the urban areas are
integrated into the world economy (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982).
The idea of linking urban development to the world economy was further developed
by Sassen (1991) in her influential book The Global City: New York London, Tokyo.
While Friedmann and Wolff view world cities as simply the outcome of a world
economy, Sassen emphasises the need for such cities in the development of world
economy, arguing that the territorial dispersal of modern economic activity creates a
need for greater central control and co-ordination and thus for the global cities of
which London, New York and Tokyo are the key representatives (Hamnett, 1995).
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According to her, global cities are not only the command points for the global
economy, but more importantly, they are now production sites for services and
financial innovations at a global level (Sassen, 1991; 1994). These changes in the
strategic functions of major cities in the world economy have had profound
implications for cities' internal structure. The advanced services for firms such as
fmance, insurance, and real estate, which she referred to as producer services, have
risen to be the dominant sector in global cities' economic base, while the
manufacturing sector has continuously lost ground.
This economic restructuring has resulted in the polarisation in the income
distribution and occupational distribution of workers. While the rise of producer
services has brought about the rapid growth of population of professionals earning
higher income, it has also created the growth of a low-income stratum of workers
(see also Hamnett, 1994, 1996). This economic polarisation has been vividly
reflected in global cities' spatial reorganisation. On the one hand, we see the upsurge
of genthfication of the central urban areas located in or around the financial core,
like Lower Manhattan in New York and the City in London, in both its commercial
and residential settings, which caters for the high-income sectors. On the other hand,
sweatshops and industrial homework proliferate. Thus, global cities are divided in
economic, social and spatial terms. For this reason, they have been labelled as
"Divided Cities" (Fainstein et al, 1994), "Dual City" (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991)
and the "Quartered City" (Marcuse, 1993).
Although with different focuses, the above two approaches to the contemporary
urban changes are interweaved under the banner of urban political economy. More
often than not, their research subjects overlapped. Global cites are
postfordistlpostindustriallpostmodern cities as well, because capitalism evolves as a
political economy that is worldwide in its scope.
2.4 Urban political economy and the state
As with any new theory, urban political economy provoked a variety of critics. One
of the main criticisms is concerned with its treatment of the role of the state in urban
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formations. Urban political economists, although claiming that they take into account
economic as well as political factors in their research, tend to overlook the
importance of political actors such as the state in shaping the urban patterns. This is
mainly due to the fact that urban political economy deprives its philosophical base
from structuralism. Structuralist ideas hold that beneath empirically observable social
phenomenon, there are causal mechanisms that determine social formations.
Economic structure based on the mode of production is seen as the determinative
element in all social formations, while other factors including the state are regarded
as derivative of economic processes, which tend to reproduce the economic structure
rather than change or undermine it (King, 1987). Because the state's policies are
viewed as essentially supportive of economic interests, most attention has been given
to the historical movement of capitalist accumulation, while the role of state both in
the central and the local was overlooked.
For example, Gordon (1976), in his research related to American urbanisation,
accords a minimal role to the state. He writes about political factors in the following
way:
All of these factors had secondary effects, however, in the sense that they
tended to reproduce the structure of the Corporate City rather than change or
undermine it. The foundation of that urban form was so strong that simple
political influence could not change its basic shape (Gordon, 1976: 55).
Clearly, Gordon considers all aspects of state policy concerned with urban issues to
reinforce or support dominant economic interests. His account of the role of the state
represents a typical proposition shared by many urban political economists. As King
(1987:2 18) points out, in his classic book Social Justice and the City, Harvey also
minimises the role of the state. He attributes a secondary function to the state as a
channel of investment to cities where the market system is doing this inadequately.
Similar views appear in his capital switching theory when he gives the state a role of
mediator between the primary and secondary circuits of capital:
Since the production of money and credit are relatively autonomous
processes, we have to conceive of the financial and state institutions
controlling them as a kind of collective nerve centre governing and mediating
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the relations between the primaiy and secondary circuits of capital (Harvey,
1978: 107, original highlight).
Even for Castells (1977), whose conceptualisation of collective consumption gives
the state an important and distinctive role with respect to cities, state policies are still
essentially supportive of economic interests and therefore, hardly independent from
economic constraints (King, 1987)..
Contrasting with this economic-centred approach, some urban scholars
acknowledged the state's potential independence of economic constraints and tried to
view state policies as an independent variable which together with economic
dynamics work as two major forces in shaping urban patterns. Mollenkopf (1983), in
his major study of post-war American federal urban programmes, emphasises the
importance of initiatives within the state. Gurr and King (1987) argue that state
managers have a certain autonomy from economic process which allows them to
pursue their own interests. As King (1987: 220) says:
at any given historical juncture the state may be dominated by capitalist
economic interests but such domination does not necessarily hold. Over the
long mn state managers will attempt to increase their autonomy from
economic interests.
A more systematic treatment of the state's capacity to affect urban change is
provided by Feagin's (1984) study of Houston, Texas. He distinguishes three






a) The central state (federal government)
b) The regional state (the "state of Texas")
c) The local state (city government)
(Feagin, 1984: 448-449)
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He then identifies six examples of the state-economy relationship which underlies
Houston's urban development in six different periods since the 19th century. Feagin's
empirical study highlights Fainstein and associates' (1983) theoretical argument,
which summarises the view shared by this group of urban scholars advocating a more
independent position for the state vis-â-vis capital: "urban redevelopment
cannot . . .be explained through either a purely economic analysis or a study of local
politics divorced from the economic relations that confine it" (Fainstein et al, 1983:1).
It is the combination of economic dynamics and state policies that are crucial to the
shaping of urban patterns.
With regard to the relationships among the state, capital and urban changes, King
provides the following figure (Figure 2.1) that catches their complicated relationships
very well.
Figure 2.1 Central Relationships in Contemporary Urban Political Economy
State interests
Underlying economic , Urbanisation patterns
processes and capital Re1 2
 of growth and decline
interests
Ret, Economic processes constrain state action both by limiting the fiscal base for
policy and by imposing certain preferences on state policy which diverge
from state interests. Economic processes also stimulates states policy and
intervention in market economies by requiring policy responses to temporally
and spatially uneven economic development.
Ret, Economic processes and change are a central dynamic of urban growth and
decline: shifting economic patterns have profound effects on municipal
conditions.
Ret3
 According to the statist arguments the state has specific short- and long-term
interests in cities reflecting both the state's own interests m survival and
certain city needs.
Source: after King (1987: 217)
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According to King, the urban political economy literature has expanded our
understanding of Re12
 but in part at the expense of Re1 3 . What he and other state-
centred scholars try to do is to redress the balance by focusing on lihe role of the state
in the shaping of urban patterns. In their mind, cities change not only as a result of
the requirements of global or local capital but also as a result of state policy at the
local and national level. Feagin and Smith's (1987: 17) following assertion sums up
their understanding of economic dynamics and state policies in determining urban
restructuring:
There are, in effect, two worldwide "logics", an economic (capitalistic) logic
and a state logic; these have for a century or more been inextricably
interrelated. Changing urban development patterns are best understood as the
long-term outcome of actions taken by economic and political actors
operating within a complex and changing matrix of global and national
economic and political forces.
Despite the strong theoretical arguments and empirical research made by the group
of scholars that advocate this dual-logic approach, the overall picture of urban studies
has been still one dominated by economic-centred approaches. With the globalisation
of the world economy, the domination of economic-centred approaches in urban
studies has been further strengthened. A recent indication of this domination has
been the quick rise of the world city perspective as one of the most influential
approaches in urban research domain since the early 1980s. The advocators of the
world city perspective believe that a single global system is becoming superimposed
on nation-states which are losing importance as a result. They argue that
globalisation produces a world city system that transcends national institutions,
politics and culture, and as a result of it, there has been a convergence in "economic
base, spatial organisation and social structure" among the world's major cities,
especially New York, London and Tokyo (Sassen, 1991: 4).
This globalist world city perspective has been strongly criticised for its neglect of the
important role of the state, culture and historical trajectories in the formation of all
world cities (e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1995; Hill and Kim, 2000). Hill and Kim's recent
paper on the discrepancy of Tokyo and Seoul from New York in many salient
respects (2000) shows that the state matters significantly in determining a city's
distinctive characteristics. While New York, the prototype of the world city theory, is
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market-centred and bourgeois, Tokyo and Seoul are state-centred and political-
bureaucratic. Tokyo and Seoul's divergence from the world city hypothesis, they
argue, stem from late industrialisation and especially the relationship between
industrial policy and finance institutionalised in a developmental state. Hill and
Kim's findings challenge one of the world city theoty's central assumptions that
globalisation diminishes the power and integrity of the nation-state, as they argue
that "understanding Tokyo and Seoul necessitates a different conception of the world
system from the globalist version of the world city argument" (Hill and Kim, 2000:
2167). In their conception of the world system, the formation of world cities is not
only determined by the capital-driven globalisation processes, but also strongly
influenced by the national development model and regional context in which each
city is embedded.
In his reply to Hill and Kim's critics, John Friedmann (2001: 2535), one of the best-
known architectures of world city perspective, has commented that
On the whole, world city research has neglected the role of the state - both
national and local - as though market forces were all but determining of spatial
form and structure. Research has also tended to neglect cities' historical
trajectories, thus robbing them of their distinctiveness (Abu-Lughod, 1995).
Both these forces, institutional and historical, are bound to create significant
differences among world cities, however defined.
In the same paper, Friedmann attributes the theory's neglect of the role of state and
history to the fact that the world city hypothesis is a theory of structuration in
Gidderis' sense. With this philosophical limitation, he thinks that the theory may
ultimately have to be abandoned although that time has not yet come.
Parallel to the development of the world city perspective is the emergence of what
can be called the theory of urban entrepreneurialism. Often associated with "the new
urban politics" referred to earlier, the central argument of urban entrepreneurialism is
that global economic restructuring and the intensification of inter-urban competition
have led to the emergence of an entrepreneurial mode of urban governance (Harvey,
I 989a, I 989b; Hall and Hubbard, 1996, 1998). Contrast with the urban
managerialism of earlier decades (pre-1970s) which had focused primarily on the
local provision of services, facilities and benefits to urban populations (Harvey,
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l989b: 3), the new entrepreneurial regime focuses on the pursuit of economic growth
and often in close alliance with (global) private capital (Hall, 1988; Leitner and
Garner, 1993). Within the entrepreneurial regime, public-private partnerships have
been deployed as a key strategy in urban regeneration programmes, most
dramatically seen in the construction of prestigious flagship projects such as
spectacular waterfront cities, convention centres and other mixed-use commercial
developments. In public-private partnerships, city governments, owing to their
inherent fiscal weaknesses, have to rely on powerful business leaders as growth
partners, and have often found themselves being disadvantaged or "captured" by
private capital (Logan and Molotch, 1987). More often than not, an uneven
distribution of costs and benefits occurs as the public sector assumes most of the risk
while the private sector reaps the benefits (Leitner and Garner, 1993: 62).
Again, critics have focused on the ways urban entrepreneurialism treats the role of
the state (e.g. Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Short and Kim, 1999). Focusing on capital
imperatives, advocators of urban entrepreneurialism tend to ignore the fact that the
nature of urban entrepreneurialism has been mediated through local social and
political factors. hi many of the studies, city governments are treated as no more than
economic agents responding to global economic restructuring and intensifying inter-
urban competition, which have left them with no choice but to engage in high risk
speculative partnership with private capital (both local and foreign). As a result, we
have seen "a homogenous entrepreneurial city emerging mechanistically from global
economic forces" (Short and Kim, 1999: 117). Such ideas are flawed as they fail to
consider the capability of the local state in resisting the pressures of global capital as
well as its role in shaping national urban systems and urban competitiveness. While
the emergence of the entrepreneurial city may be seen as a common trend in many
late capitalist societies, its shape and nature is, however, contingent upon varying
local factors and conditions such as different national regulation systems and local
political cultures.
Critics have also noticed that the literature of urban entrepreneurialism has
concentrated on only a few Anglo-American cities where local political autonomy
and the traditional ideology of privatism have led to a powerful private capital in the
shaping of urban development. When it comes to cities such as Singapore, Shanghai,
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Seoul and Tokyo, where the strong local governments are capable of exercising their
influences and harnessing private capital for cities' economic development, urban
entrepreneurialism theory immediately loses much of its interpretation force (see for
example Cybriwsky, 1999; Ford, 1998; Low, 1990; Olds, 1995, 1997, 1998; Pow,
2001). In such developmental states as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, the state
has played a key dominant role in promoting economic growth and "state
entrepreneurship" has always been a dominant feature of urban politics (Low, 1990).
This state-led entrepreneurship can be seen in the design and planning of urban
development strategies, organisation of the large scale urban spatial planning, setting
up of large state-owned land development corporations, and building of modern
infrastructure in major cities of these countries.
The central argument stemming from these critics is that new urban patterns are
shaped not only by global capital imperatives but also by local social and political
factors among which the state is the most significant. It is specific cultures of
interaction and patterns of engagements between local and global actors that have
shaped the formation of urban entrepreneurialism and urban development. Thus, the
critics call for a more socially and culturally sensitive approach that is concerned
more with the human dynamics and social relations in researches of the burgeoning
urban entrepreneurialism.
All of the above theoretical discussions are of course in the context of capitalist
countries. While economic-centred approaches dominated urban studies in capitalist
countries, researches on cities in state socialist (hereafter "state socialist" and
"socialist" are interchangeable) countries have focused on the decisive role of the
state in determining urban development.
In socialist countries, private capital does not exist and play no role in the shaping of
urban patterns. By private capital, I refer to money that can be used as an
independent form of value to invest for the profit. Although money exists in both
socialist and capitalist countries, the capitalisation of money can only be realised in
the capitalist social relation (Clarke, 1992). State socialism entails a centrally
planned economy in which enterprises produce according to the plans negotiated
with the central government. All economic transactions between enterprises are
36
directed by high authorities. Although prices are used and monetary balances are
adjusted accordingly, "such transactions were only nominal since the 'money' in
question was strictly money of account, which could not be diverted to other
purposes or converted into cash" (Clarke, 1992: 6). Socialist enterprises are,
therefore, not subject to the law of value (the nile of market) and socialist economy
is essentially non-monetary. Under such a system, there is no way in which money
could appear as the independent form of value, and so no basis on which social
property could assume the independent form of capitalist private property.
The absence of private capital means that the state is the main sphere of
determination in socialist countries. Because the power of the state, primarily the
central organs of government and the Communist Party, is so formidable and
decisive (to be discussed in detail in next Chapter), urban researchers always look to
the role of the state for the explanation of urbanisation processes in socialist cities.
What about cities in a transitional economy (more precisely, cities after socialism)?
The state-capital relationship underlying the dramatic transitions in these post-
socialist cities is an interesting yet less explored area in contemporary urban studies.
These cities are unique in the sense that they are in transition. They used to be state
socialism where the public policy was decisive in shaping of urban patterns, while
the role of private capital was minimal. Since market-oriented reforms were adopted,
the role of the state has retreated while private capital both national and international
has begun to play a significant role in urban development.
China's unique reform process makes it an ideal place to explore the evolution of the
state-capital relationship and how this evolution affects the urban development.
Unlike East European countries where the whole political economy was drastically
changed into the capitalist system through "shock therapy" (Gowan, 1995), China
adopted a gradual approach whereby the economic system was transformed by
gradually introducing market forces while the political system remained unchanged.
The role of the state, although retreated significantly, still controls urbanisation
processes. Meanwhile, private capital (mainly international capital) has grown
greatly and plays an increasingly important role in urban development. The
relationship between state and capital has developed to the extent that both state and
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capital are indispensable in an adequate analysis of China's urban patterns. The
argument that we should combine the two factors in constructing an explanation of
urban changes in the western cities has became applicable to Chinese cities, thanks to
20 years of market-oriented reforms although the Chinese state is still far more
powerful than its western counterparts.
This chapter has examined the economic logic in shaping urban development
patterns through the analysis of Urban Political Econorny in relation to the
development of theories of capitalism. The next chapter will focus on the second
logic - the role of the state in changing urban development patterns.
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Chapter 3
THE STATE AND URBAN CHANGE
3.1 Introduction
The role of capital dynamics in determining urbanisation processes was examined in
Chapter 2. This chapter is a substantial theoretical discussion of the role of the state
in urban change. It starts with a brief review of state theories, which is followed by a
discussion about the role of nation-states in today's increasingly globalised world
economy. The role of the state, both at the central and the local level, in cities is then
analysed respectively in capitalist and socialist countries by drawing on Gun and
King's (1987), and Komai's (1992) works. The chapter is concluded with an attempt
to put Shanghai's urban development into the theoretical context that has been
established in the previous analysis.
3.2 A brief review of state theories
The state is a commonly used word. However, there is no defmition of the state that
satisfies all. There are a number of state theories and all have their own definitions
from different theoretical perspectives. One of the most well-known definitions of
the state was given by Max Weber. According to him, "A compulsory political
organisation with continuous operations will be called a 'state' insofar as its
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (quoted in Shaw, 1997: 499).
More recently, Anthony Giddens (1985) defines the modem nation-state as a
"bordered power container". Their definitions of state, seen as the classic military-
political based defmition (Shaw, 1997), centred on the monopoly of legitimate
violence in a given territory. The borders of states are not merely administrative
divisions but potentially, at least, lines along which violence might erupt.
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From an organisational point of view, Dunleavy and 0' Leary proposed a more
general definition of the state. According to them, the state is a set of governmental
institutions, of relatively recent historical origin (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: 1).
"Government" here is used not in a narrow sense of administration; it is the process
of making rules, controlling, guiding or regulating. As Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987:
1) point out "Some form of government is intrinsic to human society, because a
society which is totally uncontrolled, unguided and unregulated is a contradiction in
terms. By contrast, the state -- defined organisationally - is not intrinsic to human
society." The state form of government -- nation-state emerged first in Europe in the
mid-seventeenth century, and now there are some 170 nation-states in the world,
embracing virtually the entire population of the world.
Dunleavy and O'Leary classify state theories under the following five headings:
pluralism, the new right, elite theory, Marxist and neo-pluralist. Among those state
theories, the class-perspective ones, notably Marxist and Neo-Marxist, particularly
consider the relationship of the state and capital as one of their theoretical focuses.
From the viewpoint of the state-capital relationship, Carnoy (1984) has summarised
class-perspective theories of the state as falling into three general categories:
1) the independent state theory, which views the state as substantially
independent of capital and labour;
2) the capital logic (structuralist) theory, which views the underlying
contradictions of capitalistic development as shaping the state;
3) the class struggle theory, which views the state as a product of concrete
class struggles and as directly embodying worker demands. (cited in
Feagin, 1984: 447).
To these three categories, Feagin contends that we should add a fourth category of
traditional instrumentalists, who view the state as the instrument of capitalists acting
as a governing class.
As discussed in Chapter 2, most Marxist theorists, in their analysis of the role of the
state in the urban development, tend to adopt theories falling into the categories (2),
(3) and (4), in which the state is seen as, more or less, derivative of economic
processes (capital accumulation). Rejecting imputing an economically derived logic
to state policy, some theorists using a state-centred perspective argues that the state
40
managers have a certain autonomy from economic processes which allows them to
pursue their own interests (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Gur and King,
1987).
3.3 The typo logy of nation-states
One of the best known classifications of nation-states is, of course, the dichotomy of
capitalist and socialist. A fundamental difference between capitalist and socialist lies
in the role of the state in the society, particularly in the relationship of state and
market. In capitalist countries, private capital is the major player in the economic
domain and the management, adjusiment and development of the economy are
mainly left to the "invisible hand" of market. The main function of the state is to
safeguard the proper operation of the market and the state is supposed to intervene
only where the market fails. On the contrary, socialist countries are state-dominated
societies. Private capital is eliminated and the state plays an exclusive role in all
levels of economic activities. The economy is centrally planned and operated by the
state-owned work units.
Despite different political economic systems, all states perform functions that are
necessary for their own perpetuation. Dicken (1998), in his analysis of the role of the
state in the world economy, sums up the three major functions that all states perform
in today's world economy, and as such, nation-states could be categorised by the way
they perform these three major functions. They are:
First, the nation-state acts as a container of a distinctive culture. All social activities
are embedded in broader cultural structures and practices. One of the primary
containers of culture structures and practices is the nation-state. The most important
distinguishing characteristic of the nation-state is its territorial basis. Within its
territory, the state is sovereign, holding ultimate legal authority and having the
monopoly of force with which to impose that authority. Over time, "the national
homeland became a cultural container...where national ideals are being reproduced in
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schooling, the mass media and all manner of other social institutions" (Taylor, 1994:
155, 156). As a result, "ways of doing things" tend to vaiy acmss national boundaries.
The second function of the state is to regulate economic activities within and across
its jurisdictions. No economy today operates under a pure "free market". All states
intervene in the working of the economy, only differing in the degree of significance
of intervention. For example, all governments have their monetary policies for
managing the money supply which have extremely important implications for the
distribution and redistribution of economic activity. Dicken identifies three areas of
policies that are particularly relevant for the state's role in the international economy,
i.e., trade, foreign investment and industry. Among these three policies, foreign
investment policy is particularly concerned with the state's role vis-à-vis
international capital (see next section).
Third, states can be regarded as competitive states in which they take on some of the
characteristics of firms as they strive to develop their strategies to create competitive
advantage. One of the goals of nation-states is to maximise the material welfare of
their societies. In an increasingly globalised world economy, nations are forced to
compete with one another in a struggle to attain such goals. States compete to
enhance their international trading position. They also compete to attract
international capital to build up their national production base which, in turn,
strengthens their international competitive position (see also Stopford, Strange and
Henley, 1991).
To these three functions, it is important to add a fourth function that the state
performs; that is, the nation state is itself a very important actor in the economic
domain, both from the standpoint of producer and consumer. One characteristic of a
nation-state is that it is recongnisably separate from the rest of society, comprising a
public sector which is distinctive from the private (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).
All states in the world have their public sectors, differing only in their degree of
importance. In the economic domain, the public sector exists in the form of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). In same way private enterprises works, SOEs employ
people, produce products and sometimes compete with other enterprises. The
importance of SOEs differs from nation to nation, depending on the national
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economic-political system. In state socialism, the national output is overwhelmingly
dominated by SOEs while in market-oriented countries the SOEs' share is usually
much lower. On the other hand, the state role as consumer is fulfilled through their
fiscal policies. Using the taxes legitimately levied within their territory, the state
builds the physical infrastructure of national economies -- roads, railways, airports,
and telecommunications systems - without which private sector enterprises, whether
domestic or transnational, could not operate. The state is also the provider, through
its public sectors, of the human infrastructure: in particular of an educated labour
force as well as of sets of laws and regulations within which enterprises must operate
(Dicken, 1998: 91; Johnston, 1993).
All states perform the roles described above. However, the way they play the role
differs substantially from nation to nation, depending on the cultural, social and
political structure, institutions and practices in which they are embedded. States can
be categorised according to ways that they perform their roles. Based on Dahrendorf
(1968), Johnson (1982) and Henderson and Appelbaum (1992), Dicken (1994, 1998)
put forward a typology of national economic-political systems in the following figure
(Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 summarises the basic features of each of the four ideal-types of system
and locates some nation states within the matrix. The market ideological and the plan
ideological refer to two extreme economic-political systems whose policy-making is
entirely based on ideological dogma. The former is epitomised by the Reagan and
Thatcher "new right" administrations that adopted policies solely on the basis of free-
market ideology. The latter is equated with the state socialist countries such as Soviet
Union and China before reform whose economy is centrally commanded
(Dahrendorf, 1968). Between these two, we have economies of plan-rational states,
notably Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, and economies of market-
rational states which many continental Western European countries fall into.
As indicated in Figure 3.1, the position of states should not be seen as fixed. Under
certain circumstance, the state could change its economic-political system and
therefore its place in the matrix. For example, China's reform policy in the past two
decades indicates that China has been gradually moving from a plan-ideological state
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Figure 3.1 A Typology of National Economic-Political Systems
Market-ideological state
Driven by the "new right" economic and
social policies of the 1980s. Based on a
reversion to the state-civil society
relations of the epoch of competitive
capitalism. Policy choices based on
ideological dogma.
Plan-ideological state
The state owns and controls most or all
economic units. Resource
allocation/investment decisions are
primarily a state function. State controls
redistribution of wealth/income. Policy








The state regulates the parameters
within which private companies operate.
The state regulates the economy in
general but investment, pmduction and
distributive decision are the preserve of
private companies, whose actions are
disciplined by the market. The state does
not concern itself with what specific
industries should exist and does not
have an explicit industry policy.
Hong
Kong	 South
Singapore Taiwan Japan Korea
Plan-rational/developmental state
The state regulation of economic activity
is supplemented by state direction of the
economy. The economy itself is largely in
private ownership and firms are in
competition, but the state intervenes in the
context of an explicit set of national
economic and social goals. High priority
placed on industry policy and on
promoting a structure that enhances the
nation's economic competitiveness.
Source: after Dicken (1994: 229)
into a plan-rational/developmental state. Indeed, with the collapse of the Soviet-led
system at the end of the l980s, there are fewer countries which can be placed in the
plan-ideological category. On the other hand, although there was certainly a
resurgence of the market-ideological state during the 1 980s, led by the "new right"
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governments in the United Kingdom and the United States, very few countries can
now be placed in that category. As a result, the market-rational state and the plan-
rational state are two dominant political economy models in the present world
(Thompson, 1990; Feigenbauni, Henig and Hamnett, 1999).
It is important to note that plan-rational states are often referred to as developmental
states as indicated in the figure 3.1. The developmental state is generally seen to have
originated in Japan, subsequently spreading to other East Asian Newly Industrialised
Economies (NlEs include South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong). It is a
state-guided capitalist developmental system, or to put it in different terms, a plan-
rational economy with market-rational political institutions (Johnson, 1995). The
implementation of China's reform policies in the past 20 years has convinced many
scholars that China has emulated the developmental state model (e.g. Cheng, 1998;
Simone and Feraru, 1995; White, 1991; White and Wade, 1988). Due to the
importance of developmental state theory in this research, the theory and its
application to China will be analysed in depth in Chapter 6.
3.4 Nation states and foreign direct investment (FDI)
In a world of transnational corporations and of complex flows of investment at the
international scale, few national governments operate a totally closed policy towards
foreign investment. In fact, nation-states have found themselves competing with one
another in a struggle to attract inward investment which has become increasingly
important for nation-states' competitive position in the world economy. Countries
that used to see FDI as a threat to their capability of maintaining an independent
economy have lifted regulatory barriers to the entry of FDI and joined the
competition. This is particularly the case with socialist countries that have adopted
market-oriented reform policies. When the Chinese government started reform policy
in 1979, a central element of the new policy was the opening up of the Chinese
economy to foreign direct investment (FDI).
Dicken (1998) summarises the major types of national policy towards foreign
investment in the following figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2 Major Types of Foreign Direct Investment Policy
Policies relating to inward investment by foreign firms
• Government screening of mvestment proposals
• Exclusion of foreign firms from certain sectors of restriction on the extent of
foreign involvement permitted
• Restriction on the degree of foreign ownership of domestic enterprises
• Insistence on involvement of local personnel in managerial positions
• Compliance with national codes of business conduct (including information
disclosure)
• Insistence on a certain level of local content in the firm's activities
• Insistence on a minimum level of exports
• Requirements relating to the transfer of technology
• Locational restrictions on foreign investment
• Restrictions on the remittance of profits and/or capital abroad
• Level and methods of taxing profits of foreign finns
• Direct encouragement of foreign investment: competitive bidding via
overseas promotional agencies and investment incentives
Policies relating to outward investment by domestic firms
• Necessity for government approval of overseas investment projects
• Restrictions on the export of capital (e.g. exchange control regulations)
Source: after Dicken (1998: 97)
Most national policies are more concerned with inward investment although there are
some regulations on the export of capital as well. The inward investment policies
listed in the figure fall into four broad categories.
The first category relates to the entry of foreign firms into a national economy.
Governments may operate a "screening" mechanism to attempt to filter out those
investments which do not meet national objectives, either economic or political. Also,
there may be a restriction on the extent to which individual firms may be owned or
controlled by a foreign enterprise. For example, the Chinese government regularly
promulgates "the catalogue for the guidance of foreign investment industries" which
has a clear-cut regulation on what industnes can enter China. In the recent version
promulgated on 29 December, 1997 (StFIC, 1994), FDI is divided into three
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categories: encouraged, restricted and prohibited. Industries such as high-tech,
advanced agriculture technology, and export-oriented are encouraged, those needing
a special franchise from government are restricted while industries such as
journalism, broadcasting, film and the like which are still monopolised by the
government are prohibited. Meanwhile, in the catalogue, the communication,
transportation and post-telecommunication sectors belong to the encouraged FDI
sector, but in the areas such as construction and management of feeder railways,
local railways and related bridges, tunnels, and ferry facilities wholly foreign owned
enterprise are not allowed, whereas in the construction and management of civil
airports the Chinese side shall be the holding party or play a leading role.
The second category of policies shown in the figure relates to the operations of
foreign firms. A particularly common requirement is for such firms meet a certain
level of the "local content" in their manufacturing activities. And very often a
government may insist on a foreign firm exporting a specified proportion of its
output. For example, according to the Act of Foreign Enterprises in the People's
Republic of China ratified on 12 April, 1986, foreign investment enterprises should
maintain a balance between foreign exchanges revenue and expenditure through
export of their own products. The Chinese government also pursued a gradual
opening up of locations for FDL FDI was first allowed in the Speciai Economic
Zones (SEZs), and gradually the location was extended to 14 open cities in mid-80s
and now most parts of the country are open to FDI.
The third set of policies relates to government attitudes towards corporate profits and
the transfer of capital. All governments are concerned to minimise the outflow of
capital; on the other hand, TNCs invariably wish to remit at least part of their profits
and capital abroad.
The final category of policies aims to stimulate inward investment. An increasingly
common feature of today's world economy - of developed as well as of developing
economies - is the scramble to attract foreign investment. Since the early 1 980s, the
Chinese government has introduced a series of preferential policies for foreign
investment. The most frequently mentioned investment incentive, for instance, is
"two years of tax exemption and three years of tax reduction by hair, that is, the
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foreign-invested enterprise's income tax is exempted in the first two years after its
establishment and in the following three years shall be levied with a 50% reduction.
3.5 Globalisation and the state: the rescaling of the state
As Amin and Thrift (1997) note, there are two major fears associated with the rise of
globalisation. One is that the rise of a global field of action represents the end of
geography. The other is that the rise of a global field of action represents the end of
the nation-state. The latter is actually a question as to how to view the role of state
within the global-local nexus which has seemingly increasingly escaped the hand of
nation-states in the era of globalisation. With regards to this question, as Dicken
(1998) points out, there are two opposite opinions.* One questions the significance of
the nation-state as an important force in the world economy. For example,
Kindleberger (1969:207) bluntly asserted that "the nation state is just about through
as an economic unit". More recently, Ohmae (1995, inside front cover) claims that
"Today's global economy is genuinely borderless". However, this end-of-the-state
discourse of a borderless world has invited strong critiques. Shaw (1997: 498)
contends that:
Globalisation does not undermine the state but includes the transformation of
state forms. It is both predicated on and produces such transformations.
Yeung (1998: 291) argues that "despite the accelerated processes of globalisation,
national boundaries still matter in the decision-making and global reach of capital".
Weiss (1997: 27) takes it further, arguing that "the ability of nation -states to adapt to
intemationalisation -- so-called 'globalisation' -- will continue to heighten rather than
diminish national differences in state capacity and the accompanying advantages of
national economic coordination".
To understand the evolution of contemporary nation-states in the context of
globalisation, it is necessary to grasp the huge variation which exists between the 170
Weiss (1997) identifies four different hypotheses of globalisation and the changing role of the
nation-state.
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nation-states around the world. Robert Cooper (1996) has proposed a three-fold
categorisation of contemporary nation-states as "postmodern", "modem" and "pre-
modem". While the terminology may carry questionable theoretical overtones, it
catches a division of states which is useful in understanding the nature of
contemporary nation-states and their relations with globalisation.
First, within the west, nation-states are no longer classic nation-states according to
Weber's definition quoted above, which focuses on nation-states' monopoly of
legitimate violence in a given territory. They are "postmodern" in the sense that they
are very fully articulated with transnational western and global power networks. It is
in this group of states that globalisation has initiated and rippled through the world. It
is also this group of states that researches and debates of globalisation have
concentrated on. Of course, states vary enormously even in the group in the extent to
which they deviate from the characteristics of traditional nation-states. The USA,
Britain and France each retain a clear capacity for significant independent military
action, while the Canadian, Benelux and Scandinavian states have largely
surrendered their capacity for independent initiative to NATO and the UN. Western
states are also variably embedded in more or less dominant positions in the wide
range of global economic institutions (see also Gill and Law, 1988; Taylor, 1993).
Beyond the western state lie countries like the central and eastern Europeans, smaller
East Asian and many Latin American and African states, which have weak
autonomous power. They shelter under western power: they have no serious
strategic options apart from closer relationships with the western-centred global
institutions. The relations of western and these allied nation-states to regional and
international organisations are increasingly institutionalised with the USA as the
unchallengeable centre. The centrality of the USA in the new world order has been
strengthened and confirmed in all senous global crises of the post-1989 period, from
Kuwait to Kosovo. It has been claimed that the centre of the emergent global state is
constituted primarily by the USA (Shaw, 1997).
The second major group of states consists of some major non-western countries,
which correspond best to the classic model of the modern nation-states. These states
include Russia and China as well as India and Brazil, and lesser powers such as Iraq,
Iran and Serbia. These states mostly acknowledge the reality of western global
dominance by partial incorporation into western-led global institutions. For example,
the adoption of market-oriented reforms and open-door policies by the Chinese
government in the late 1978 means that China started to involve actively in western-
led international organisations (the most recent development is China's accession to
the WTO) after its three decades isolation from the world capitalist system. However,
many of these states have a capacity of mobilising substantial military power which
they many well use in confrontations with each other, and which may then result in
their conflicts with the western-led global system.
The third category of state consists of countries where the sate does not even reach
the level of a stable nation-state, let alone full participation in global institutions.
These "pre-modern" states include some African countries, former Yugoslavia,
countries in the former Soviet Union and some parts of Asia. In these territories, state
power is fragmentary, often based crudely on violence with threadbare legitimacy. In
some cases state power has degenerated into warlordism and gangsterism
(Afghanistan is a case in point).
Cooper's analysis reveals a general trend of evolution of nation-states in a
globalising world, which has been called as the "denationalisation of the state"
(Jessop, 1997). However, this trend is by no means limited to nation-states' loss of
authority to supranational bodies or a reinvigorated and relatively unchallenged
American superstate with capacities to project its power on a global scale as
Cooper's research implies. It also involves the delegation of authority to subordinate
levels of territorial orgamsation and/or the development of interlocal but
transnationalised policy-making regimes (Jessop, 1997). From a geographer's point
of view, Swyngedouw (1997: 170) suggests a revealing analysis of this trend which
he called "the rescaling of the state". Swyngedouw argues that with the rise of
globalisation, there is a shake-up in the scales of production and the scales of
regulating reproduction. Globalisation provides unprecedented opportunities for
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to set up their own networks across the planet.
More and more TNCs are becoming highly internationalised and globalised both
oiganisational1y and in terms of trade and other networks. However, these firm
networks, be they industrial or service, have to be embedded in local/regional
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institutional, political and cultural environments, co-operating locally although
competing globally. As a result, TNCs have adopted new organisational strategies
such as the embedded firm (Grabher, 1993), vertical disintegration (Scott, 1988),
strategic alliances and so on. Companies are simultaneously intensely local and
global.
Facing this rescaling of production, nation-states have to rescale their levels of
governance in order to keep pace with the changes in the production processes and
inter-firm networks. For example, the bureaucratic regulation of the wage nexus at
the scale of the national state became more problematic as a significant part of the
production system became supernationalised. As a result of the rescaling, there is a
tendency for the "hollowing out" of the national state, both downwards and upwards,
that is, the simultaneous internationalisation and decentralisation/devolution of the
key policy/regulatory/economic issues (Swyngedouw, 1997: 172). hstitutions such
as NAFTA, GATT and EU in particular are testimony to the process of upscaling of
the state. The national state has also been rescaling downwards to the level of the city,
or the region, where the local government is supposed to have better on-the-ground
knowledge to deal with the localised or regionalised production complex, and where
the public-private partnership shapes an entrepreneurial practice and ideology needed
to successfully engage in an intensified process of inter-urban competition.
However, the rescaling of the state does not suggest a diminishing role of the state
apparatus. The rescaling of the state takes place through the formation of new elite
coalitions on the one hand and the systematic exclusion or further disempowerment
of social groups already weaker, politically and/or economically, on the other. In the
process of rescaling, power and control over public funds and state capital is
increasingly diverted to a small elite who shape the urban and regional fabric in their
own image and fashion, and define the very content of the restructuring process.
Therefore, rather than diminishing the state apparatus, the "glocalisation" or
rescaling of institutional forms leads to more autocratic, undemocratic and
authoritarian (quasi-) state apparatus (ibid.).
Neither does the rescaling of the state mean the national state does not matter any
more. The "hollowing out" of the national state is the national government's
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response to the new situation stemming out of the globalisation in which the
circulation of capital spiralled out to encompass even larger spatial scales.
Globalisation may have increasingly exposed the local to the global forces directly,
but a critical determinant of local economic development is still the dynamic power
relationship between transnational corporations and national states (Dicken, 1994).
As Dicken (1994:247) points out,
Although much depends on the extent to which a national political system is
centralised or decentralised, virtually all effective bargaining power lies, not
at the local level, but at the national level, or in cases like the EC, at a
supranational level. To that degree, therefore, the prospects of local
economies will be influenced as much, if not more, by national policies as by
local actions. Within the global-local nexus, the key interactions in a power
sense, remain at the level of the TNC and the nation-state; in that respect, the
"seriously local" is a serious problem whose solution requires a broader
policy framework.
In a world in which the capital-labour nexus is still nationally regulated, nation-states
still have a capacity of countering this "hollowing out" effect. This can be seen
apparently in the survival of the national state as the principal factor of social
cohesion in societies and its associated role in promoting social redistribution. The
nation state remains the most significant force in shaping the world economy. The
roles of nation-states as culture containers, economic regulators and economic actors
are basically intact. What has been changed is the way they perform these basic
functions. In other words, the real question is not whether the state is subsumed
under global forces, but rather how the state adapts and reorganises its capacities to
meet the challenges of globalisation (Weiss, 1997; Yueng, 1998).
3.6 The state in capitalist cities
Although there are a number of state theories, a systematic analysis of the state-city
relationship can be barely found. Apart from articles by Fainstein Ct al (1983), Feagin
(1984) and King (1987), which have been discussed in Chapter 2, Gun and King's
work (1987) is one of the few theoretical-informed accounts of the role of the state in
capitalist cities. This and the next sections draw heavily from their book The State
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and the City. Their basic argument is that national and local states have their own
distinctive interests in cities and have significant autonomy in how they pursue them.
This autonomy allows the state to play an important role in the shaping of urban
patterns. The thesis of the autonomous state distinguishes them from most urban
political economists who see the state as an essentially dependent factor of the
dominant economic interests in urban development.
According to them, the state has two kinds of interests in cities: primary and
expedient. Primary interests refer to those that are essential to the perpetuation of
state institutions and authority. Specifically, it is in the primary interest of the state to
establish public order in cities, to secure acceptance of the state's authority among
urban populations and to maintain durable and adequately-financed institutions of
local governance. In pursuing the primary interests, the state officials have often
found it expedient to assume responsibility for providing various special and general
collective goods and services for urban populations. Expedient interests are therefore
those pursued because they are useful to the attainment of primary objectives, for
whatever historical, structural or ideological reasons. In pursuing these two interests,
the state activities can be divided iiit two broad categories (King, 1987).
The first set of activities refers to these actions undertaken by the state in cities
related to its own persistence. According to Eckstein (1971), a national state's
effective political performance depends on its ability to maintain civil order,
legitimacy and durable political institution of state authority. Cities are clearly the
central location to achieve these purposes, because western countries are
preponderantly urban societies. Most people live in cities, public revenues come
disproportionately from urban sources, most social and political movements have
urban origins, and the vast majority of public officials live and work in cities. If the
state cannot restrain conflict and maintain its authority in cities, it is unlikely to be
able to do so anywhere. In consequence, state policies concerned with their own
perpetuation, notably policing and education, are mainly carried out in cities.
The second set of urban activities undertaken by the state refers to those actions and
public policies necessary for the perpetuation and vitality of municipalities. The first
type of these activities is the provision of collective consumption goods. Collective
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consumption goods refer to the basic, indispensable urban services which have
become commonplace in contemporary urban environments, including public health,
water supply, streets, fire protection and refuse collection. These collective goods are
necessary to the survival of cities but cannot effectively be provided by the market
place. It is in the primary interest of the local state to provide some minimum levels
of these urban services, and it is in the expedient interest of the national state to
ensure that local states have the means to do so.
Apart from these essential urban services, the state also provides special social
services at the municipal level that are designed for the disadvantaged, such as
unemployment benefit, family allowances, welfare and medical help. The primary
purpose served by the provision of essential and special collective goods is to
minimise civil disorder and to enhance public acceptance of the state's authority.
The last group of activities provided by the state at the municipal level are urban
developmental policies. Developmental policies are designed by the state to enhance
local productivity levels and to promote entrepreneurial activity which in the long
run build a sound local economy and expand the national revenue base. In general,
the promotion of economic activity is of primary concern for the state because of its
needs for revenue. This is particularly so for local states which are heavily dependent
on locally-derived revenues. Local governments have become increasingly active in
pursuing developmental policies since the late 1 970s when urban governance started
to shift from managenalism to entrepreneuralism. This has put local governments in
a more aggressive competition with other cities, first to attract new investment and,
second to increase their share of extra-local revenues.
Gurr and King (1987) summarise the state's interests in cities in Figure 3.3, with
emphasis on the points of divergence between the national and the local state. Both
the national and the local state have a common, primary interest in the maintenance
of public order and the state's authority in cities. However, the local state is more
concerned with the maintenance of essential urban services and the economic
wellbeing of the city than is the national state, which is interested more in the
aggregate wellbeing of the urban system than of individual cities.
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Expedient	 Special social services
to distinctive groups
Source: Gurr and King (1987: 41)
3.7 The autonomy of the local state in capitalist cities
A general definition of the local state is provided by Johnston (1982: 187): "the term
local state applies to any non-sovereign body concerned with the government of a
constituent area of a sovereign state". In this thesis, the local state refers specifically
to municipalities, and in China's case it is used to refer to subnational governments
including provincial governments and centrally controlled municipalities such as
Shanghai.
If the state is important at all in cities development, then the local state has intrinsic
importance because it is a key point of contact for most citizens with the apparatus of
the national state structure, whether in federal or unity political systems. However,
unlike the sovereign nation-state, the local state is a distinct administrative apparatus
with some power and authorities within the overall state structure, and therefore, it
has more constraints on its autonomy. Gurr and King (1987) identify two sets of
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constraints on the local state as: (a) limited economic resources and (b) political
control by other elements of the state, whether vertically or horizontally located.
The first set of constraints concerns the local state's autonomy from local economic
and social forces. More specially, the conditions most likely to constrain local state
autonomy are of three kinds:
I. Limits on the revenues which can be extracted from the local economy;
2. Resistance of dominant local interests to the policies of the local state; and
3. The activities of locally-based (or focused) political organisations and social
movements which aim at reshaping the content of local public policy or at
thwarting its implementation. (Gurr and King, 1987)
The local state needs revenues from the local economy to ensure its perpetuation.
However, the local state's revenue-raising capacities depends on the local economic
situation and the statutory stipulations as to what within its jurisdiction is taxable and
how much it can be taxed. The local economy is a much more open system than the
national economy, and as a result, the link between the local state and the local urban
economy is much less direct than that between the national state and the national
economy. This means that there are sharp constraints on the local state from
powerful economic interests outside the state including corporations, banks,
developers and labour unions. They are either locally based or agents of national or -
in the case of corporations - transnational organisations. These interests group are
very powerful in influencing the content and execution of the local state's policies.
Molotch's (1976) analysis of the city as a "growth machine" shows how powerful
these interest groups can be in shaping the urban policies in the United States.
According to him, interest groups, particularly the local political elite and land
developers united in pursuing the objective of growth and drove the local state
behaviour towards entrepreneuralism. This alliance for the growth is so strong that
the growth has dominated the municipal political agenda in the United States since
the eighteenth century.
The second set of constraints on the local state comes from the national state.
National state constraints have traditionally taken two main forms. The first are
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constitutional and legal constraints which are formally stated and embodied in
explicit institutional arrangements. Such formal constraints vary from country to
country, particularly across federal and unitary systems. Generally, in the federal
system like the US, municipalities have less constraints from the national state than
do those in the unitary political system such as Britain. This formal constitutional
difference is much modified by administrative and political practice. This leads to the
second type of national constraints upon the local state, i.e., those administrative
constraints that emerge from the intrinsically political nature of the national-local
state relationship. The day to day administrative interaction between the national and
the local state is very much associated with the political culture that is historically
formulated. For example, because a highly centralised power structure has been
practised in China's political system for over two thousand years, local state
autonomy in China may be far less than suggested by formal administrative
arrangements.
3.8 The state in socialist cities
Socialist cities refer to cities in a particular political economy that is widely known
as state socialism. The term of state socialism is used to describe the social system
that developed in Russia after 1917 and was variably achieved in many countries
after 1945. At its peak, twenty-six countries were believed to adopt this Soviet-type
system, with its population accounting for one third of the world total (Kornai, 1992).
Despite the various forms in practice, according to Harloe (1996), state socialism has
three principal features in common:
These features, were, first, state monopoly ownership of the means of
production and of most of the means of collective consumption as well,
together with the substitution of centralised planning for market-led
distribution of investment, incomes and consumption goods and services.
Second, there was the political domination of the Communist Party, acting
through a centralised state apparatus, which sought to control and order every
aspect of social, economic and political life. Finally, there was the
development of a distinctive class structure or socialist rank order, with the
elimination of the bourgeoisie as a distinctive social category, the creation of
a modestly differentiated broad "middle mass" of the population, a politico-
military, industrial and intellectual elite, and an equally limited stratum or
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"underclass" of those who were excluded from the mainstream of society
(Harloe, 1996: 4, emphases added).
Among these three features, the political domination of the Communist Party is the
most important feature that distinguishes state socialism (hereafter "state socialism"
and "socialism" are interchangeable) from capitalism in terms of political structure.
Socialist countries have a one-party system in which no other party can operate. In
this one-party system, the activities of party and the state are closely interwoven in a
way that ensures that the party is the dominant force in their common activities.
Kornai (1992: 37-38) identifies three political arrangements whereby the party
ensures its control of the state:
1. All major appointments, promotions, and dismissals are decided upon by the
various bodies of the party. This applies to all three branches of the state: the
government, the legislature and the judiciary. In case of the normally elective
positions such as the member of the parliament and the head of the local
government, party committees decide who will stand for. Since in most of the
cases, there is only one candidate for each seat, the practical result is that the
representatives are selected by the party.
2. The party organisation reach decisions on every major affair of state before the
state organisation responsible has come to its own decision. The major decisions
of the government are preceded by resolutions of the party's central leadership or
Political Committee, those of county councils by resolutions of county party
committees, and so on.
3. The party apparatus is in direct touch with the apparatus of state. The effect is a
curious kind of duplication in which a specific party functionary or group of
functionaries within the party apparatus has responsibility for every important
sphere of state activity. The central party apparatus contains departments
responsible for industry, agriculture, education, culture, foreign affairs, military
matters, and so on. This arrangement allows the party apparatus to set guidelines
In China, eight other "democratic parties" exist formally, but they have no actual power es even
independent influence over political matters.
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and policies for various spheres and oversee how the parallel state organisation
implements them.
Clearly, although the state and the party nominally assume different constitutional
responsibilities, i.e., the party performs political functions and the state
administrative ones, one cannot separate them in the political practise. As a
Hungarian ideologist sharply points out: "The party and the state are not one, but
they are not two either" (cited in Kornai, 1992: 37). No wonder some authors employ
the term "party-state" to depict this peculiar state-party relationship in which the
Communist Party is actually superior to the state.
In its formal constitution, laws and legal regulations, the state under the state socialist
system resembles any other modem state. It is divided into three separate branches: a
legislature, a state administration (government), and a judiciary. The members of the
legislature (parliament) are elected by the general public. Parliament then nominates
the government. Local legislatures (local councils) operate in each territorial unit.
These local councils are independent within limits laid down by the law and have
their own executive organisations (Komai, 1992: 37). All these political
arrangements appear to be similar to those in capitalist countries.
With regard to the state-city relationship, as in the capitalist state, the socialist state
has its primary and expedient interests in the city. The soviet system was born as an
immediate consequence of an urban-based struggle for dominance. Cities are the
central location for the prosecution of all state functions. Even in a country like
China where the majority of population live in the countryside, cities are still the
critical places for state policies to be carry out, because modern economic sectors,
social and political activities, and state institutions are concentrated in cities. The
acknowledgement of the importance of cities was reflected by the fact that the
socialist China provided a welfare system that covered only the urban areas, while
the rural areas were basically ignored. Therefore, it is in the primary interests of the
socialist state to maintain public order and state authority in cities so that its own
persistence can be secured. In order to maintain its own perpetuation, the socialist
state will undertake all necessary activities such as the provision of collective
consumption goods in cities.
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This said, however, an essential difference exists between the capitalist state and the
socialist state in the process of pursuing their primary interests - the maintenance of
the state's authority and the use of authority to maintain order. "Authority refers to
the state's capacity to secure public compliance with officials' directives by invoking
legitimacy - the state's right to obedience - rather than sanctions" (Gurr and King,
1987: 31). Most capitalist countries have a political system that is well known as
liberal democracy. According to Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987: 5-6), "Liberal
democracy is a system of representative government by majority rule in which some
individual rights are nonetheless protected from interference by the state and cannot
be restricted even by an electoral majority". In a liberal democracy, state legitimacy
is based on the mandate given by the majority of people in the elections that take
place periodically. The legitimacy of the socialist state, however, stems from the
socialist revolution, or in cases of most East European countries was imposed by the
Soviet Union, and the maintenance of legitimacy is mainly achieved through the
highly centralised Communist Party system that penetrates into the every corner of
the society.
The high reliance of state legitimacy on the party, together with the centrally planned
economic system, put the state into an extremely powerful position in society. In
capitalist countries, although the state is the most powerful social organisation, its
intervention in civil society is considerably constrained, economically by market
forces, socially by other civil organisations, and ideologically by liberals who view
the state as a potential threat to individual's rights. On the contrary, in socialist
countries, state ownership replaces private ownership and plan replaces market, the
party controls all social organisations, and the official ideology of Marxism-
Leninism excludes all others. In a word, the state is ubiquitous to the exclusion of
any other organisation.
With regard to the city, because state organisations, and primarily the central organs
of government and party, take control over such matters as land ownership, land use,
the degree and direction of industrialisation, capital investment in all sectors, and at
all levels of economy, rents, wages, prices and even (in certain periods and in certain
places) movements of population, the state has a far greater power to determine the
pace and the form of urban development than that wielded by any western
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government, central or local (French and Hamilton, 1979). Indeed, most scholars
believe that the power of state is so formidable that a socialist city has been created
which is a distinct, special phenomenon, more or less sharply differentiated from the
capitalist city (ibid.).
While the central state has a decisive power in shaping urban patterns, the socialist
local state has little autonomy in determining urban development. In capitalist
countries, the power structure of the central-local state is embodied in and protected
by institutional arrangements, and the local state has significant, though variable,
autonomy from the central state. The mayor of the city (or the governor of the state),
elected by the local people, represents local interests in relations with the central
state or other local governments. One may find a similar institutional arrangement in
the local-central state relationship in socialist countries. However, this formal
structure of power between the central and local state in socialist countries exists
only in a nominal sense, because the party decision overrides any other institutional
arrangements. Despite the nominal election involved, all heads of local states are in
fact selected by the central party committee. As a result of this centrally party
controlled system, socialist countries, be they a federal system like the USSR or a
unitary system like China, are all central-state dominated. Local states have little
autonomy and constitute little more than agencies of the national state. Selected by
the central organ of the party, heads of local states are concerned with instructions
and plans from the central state more than the local interest. It has been observed that
local leaders in socialist China were not susceptible to local politics (Lam, 1996). As
a result, the socialist local state plays little role in urbanisation processes, and urban
patterning results mainly from the central government's urban policies.
3.9 The state, capital and Shanghai's urban development
Chapter 2 and the above analysis in this chapter tried to establish a theoretical
framework in which Shanghai's urban change can be analysed. The theoretical
framework is political economy, but it is an urban political economy which takes into
account the significant role of the state in the shaping of urban patterns. This urban
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political economy provides two very important insights for the understanding of
urban change in general and Shanghai's current urban restructuring in particular.
First, any city's urban change cannot be fully interpreted without setting it in a broad
historical context. "Urban restructuring is associated with a major redirection of
secular trends induced by severe shocks to pre-existing conditions of urban growth
and development" (Soja, 1991: 361). It is a period when the old and the new, the
inherited and the projected order are juxtaposed at the same place in a special way.
We cannot understand a city's change by only looking at the present situation. Every
city has its own histoiy. In this case, Shanghai's urban restructuring in the post-
reform era cannot be properly understood without considering its urban structure in
the pre-reform era which developed out of the pre-existing structure before the
communist party took power in 1949. Therefore, in order to analyse Shanghai's
current urban restructuring, we have to take into account Shanghai's historical
evolution.
Compared with other megacities in the developing countries, Shanghai's uniqueness
reflects three aspects. First, modern Shanghai is a direct outcome of the expansion of
the world capitalist system in the 19th century (Wallerstein, 1979; King, 1989). In
other words, the transformation of Shanghai from a feudal commercial town to a
capitalist city is the outcome of the incursion of the external forces rather than a
natural evolution from within. Defeated in the "Opium War" with Britain in 1843,
the Qing dynasty was forced to open five port cities including Shanghai to western
trade and residence. While the whole country was still under the reign of the Qing
dynasty, the international settlement in those "treaty cities" was a semi-colonial
enclave where modern capitalism prospered under extraterritorial protection. It was
in the international settlements that modem capitalist Shanghai was formed.
Second, the development of capitalism in Shanghai was interrupted by the victory of
the communist party in 1949. Following the civil war, capitalist Shanghai was
revolutionalised into a socialist city. Third, unlike urban restructuring in capitalist
countries which results from the evolution of capitalist economic development,
contemporary Shanghai's urban change is based on the state socialist system. Unlike
urban restructuring in the East European countries where the political economy was
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drastically changed into a capitalist system through "shock therapy", Shanghai's
urban transformation is occurring as China reforms state socialism towards a market-
oriented economic system in a gradual way. After 20 years of market-oriented
reforms, China in general and Shanghai in particular is no longer a traditional
centrally planned economy. But neither is it a pure capitalist economy. Officially it is
called a socialist market economy which means that the market mechanism works in
the framework shaped by the communist regime. So, from feudalism to capitalism to
socialism to post-socialism, Shanghai has experienced a distinctive path in urban
development. It is in such a historical context that Shanghai's urban restructuring
should be understood.
The second insight provided by urban political economy is that city's change should
be interpreted in a broad geographical context. It is not possible to understand a
city's change by looking only at the city itself. Contemporary urban restructuring is
the outcome of interplay of forces at work at regional, national and global scales. As
Massey (1993) and others argue, any adequate explanation has to set the city in its
wider geographical context. In Shanghai's case, two different scales have to be taken
into account as well as the local: the national and the global. Shanghai's urban
changes in the post-reform era can and should be traced to the changes of the wider
political economy in China since the Chinese government adopted the reform policy
in 1979. After the communist party took power in 1949, it established an
authoritarian socialist system in which the vertically-controlled communist party
system penetrated every corner of society and in which local government had little
power over local affairs. It was also a system which was fundamentally isolated from
the world capitalist system, which had not changed until 1979. Under such a political
economy, it would be impossible for Shanghai to make any significant change
without a tremendous shift in the central government's policy (more precisely, the
Communist Party's political line) in the first place. Therefore, the first step to
approach Shanghai's urban change is to understand the development of China's
reform policy.
China's "door" was opened when the process of globalisation speeded up at all levels
in the world. While the Chinese state gradually retreated, international capital,
attracted by the most populous market in the world, quickly stepped in and began to
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penetrate the economy and society. In many ways, Shanghai's urban restructuring
has been and is shaped by the dynamic interplay of the state and international capital
over the control of production and market.
Both historical and geographical dimensions are important in the understanding of
Shanghai's urban change. In the chapters which follow, an interpretative framework
that combines not only the two underlying factors -- capital and the state but also the
historical and geographical dimensions - is employed to examine Shanghai's urban
development since modern Shanghai emerged at the mouth of Yangtze River in the
late 19th century. Based on the relevant historical researches (Bergere, 1981;
Murphey, 1953; Wei, 1987), 1 divide the history of modern Shanghai into six periods:
1) The formation of modern Shanghai (1842-1895)
2) The golden age of Shanghai (1895-1927)
3) Nationalist Shanghai (1927-1937)
4) The end of Shanghai's international status (1937-1949)
5) Socialist Shanghai (1949-1 979)
6) Post-Socialist Shanghai (1979-present)
During these historical periods, different factors affecting Shanghai's urban
development have waxed and waned. However, as the above analysis suggested,
capital and the state are two underlying forces in the history of Shanghai's urban
development, and the ever changing relationship between capital and the state is the
main nexus which cuts across all periods and from which Shanghai's urban
development can be better analysed. In the next chapter, we will see how changing
relationships of capital and the state determined Shanghai's urban development
patterns in periods prior to 1949.
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Chapter 4
THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF SHANGHAI
BEFORE 1949
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the urban development of Shanghai before 1949. Four
historical periods -- the formation of modern Shanghai (1842-1 895), the golden age
of Shanghai (1895-1927), Nationalist Shanghai (1927-1937), and the end of
Shanghai's international status (1937-1949) - are examined by focusing on the role
of the state and capital in the shaping of Shanghai's urban patterns. The final section
gives four schematic diagrams of key state-capital relationships that underlie each
period of Shanghai's urban development.
4.2 The formation of modern Shanghai (1842-1895)
Shanghai is located at the confluence of Huangpu River and Suzhou Creek and
connected to the Grand Canal, only a dozen or so miles from the point where the
Huangpu River entered the estuary of the Yangtze. It is also situated at the middle
point of China's east coastline, with the Yangtze delta, one of China's most affluent
areas, as its hinterland (see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). With such a geographical
advantage, Shanghai had been an active port in Chinese coastal and inland trade for
several centuries. The name "Shanghai", meaning an embarkation point, is first
recorded in documents of the Song dynasty. By 1264, Shanghai became a county seat
('White, 1981:21).
Through a continued dependence upon cotton, silk, porcelain and transportation, the
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Figure 4.2 East Asia
Note: Dates refer to the opening to foreign trade as ports of the cities as indicated.
Source: adapted from Murphey (1953: 5)
and reached its p re-colonial apex in the late 17th century when it "had become one of
the world's greatest ports, with a forest of masts and a volume of shipping equal to or
greater than London's" (Pan, 1993).
However, the modem history of Shanghai did not start until it was forced to open to
international trade and residence in 1843. Defeated in the Opium War, the Qing
dynasty signed the Treaty of Nanjing with Britain on August 29, 1842. In the treaty,
Shanghai together with other four ports on the Chinese coast was designated as a
Treaty port, opening to British traders and giving British nationals the "convenience
of abode" (Wei, 1987: Introduction). The treaty also stipulated that the Chinese
government was to accept extraterritoriality and to refrain from interference with
British trade. Other powers, including France and the US, gained similar concessions
from the Chinese government
The Treaty of Nanjing, however, was signed mainly for commercial reasons. Under
the treaty, China conceded no territory in the treaty ports. At first, most Westerners




increasing considerably, in order to restrict the area in which the foreigners might
lease, the local Chinese mandarin wanted foreigners to move to a designated area
outside the wall. In Shanghai, the agreement negotiated between British consul and
Chinese governor (Daotai in Chinese) on November 29 1845 became the first "Land
Regulations", the basic law of the foreign area, in which a specific area for the
foreign settlement was designated (White, 1981: 22). This designated area developed
by stages and eventually formed the International Settlement. Similarly, the French
obtained their settlement beside the north wall of the Chinese City on April 6 1849
which was inaccurately titled "French Concession" (ibid.). These three components,
the Chinese City, the International Settlement, and the French Concession, were
separate administrative units each with their own laws and officials, as well as the
surrounding towns and countiyside which in time became absorbed into the
metropolis, were known to the world at large as Shanghai (see Figure 4.3).
While the Chinese walled city was still a county seat under the Qing dynasty, the
first non-Chinese municipal government in China - the Municipal Council was
established in the International Settlement in 1854. It was a liberal, if not democratic,
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government elected by taxpayers, not by the official consuls. It was in theory
subordinated to the "Court of Consuls". The "Court of Consuls" was a subcommittee
of the "Consular Body", comprising the emissaries in Shanghai of all nations that
had extraterritorial treaties with China (ibid. 31). The municipal council initially had
five members, but in 1866 its powers were somewhat amplified and its membership
was increased to nine. No Chinese actually sat on the municipal council until 1928.
The Municipal Council was a typical "growth coalition" comprising the members
most of whom had local business interests. As White (1981: 32) points out, "It was
deemed important to preserve the collegial nature of the local decision process; so
this city-state never had a chief executive. Its political structure was not just
international; for the sake of peace and commerce, it was carefully kept non-
national." The raison d'etre of the Municipal Council was business. Decisions were
made in a low-cost, low-key manner. Necessary work was handled in small
bureaucracies, overseen by the Municipal council's functional committees.
The administration of the French area proper, unlike that of the international sector,
had a strong chief executive: the consul-general. While an advisory council was
established, only half its members were elected and the other half was appointed by
its president, the consul-general. In constitutional form, it was practically a small
dictatorship.
Whatever forms the governments took, it was in the international settlements that
world capitalism set up a beachhead, in which the modern idea of government as
well as western advanced technology and the modern urban amenities made their
debut in China. The first telephone wires were laid between Shanghai and Wusong in
1865, and in the same year the gas street lighting was installed in the International
Settlement. In 1882, electric lighting was introduced in public gardens, and a public
tram service was opened in 1908 (I-lowe, 1981: 413).
The second half of 19th century was a period of social disorder and chaos for China,
but Shanghai, due to its international status, remained relatively peaceful. Many
storms of war swirled around Shanghai, but not in it. The Taiping Rebellion swept
over 18 provinces in southern China during 1850 -1864, and about the same time the
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Small Sword Society, a secret society opposed to the Manchu government, occupied
Chinese Shanghai and the nearby counties. Fighting the Qing imperial army, neither
of them entered the international settlements. During the Sino-French conflict of
1884-85, both sides had a tacit agreement not to attack each other amund Shanghai.
And in Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Britain was able to secure from her Japanese
ally a promise that the city would not be touched (White, 1981: 39).
Under the protection of the international presence and with the construction of the
modem urban infrastructure, international commercial capital prospered and
Shanghai was rapidly transformed into a modem entrepot city. Because Westerners
were not allowed to set up factories in China until 1895, the main function of
Shanghai was domestic and international trade. During this period, China's foreign
trade was dominated by the export of tea and silk and the import of opium. For all of
these three great trade commodities Shanghai was advantageously located. The major
silk-producing regions of China lie in the lower Yangtze basin. Tea for export was
grown primarily in the belt of hills which forms the Yangtze divide on the south, and
waterways connected the northern slopes of this region with Shanghai more easily
and directly than any other ocean port. Opium could be distributed domestically to
greater advantage from Shanghai, via the Yangtze, than from any other coastal port.
Meanwhile, foreign trading firms many of which used to locate in Canton moved in,
attracted by Shanghai's advantageous location. In 1846, within three years of its
opening, 16 per cent of China's export trade passed through the city, and by 1861 its
share was 50 per cent. By 1870, Shanghai was responsible for 63 per cent of the total
external trade of China by value, as against 13 per cent for Canton, still its closest
competitor (Murphey, 1953: 65). Shanghai rapidly established itself as the
indisputable leading port and commercial city of China.
4.3 The golden age of Shanghai (1895-1927)
Shanghai remained almost exclusively a trading city until China signed the Treaty of
Shiminoseki with Japan in 1895. The treaty, which ended the war of 1894-95
between China and Japan over Korea, first granted to foreigners the right to establish
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factories in the treaty ports of China. The consequent investment of transnational
capital together with the rapid growing local capital led to the industrialization of
Shanghai.
This golden age can be divided into two periods: the period of foreign enterprises
which spanned the years from 1895 to the beginning of the first world war in 1914,
and the period of flourishing private enterprises from 1914 until 1927 when the
Nationalist Party unified China.
Foreigners took the opportunity and led the first wave of industrial investment in
Shanghai after the signing of the Treaty of Shiminoseki in 1895. For example, cotton
mills like Ewo and Lao Kung Mao of British Nationality, Hung Yuan, owned by
American interests, and Jui Chi, a German concern, came into existence one after
another (Lieu, 1936: 21). Cotton mills were then followed by the other modern
industries such as flour mills, oil mills, machine-manufacturing factories and the like.
At the time when foreign industrial capital first appeared, modern industry in China
was still in an inchoate state, and the most industries were managed by the
government. China's modern industrial history did not start until the government
built an ammunition factory in Shanghai in 1862. Five years later, the first modern
dockyard - Jiangnan Dockyard was established in Shanghai, which was followed by
the establishment of Jiangnan Arsenal in 1867. This early period from 1862 to 1877
was characterized by the emphasis on arms and ammunition manufacturing - one
direct result out of the defeat in the Opium War. Lieu (1936: 19) calls it "the period
of ammunition manufacturing" in his seven-period classification of China's
industrial development. The following period, which lasted 1878 to 1894, was
designated as "the period of the commercial commodities manufacturing" in which
the manufacture of articles of daily use, particularly textile industries flourished. But
as in the previous period, industrial enterprises were mostly initiated by the
government and many of them did not produce satisfactory results.
The arrival of foreign direct investment brought western advanced technology as
well as the modern management into the treaty ports, which had a profound impact
on China's economic development. Many Chinese entrepreneurs, emulating the
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success of these foreign enterprises, began to raise funds for establishing similar
modem factories. Thus private capital started to develop. This infant Chinese
national capital was given a huge boost by the removal of foreign competitors in the
First World War that gave rise to what was referred to as "the period of flourishing
private enterprises" (Lieu, 1936).
During and immediately after the First World War (1914-1918), imports from
Europe and America declined dramatically while Japanese goods were boycotted due
to the conflict between China and Japan over the Twenty-One Demands and the
handover of Tsing-Tao from German to Japan by the Versailles Conference in 1919.
The Chinese manufacturers therefore enjoyed almost a monopoly of the home market
which was growing fast at the time. Given such exceptionally favourable
circumstances, Chinese industries in Shanghai grew rapidly and many new factories
were set up during this period. Take cotton textiles - the city's then dominant
industry -- for example. The first cotton mill equipped with modem machinery
appeared in Shanghai in 1890. After a short period of growth in the beginning,
Chinese cotton mills grew slowly until 1914 due to the competition from the foreign
mill and shortage of raw cotton supply. As shown in Table 4.1, there were 7 factories
with a total of 160,900 looms in Shanghai in 1914. The Great War was the turning
point. During the years 19 14-20, the number of Chinese cotton mills trebled from 7
to 21 while the number of looms doubled from 160,900 to 303,392.









Source: after Bergere (1981:9)
Although China had lost her one-time monopoly of the trade in silk and tea by about
1900, Shanghai's primacy in China's trade was secured by its favourable location for









of China during the war and its aftermath*, of which the industrialization of Shanghai
was the most important component, the net value of total trade passing through
Shanghai's maritime customs experienced a meteoric increase from 1915 to 1930, as
shown in the following Graph 4.1.
Graph 4.1 Shanghai's Trade, 1865-1935
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Source: after Murphey (1953: 118).
Table 4.2 The Rise of Traditional Chi'en-Chuang Banks at the Time of the
First World War (Capital data in Chinese dollars)
Average capital
No. of banks	 Total capital	 per bank
1913	 31	 1,600,000	 51,600
1920	 71	 7,700,000	 109,000
Source: after Bergere (1981: 6)
Accompanying the growth of commerce and industry was the development of credit
and of modern Chinese banking. Foreign banks were among the first modern sectors
that came into Shanghai after it opened up. The twenty or so foreign banks which
operated in China including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Co. Ltd. (see
Table 4.3) were all represented in Shanghai, where they continued to monopolize the
financing of external commerce and control the flows of precious metals and foreign
currency (Bergere, 1981: 4). Chinese banks which were the principal financiers for
national enteiprises grew rapidly during the war. As indicated in Table 4.2, the
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number of Chinese "Ch'ien-Chuang" banks increased from 31 in 1913 to 71 in 1920
with their capital growing almost five times.
By the end of 1910s, Shanghai had established itself as Asia-Pacific's most powerful
financial centre. Banks were concentrated on the Bund, colonial waterfront next to
the Huangpu River. The development of the Bund reflected Shanghai's development.
Picture 4.1 The Bund Seen in 1853
Source: Wu (2002: 7)
Picture 4.2 The Bund in its Golden Time (circa 193 Os)
Source: Wu (2002: cover photo)
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Picture 4.1 and Pictum 4.2 show the dramatic landscape change of the Bund. Taken
in 1853, Picture 4.1 shows the Bund in its early stage. In only ten years after
Shanghai was opened to foreign trade and residence in 1843, a colonial waterfront
with a cluster of western style buildings had emerged along the Huangpu River.
Picture 4.2 shows a completely different scene of the Bund - the Bund in its golden
era in the 1930s. Along the Bund stands a wide variety of architectural styles
including European Classic Style and Eclectic style (during the late I 890s to 1 920s)
and European Modernism (from the 1920s on), most of these magnificent buildings
were built by the foreign banks (see Table 43).
Table 4.3 Major Buildings in the Bund (Zhongshan Road East I)
Address Building/Company	 Designer	 Years of
completion
No. 1	 Asia Petroleum Company Building 	 Moorhead and Halse(UK)	 1916
No. 4	 Union Building (Union Assurance Co.) Palmer and Turner (UK) 	 1916
No. 5	 Nishin Building (Nishin Co.) 	 Lester, Johnson and Morris (UK)	 1921
No. 7	 Commercial Bank of China Building 	 Atkinson and Dallas (UK)	 1906
No. 12	 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 	 Palmer and Turner (UK)	 1923
Corporation Building
No. 15	 St. Petersburg Russo-Asiatic Bank	 H. Becker (Germany) 	 1901
Building
No. 16	 Bank of Taiwan Building	 Palmer and Turner (UK)
	 1931
No. 17	 North China Daily Building 	 Lester, Johnson and Morris (UK) 1924
No. 19	 Sassoon House	 Palmer and Turner (UK)	 1929
No. 23	 Bank of China Building	 Palmer and Turner (UK)	 1936
No. 24	 Yokohama Specie Bank Building 	 Palmer and Turner (UK)	 1924
No.26	 Yangtze Insurance Association Bldg.	 Palmer and Turner (UK)	 1920
No. 29	 Banque de I'Lnde-Chine Building	 Atkinson and Dallas (UK) 	 1911
Source: Luo, 1996; Shanghai Real Estate Market '1999.
Table 4.3 shows that all of 13 major buildings in the Bund were designed by foreign
architects, particularly the involvement of British architects (12 out of 13). In order
to impose their own mark on the landscape, international capitalists spared no
expense to show their wealth and power. For example, the British-controlled
Victorian classical Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Building (1923)
(see Picture 4.3), designed by British architectural firm Palmer and Turner, was
claimed as "the most magnificent building in the Far East" with "eight columns of
Sienna Marble supporting the dome of Venetian mosaic", and a "300-foot long
marble counter in the banking ball" (Pan, 1993: 62). The Bund, vividly reflecting
what Zukin (1992) called as the construction of "a landscape of power", has since
become the traditional landmark of Shanghai. Picture 4.4 shows the Bund in 1990s,
where we can see that the landscape of the Bund has remained basically unchanged
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from the 1930s. The fourth building to the left is the magnificent Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Building, which had been used as the building for the
Shanghai Municipal Government since 1949 until 1998 when it was taken over as the
headquarter for Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.
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Also associated with Shanghai's industrialization was the rapid growth of population.
Until 1895 Shanghai remained almost exclusively a tradrng city, with a consequent
population which never exceeded half a million (Murphey, 1953: 20). The rapid
industrial development, and the creation of jobs which came with it, drew to
Shanghai an influx of newcomers. It is estimated that the population of the city
increased from one million inhabitants in 1910 to nearly two and a half millions in
1920 (Bergere, 1981: 4). Such a dramatic increase, unequalled in China, was also
unusual in the world. People from virtually every corner of China, notably those
from Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong, came to Shanghai for jobs and
formed their own communities there. Foreigners, mainly the British, French, German,
Russian, American and Japanese, attracted by Shanghai's golden opportunity of
making money, converged in this "paradise of venture" and set up their own diaspora
culture (Wakeman and Yeh, 1992). Shanghai was then one of the most cosmopolitan
and divided cities in the world.
From this economic boom, a new generation of businessmen - the national
bourgeoisie class appeared in Shanghai. Many professional associations were
founded by these young Chinese managers in this period, the Shanghai Banker's
Association in 1917, and the Chinese Millowner's Association in 1918. Along with
the rise of the conquering bourgeoisie was the development of a working proletariat.
In 1921, Shanghai accounted for about a quarter of the one and a half million
Chinese workers employed in modern factories and associated services (Bergere,
1981:11). These 300,000 to 400,000 workers became a socially and politically
important force at the local and national levels from 1919 to 1927.
The decisive factor in the worker's movement in Shanghai was the intervention of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded at a Congress in Shanghai in July 1921.
The Shanghai General Union which brought together 117 unions and 218,000
members was under the control of the CCP. Provoked by the assassination of a
Chinese worker in a Japanese cotton mill, it organised the demonstrations of 30 May
1925 in which the workers' strikes continued for three months in the Japanese and
English factories of the International Settlement (Bergere, 1981). It even organised
two attacks in November 1926 and February 1927, trying to launch a revolutionary
strike. Fearing that the CCP would grow out of control, Chiang Kai-shek, then de
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facto leader of the Nationalist Party, with the help of the bourgeoisie, perpetrated the
coup of 12 April which brutally destroyed the Shanghai General Union. The coup
also claimed the end of the robust movement of proletariat in Shanghai which had
since never recovered until 1949.
Attracted by the relative safety and the freedom of expression provided in the
international settlements, intellectuals started to gather in Shanghai which became
the cultural centre of China, while Beijing, home of the intellectual renaissance of
1915-19, was gradually deserted by its writers and academics due to the chaotic and
brutal regime of the warlords. In 1921, there were 26 foreign newspapers and
magazines and over 80 Chinese publications in Shanghai. All the important literary
movements such as Saturday School novels and the Creation Society and all the great
names in the new Chinese literature were found there (Bergere, 1981).
One decade is a short time in a city's development. However, the decade of
prosperity after 1914 in Shanghai was sufficient to transform a commercial port into
an industrial city and to nurture a new Chinese society. It was an enterprising,
cosmopolitan urban society. At the turn of the 20th century, Shanghai was known as
the Paris of the East, where sojourners from all corners of the globe converged to
created one of the most dynamic and sophisticated capitalist entrepots the world had
ever seen (Perry, 1993). It was "as crowded as Calcutta, as decadent as Berlin, as
snooty as Paris, as jazzy as New York" (cited in Young, 1997).
Such a prosperous cosmopolitan city could not have come into existence without
Shanghai's special political status and its non-governmentalism in the international
settlement. The golden age of Shanghai was again a period of political turmoil and
civil disorder for China. The xenophobia-induced Boxer Rebellion in 1900 swept
through northern China. The republican revolution of 10 October 1911 led by the
Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang) fmally toppled the Qing dynasty, which put an end
to Imperial China. The revolution brought China into the warlord period with the
north warlords occupying Beijing as their centre and the Nationalist Party in Canton.
While the country was in a state of social upheaval, Shanghai enjoyed relative
security and order thanks to its international status. This special status remained
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strong encountering no challenger from the Chinese side where political and
ideological order were increasingly weakened in the wake of the breakdown of the
Qing government. The refuge haven of the international settlement plus a growth
machine style Municipal Council based on the laissez-faire ideology, thus secured
Shanghai's golden age. Paradoxically, the international status which laid the
foundation for Shanghai's economic miracle helped to create and strengthen the
nationalism which threatened to destroy the very foundation on which Shanghai'
prosperity was based.
4.4 Nationalist Shanghai (1927-1937)
With the success of the Northern Expedition, the Nationalist Party established the
national government in Nanjing in 1927 and finally unified China in 1928. The
political success of the Nationalist Party came from its adamant nationalism which
has dominated China's history since the May Fourth Movement of 1919 and for
which Chinese people from all walks of life supported after enduring decades of
humiliation from western imperialism. From its establishment, the Nationalist
government led by Chiang Kai-shek threw itself into a policy of national restoration
of which one of its main objectives was to have the international settlements returned
to Chinese sovereignty including the abandonment of extraterritoriality.
Following the increasing requests from Chinese government, the controversial
problems of Shanghai's legal status were re-examined between 1927 and 1937, but it
did not result in a revision of the Land Regulations (Murphey, 1953). However, the
Chinese authorities did manage to regain some of the rights of which China had been
deprived.
First, the Mixed Court, created in 1864 to settle differences between Chinese
residents in the international settlement, which ceased being a Chinese court and
became fully controlled by the foreigners in 1911, was abandoned and the Chinese
judicial system reclaimed the right over its people in whole city. In May 1930 the
Chinese municipality reaffirmed its control on the External Roads which were built
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in 1925 surrounding the settlements and maintained and policed by the Municipal
Council which also placed a tax on local residents (Murphey, 1953; Bergere, 1981).
Administratively, the national government established the Greater Shanghai
Municipality in 1927 which brought together under its authority the different Chinese
parts of Shanghai and its outskirts. The international settlements were now
surrounded by one integrated Chinese administrative unit which was put under the
direct control of the central government. What is more, the newly established
Municipality waged a war of attrition against foreigners, raising incidents and
difficulties, proposing a more and more restrictive interpretation of the treaties and
sometimes ignoring them completely (Bergere, 1981: 15).
Economically, the Kuomingtang regime was in principle a plan-rational state -- a
system that was later brought to Taiwan by the Kuomingtang (For definition of plan-
rational state, see Chapter 2). Although its economic policy was basically in favour
of the capitalist development, it proved to be much more hostile than had been
admitted towards a laissez-faire economy and private enterprise, refusing to let the
bourgeoisie participate in local administration and superseding them in most of their
economic functions (Bergere, 1981).
The Chinese City Council established in 1905 was said to be the first representative
Chinese municipal government which arose from the merchant-gentry tradition
rather than from imperial decrees (White, 1981: 32). The council members were
usually the local business elite faithful to the tradition of guilds and Charitable Halls.
The newly established Municipality of Greater Shanghai whose mayor was named by
the central government put an end to this tentative decentralisation of administration.
The local elite were then completely excluded from this municipality of civil
servants designated by the government and controlled by the local branches of the
Kuomingtang which adopted the Soviet system of organisation despite its strenuous
anti-communism.
In March 1929, the Kuomingtang managed to reorganise the General Chamber of
Commerce which gathered together the most influential businessmen within the
international settlement and which had often displayed political independence, and
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put it under the direct control of the Kuomingtang. The bourgeoisie then lost the
ability to even express themselves in their own organizations. The "coup" of March
1935 which brought the Bank of China and the Communication Bank under direct
control of the government put an end to the financial power and independence of the
Chekiang banking group. Once the financial groups were under control, it was not
difficult for government to turn to the commereial and industrial sphere. Gradually,
the old business middle class was replaced by a class of officials/capitalists working
privately or publicly with their own capital or funds from the state (Bergere, 1981).
The Kuomingtang regime pursued a series of policies which returned to the Imperial
tradition of bureaucratic capitalism (Bergere, 1981). Bureaucratic capitalism refers to
a kind of capitalist system where capital was controlled by a group of bureaucrats in
the government -- a phenomenon arising in the late Qing dynasty when a group of
"pro-westernisation bureaucrats" controlled and directed national capital into modern
industries. This system was adopted by the Nationalist government whereby national
capital was controlled by the Nationalist Party.
The Kuomingtang regime was more relentless towards the suppression of working
class which became the object of constant supervision and repression. Under the flag
of eliminating all communist influence, a series of measures were adopted in the
draconian law governing unions of October 1929, which required prior approval
from the government, notice and minutes of meetings, prohibition of regional
federations, the appointment of administrative watchdogs over union of civil servants
and so on (Bergere, 1981: 19). In the face of intensified repression, the proletariat
ceased to be a coherent political force.
The Kuomingtang regime even tried to control public opinion in the settlements
where the critical spirit and frequent animosity of the press was irritating. Although it
was not without success, this censorship was strongly resisted by the international
authorities and the liberal intellectual organizations such as the League of Left-wing
Writers founded in February 1930 still prospered in the international settlements.
In 1937, however, the reconquest of Shanghai by the national government was far
from complete. The international statue of Shanghai basically remained and the life
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of the city continued to be largely governed by the evolution of the international
economic situation. The Kuomingtang regime, although anxious to control the
bourgeoisie politically, relied heavily on Shanghai's economic power, and as a
national government it did make efforts to encourage and promote China's
modemisation. National banknotes were introduced, a central bank was established
and government put in place a monetary policy to adjust and regulate interest rates.
Meanwhile, the system of weights and measures was standardised, industrial
registration was enforced, and collection of industrial statistics began. All these
unprecedented measures helped greatly the formation of a national market and thus
facilitated the development of national capitalism. The regaining of tariff autonomy
in 1929 particularly enabled the national government to adjust tariff rates to produce
a favourable position for national capitals in the competition with imports (Lieu,
1936).
Therefore, although the economic growth of Shanghai under the Kuomingtang
regime was less rapid than it had been in the preceding decade, it still managed to
achieve remarkable progress. In 1934 the city had three and a half million inhabitants,
its factories provided half of China's modem industrial production and its port, with
traffic of 35.4 million tons, ranked among the largest in the world (Bergere, 1981:
21). National capital continued to flourish. In Shanghai, the number of spindles in the
Chinese cotton mills increased from 684,204 in 1927 to 1,005,328 in 1931. This
equipment represented 41 per cent of the production capacity of China's cotton mills
(ibid.). For transnational capitalism, Shanghai was still the most important beachhead
to the whole Chinese market, and about half of the foreign direct investment in China
was concentrated in Shanghai at that time.
4.5 The end of international status (1937-1949)
The end of Shanghai's international status started when the all-out Sino-Japanese war
broke out in July 1937. After three months' bitter battle, Japanese troops captured
Chinese Shanghai and its outskirts in November. The administration of the Greater
Shanghai Municipality was then given to the puppet government of Datao. However,
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right up to the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 1941) the status of the international
settlements was conserved, although its territory was drastically cut down.
The war cut Shanghai off from its domestic and foreign markets. The great
international port became "a lonely island". Activity in the port of Shanghai declined
dramatically and the value of foreign trade handled by the port dmpped by 55 per
cent between 1937 and 1938. The military operations of 1937 also destrnyed 5,255
workshops and factories. Estimates of the damage varied from 350 million to 4,500
million Chinese dollars. In addition, after July 1937, 152 factories were transferred to
Free China - China controlled by the Nationalist government (Bergere, 1981: 24).
Once again, the international settlements became a refuge from the war. Hundreds of
thousands of Chinese refugees fled into the Settlements and Chinese businessmen
also moved in to avoid control by the Japanese troops. With the abundance of both
manpower and money, industrial activity in the settlements managed a short period
of revival. However, as a city whose prosperity depended on the Settlements,
Maritime Customs and the doctrine of the Open Door, Shanghai's development was
about to be destroyed.
On 8 December 1941, the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the International
Settlement was overwhelmed by the Japanese troops. The French Concession was
spared for Japan preferred to exert diplomatic pressure on the Vichy government. At
first the Japanese did not destroy the international administration, for they did not
want to relinquish their own rights at Shanghai. However, when Allied efforts in the
Solomon Islands and North Africa were showing success, the Japanese officially
turned all of Shanghai over to Wang Jingwei's administration - its puppet Chinese
government on 9 January 1943 in order to mobilize more Chinese support in this
adversity (Bergere, 1981). Almost the same time, America and Britain signed a treaty
with the Nationalist government, abrogating all extraterritorial rights. France and
fourteen other nations that also had extraterritorial treaties with China followed suit.
Shanghai's international status finally ended.
After Japan's surrender in August 1945, United States Air Force planes flew
Nationalist troops to occupy the city which for the first time was putatively unified
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under a Chinese administration. However, the city's fate was doomed. While the
countly was still in ruins after eight years of Anti-Japanese War, the civil war
between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party who were the alliance
against Japan broke out. For Shanghai, the years of civil war were years of wild
inflation. The government, incapable of financing its growing military expenses,
found no way to tackle the deficit except by issuing of notes: 40 billion Chinese
dollars a day in 1947. In Shanghai, where capital from the Chinese interior found an
outlet and where the government spent a third of its money, prices increased by
33.7% a month during the 1945-8 period (Bergere, 1981: 27).
With the Communist army sweeping over north China, Shanghai was increasingly
losing its raw materials and markets. At the beginning of 1948 only 20 per cent of the
3,000 mills were working to full capacity (Bergere, 1981: 28). Shanghai's economic
activity was only maintained thanks to help from abroad. In 1946-7 deliveries carried
out in the name of 1.JNRRA (United Nation Relief and Rehabilitation Administration)
reached around 500 million American dollars. These relief goods together with the
influx of refugees and their capital brought about feverish activity. This false
prosperity did not last long when the Communist army approached and finally took
the city on the morning of May 25, 1949.
4.6 Shanghai: key to modern China
In his classic book "Shanghai: Key to Modern China", Rhoads Murphey (1953)
started by saying: "This is the study of an anomaly". It is an anomaly for two reasons
(Murphey, 1953). First, modern Shanghai was not born out of the natural evolution
of capitalism in China as were its western counterparts in 17th and 18th century, but
was in effect superimposed on a peasant civilisation. As Murphey (1953: 1) points
out that Shanghai was:
A city of four million people grew up in the short space of a hundred years
out of the traditional agrarian economy of China, before the building of a
modern railway network, before the development of a single national market,
and before other Chinese commercial cities of metropolitan size had appeared.
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Even by 1941, it was still possible to walk from the centre of the Bund to unchanged
agricultural countryside in three or four hours. Second, the concentration of the
administrative functions contributed decisively to the rise of other great cities (Rome,
London, Beijing). It was particularly the case with China where the extraordinarily
developed imperial administrative system was always at the core of economic and
social activities over two thousand years of feudal history. Shanghai, however, has
never performed any administrative functions beyond its own metropolitan limits.
Shanghai's rise was in the main attributed to two factors: the favourable geographical
location and its international status. Location has been the predominant factor in the
growth of the city at every period, and distinguished Shanghai from other treaty ports
which, with the same economic opportunity derived from their political status, were
rapidly outdistanced by Shanghai. Shanghai's advantageous location lies in two
aspects. First, Shanghai stands at the apex of the most fertile and populous area of
comparable size anywhere in the world, the lower Yangtze basin. The Yangtze
watershed totals 750 millions square miles, or half of China proper, and had a
population of approximately 200 millions when the Nanjing Treaty was signed. The
Yangtze delta, bounded by Thenjiang, Hangzhou and Shanghai, an area of about 20
million square miles, had an estimated population of 40 millions. With nearly 80 per
cent of the total land area being cultivated, it was one of the most widely cultivated
areas in China. The delta was also one of the most important areas in producing tea
and silk, then China's two dominant staple exports. Nodes of commerce were thickly
scattered over the fertile triangle, which contained three cities of over half a million
population (Hangzhou, Suzhou and Shanghai).
Apart from the great extent of its hinterland, Shanghai possesses another decisive
locational factor whereby it outpaced other big cities in the delta, namely, its
unrivalled position on China's network of water transportation. Shanghai is located
at the mouth of the Yangtze River and at the central point on the coast of East Asia
(see Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2). On the Yangtze there was an all-year ship channel
for 5,000-ton ships as far as Hankow, 600 miles from Shanghai and a summer
channel to Hankow for 10,000-ton ships. Above Hankow, a permanent steamship
service was maintained as far as Chungking, 1400 miles from the sea, by vessels of
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up to 2,000-ton. The total of inland waterways navigable from Shanghai by junks at
all seasons was nearly 30,000 miles, reaching approximately 200 million people.
Shanghai's orientation to the sea is almost equally favourable. Midway on the China
coast, it lies less than a hundred miles east of the great circle route followed by
shipping between west coast North America, and Japan, China and Southeast Asia.
All of the major commerce lanes of the western Pacific met there. In the pre-
industrial economy of China, water transport was by far the most important volume
carrier. Some Chinese cities such as Hangkou have quite good inland waterways,
others such as Hong Kong and Canton have a good sea routes. But none of them
holds both as Shanghai does. Even for the major cities with similar location in
Southeast Asia, "Shanghai is nearly twice as large as any of them because the trade
of half, and that half the richer one, of the most populous political unit in the world is
funnelled through the city by the pattern of inland waterways and sea routes which
focuses on it" (Murphey, 1953: 3). This transport pattern is reflected in the fact that
Shanghai between 1865 and 1936 handled between 45 and 65 per cent of the total
foreign trade of China by value (ibid.: 48).
However, the advantageous geographical location alone would not have given rise to
a modern cosmopolitan Shanghai. It was its independent political status imposed by
the western powers that made this favourable status meaningful in the rapid
capitalisation and industrialisation of Shanghai. The political status of the
International Shanghai created by the Nanjing Treaty was ambiguous in legal terms.
Under the treaty China conceded no Shanghai territory to Britain. British concern
was not about territory either, its main concern was about the right to trade, and
consequently the right of residence for foreigners in the treaty ports. Furthermore, the
basic law of the foreign settlements - Land Regulations was negotiated and signed
by the British consul and the local circuit intendant (daotai) rather than the two
national governments.
However, the Nanjing Treaty gave British, and later citizens of all powers having
most-favoured-nation agreements with China, the right of extraterritoriality which
placed them under the jurisdiction of their own national laws wherever they went
within China. In the international settlements, therefore, the Chinese authorities lost
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all legal, and with the establishment of Municipal Council, fiscal jurisdiction. The
extraterritoriality was of course a humiliation for Chinese government who lost at
least part of the sovereignty over the international settlements. Nevertheless, it gave
foreigners and the Chinese residents in the international settlements security of
person and property. Such a security was absolutely crucial for modern Shanghai's
formation and prosperity given the fact that China was mainly in disorder and chaos
for over a hundred years after the sign of Nanjing Treaty. Despite all the rebellions
and wars, the foreign settlements were never invaded by a hostile force, nor occupied
by Chinese troops until Japan's assault on China engulfed the entire city after Pearl
Harbour in 1941.
By the early 20th century Shanghai was one of the largest cities in the world as well
as the fmancial and trade centre of the Far East. The Shanghai model has reached its
peak. It is an unusual model in the history of world city development. Imposed by the
western powers, it is a model in which the city was not only economically integrated
with the world capitalist system while its home country was far away from the single
national market, but also politically controlled by westerners. The foundation of this
model was Shanghai's international status which was politically independent from
Chinese authorities. When this special status was endangered under attacks from
rising Chinese nationalism, the model started to decline and finally came to end.
One interesting observation that we can take from Shanghai's rise and fall is the
changing role of the state in Shanghai's urban development. The rise of modern
Shanghai was not organised or planned by the Chinese government, rather, it
occurred exactly at the time when the national government (Qing dynasty) declined
and lost its control over the city. Neither was it planned by any western power. The
power vacuum was filled in by a corporate and business-oriented city government
the Municipal Council of Shanghai. Its decision-making was collegial in nature and it
never had a chief executive. Its political structure was not just international, for the
sake of peace and commerce, it was carefully kept non-national. It was this non-
govemmentalist city-state that gave Shanghai "fifty years of maximum
modemisation with minimum administration" since its power was amplified in 1866
(White, 1981). Ironically, when the Nationalist Party established the national
government and tried to regain control over the city, the growth of Shanghai slowed
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down; and when the Communist Party took power and Shanghai was tightly
controlled by the central government, it completely lost its vitality and
cosmopolitanism which were so strong in its golden age, and which were vital for
Shanghai's development.
The strength of the Shanghai model lies in the fact that when the whole country was
still controlled by a backward political-economic system, the western powers could
implant from outside a modern capitalist system which might otherwise never be
naturally born from within. This externally-induced model, however, contained at its
outset a fatal seed which would grow up and finally destroy the model itself, that is,
nationalism. Chinese nationalism, as much as China's economic revolution, put
down its first modern roots beside the Huangpu. In the city China for the first time
learned and absorbed the lessons of extraterritoriality, gun-boat diplomacy, foreign
concession, and the aggressive spirit of nineteenth century Europe. For the Chinese,
foreign Shanghai was an excrescence on the Chinese body politic; it was the
outstanding symbol of the economic exploitation of China by western imperialism;
and it was the principal reminder of China's unequal treaty status with the western
powers. This reaction against Shanghai and against what it stood for was one of the
few points on which Nationalists and Communists have consistently agreed.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then Chairman of the Nationalist Party, had this to
say about the treaty-ports in 1943:
Year after year our country's life was increasingly concentrated in these
areas... Within the concessions the only ones that prospered were the
compradores... and no productive enterprises developed in these ports
because they could not absorb people from the agricultural villages... This
abnormal development of the national economy could not be adapted to the
defense needs of the state... the imperialists could have strangled the
country's economic life... The state could not protect itself and the people
could barely exist... (Chiang Kai-shek, 1947: 85-87, cited in Murphey, 1953:
27).
The Communist condemnation was even more specific:
Shanghai is the concentrated, typical expression of the colonial or semi-
colonial nature of old China's economy. Its so-called prosperity in the past
was not founded on an independent, sound economic basis, but on
bureaucratic capitalism and on imperialism and its compradores... Such
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colonial or semi-colonial economic status must be discarded before Shanghai
can become a truly prosperous new peoples' city... (China Digest, August 10,
1949: 10, cited in MuTphey, 1953: 27).
The Shanghai model was discarded when the Communist army entered the city in
May 1949. The treaty port system of which Shanghai was the kingpin failed to work
as the nuclei of the institutional ferment that would eventually engulf and transform
China, as did they in South and Southern Asia. In its semicolonial days, Shanghai
was described as "in but not of China" (Murphey, 1988). Therefore, this enclave
economy cut off from China was seemingly easily got rid of by the Communist Party
in 1949. However, what the Shanghai model stands for was far more than a
commercial or industrial phenomenon. The flow of ideas and of noneconomic
institutions was perhaps of greater revolutionary importance in the long run. This
undercurrent constrained by the authoritarian communist regime did not come to
surface until 1979 when the Shanghai model started to partly reemerge, but this time
in the name of globalisation from outside and of the reform and open-door policy
from inside.
4.7 Key relationships of the state and capital in pre-1949 Shanghai
This chapter has examined Shanghai's urban development prior to 1949, focusing on
two underlying forces - the state and capital. From the above analysis, we can
identify the key relationships between the state and capital in four historical periods.
The first period was termed "the formation of modern Shanghai", starting in 1842 --
the year when Shanghai was forced to open to western trade and residents -- and
ending in 1895 when foreigners were granted the right to set up their factories in
Shanghai. In this period, if we were to summarise diagrammatically the key actors in
determining Shanghai's urban development, we would find that one level of the state
- the local state (mainly the SMC) and one level of capital - international capital
were especially critical from 1842 to 1895:
* There was a total of about a hundred treaty port cities by the time of the First World War, including




Due to the extraterritoriality, the Chinese central government (the Qing dynasty) was
kept at arm's length from the international settlements. The main local authority --
the Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement was a typical local
growth coalition, mainly constituting the western elite who had strong local business
interests. Shanghai was opened due to the conflict over the trade and business
between China and western powers, and its early development was overwhelmingly
dominated by the business agenda. The formation of modern Shanghai was mainly
determined by international capital whereas the role of the state was subdued.
This capital-dominated power relationship between the state and capital continued to
develop in the second period-- "the golden age of Shanghai" (1895-1927). Following
the topple of the Qmg dynasty, China entered the warlord period in which the
country was in fact broken down into different warlord-controlled regions, and the
Chinese state was at its weakest. By contrast, Chinese local capital emerged as an
important player in Shanghai's urban restructuring after over fifty years of
international capitalist-led development. The upsurge of local capital came in the
First World War and its aftermath when the presence of the old Imperial powers in
Shanghai began to decline. The establishment of local professional associations, the
Shanghai Bankers' Association in 1917 and the Chinese Millowners' Association in
1918, reflected this tendency.
Therefore, the capital dominated state-capital relationship remained strong in the
golden age of Shanghai. If there was any difference, as shown in the following




International capital 	 I	 I	 Local capital
The capital dominated state-capital relationship started to change in the third period
of Shanghai's urban development--Nationalist Shanghai (1927-1937). In this period,
although the international status of Shanghai continued, the Kuomingtang regime
started to tighten its economic control of international settlements by using state
capital. As a result, Shanghai, for the first time since 1842, was affected by another
key actor - the central state which appeared in state-capital relations by bringing in
bureaucratic capital. However, as indicated in the following diagram, the penetration
of the central state was indirect given the fact that the international settlements were
still politically controlled by the westerners. Shanghai's remaining international
status meant that although the state-capital relationship started to tilt toward the state
side, Shanghai's urban development was still basically determined by the capitalistic
logic.
The capital dominated state-capital relationship was finally transformed in the fourth
period (1937-1949) when Shanghai's international status came to end. The Japanese
occupation and later the renouncement of treaty rights by western powers put an end
to Shanghai's century-long international settlements and together with it the
Shanghai Municipal Council. International capital fled the war-plagued country, and
its impacts on Shanghai's urban development faded away. Therefore, in this period
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(the period of 1945-1949), the key state-capital relationship that determined
Shanghai's urbanisation processes can be depicted as follows:
Central state	 I	 I	 Local state
National/local capital
The Chinese central state finally got control of Shanghai. However, this was a
government that was going to lose its control to the Communist Party even before it
could establish a stable state-capital relationship. The victory of the Communist
Party in the civil war in 1949 is a watershed in the history of Shanghai's urban
development. As examined in this chapter, before 1949, Shanghai's changing urban
pattern was dominated by the capitalistic logic, despite the increasing challenge from
the Chinese state. This capital-dominated relationship of the state and capital was
fundamentally changed by the communist revolution, which brought about a socialist
Shanghai. It is this socialist Shanghai that I turn to in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND URBAN STRUCTURE IN
PRE-REFORM SHANGHAI
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 examines Shanghai's urban structure under the political economy of state
socialism (1949-1978). The introduction of state socialism eliminated private capital,
and Shanghai's urban development was determined exclusively by the state,
particularly the central state. State policies, particularly the overriding policy of
industrialisation with minimum urbanisation, transformed Shanghai from a capitalist
city of consumption into a socialist city of production. This revolutionary change is
then analysed from aspects of economic base, spatial morphology and social
structure. The chapter is finished by a brief summary of the underpinning state-
capital relationship in Socialist Shanghai.
5.2 Shanghai under state socialism
The victory of the Communist Party over the Nationalist Party in the civil war
brought about a completely new political economy - that of state socialism. This
political economy revolutionised the relationship between the state and capital, on
which Shanghai's urban structure was based. Like the Nationalists, the Communists
put Shanghai under the direct control of central government, both politically and
administratively. Unlike the Nationalist government which adopted a market-based
economic system, the Communist government adopted a Soviet-style centrally
planned economy in which economic decisions were made by central government
and sent down through ministerial channels to the state work unit. Under the
centrally planned system, all territorial localities lost their position as independent
economic units, because local government's major responsibility was to ensure SOEs
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located in their territories to fulfil the plans set by the central government rather than
to develop the local economy.
State socialism entailed the nationalisation of the private sector. Most of the city's
capitalists had fled to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and other part of south east Asia
before the communist army entered Shanghai in May 1949. In order to help the
economy recover from the war, the government was initially more tolerant than
expected to the remaining private sector. This is reflected by the fact that in 1953 the
private sector still accounted for more than 63% of Shanghai's output (Howe, 1981).
However, under state socialism, private capital was doomed to be reformed,
controlled and restricted and finally nationalised. With the progress of socialisation,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange was closed, market-based prices were replaced by
prices set by the state, private enterprises were forced into joint state-private
ownership, and the nationalisation of the private sector was finally completed in
1956.
Table 5.1 shows the dramatic change of ownership structure of Shanghai's industrial
enterprises from 1952-1978. In 1952, three years after the communist party came to
power, there were 288 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 37 collective-owned
enterprises (COEs), and 25,613 other enterprises. After a wave of socialist
transformation started in 1952, by the year of 1962 there were no other enterprises at
all in Shanghai's industrial ownership structure. Indeed, any form of private
ownership of industrial enterprises virtually disappeared in Shanghai for more than
two decades.
Table 5.1 Number of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in Shanghai,
19521978a
SOEs	 COEs	 Othersb	 Total
Year	 Number 0 of	 Number o of	 Number 0o of
total	 total	 total
1952	 228	 1	 37	 0	 25613	 99	 25878
1962	 3529	 40	 5280	 60	 0	 0	 8809
1970	 3253	 33	 6581	 67	 0	 0	 9834
1978	 3372	 42	 4590	 58	 0	 0	 7962
Notes: Includes all enterprises operating at the village level and above. Excluded
are those operating below village level and those operated by individual
households.
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b Others include private and state-private joint enterprises.
Source: Mok (1996: 206)
Another fundamental change to Shanghai's urban development came from its
relationship to the west. Immediate after Shanghai's fall to the communist army, the
Nationalist blockade and the United Nation Embargo on China, effectively closed the
sea routes through which Shanghai's economy had been closely linked with the west.
The rise of two camps in the post-war international politics led China's foreign trade
further towards the Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) bloc,
particularly the Soviet Union. The breaking of China's tie with the Soviet Union in
the 1 960s did not increase China's trade with the west but further strengthened its
self-reliance policy (Tian, 1996). This closure of Shanghai's relation to the west that
had been vital to its economic life remained basically unchanged until China opened
up its door to the outside in the late 1 970s.
The abolition of private capital and the isolation of China from world capitalism
meant that private capital no longer existed as an independent force affecting urban
development in China. An equation without capital meant that state policy became
the only decisive factor defining Shanghai's fate. Due to the highly centralised
political regime, the local state was no more than a subordinate extension of the
central state and as such played a very limited role in its own urban development.
Therefore, in order to understand urban stmcture in pre-reform Shanghai, it is
imperative to focus on the policies of the central state.
China's urban development in the pre-reform era has been well-known for its
"under-urbanisation" while most of the third world countries experienced the
explosive city growth in l960s and 1970s that came with the rapid industrialisation,
China was said to have industrialised without becoming urbanised (Tang, 1993).
Some attributed this under-urbanisation to political reasons such as class struggle and
Mao's anti-urbanisation (Gurley, 1973; Ma, 1976). Recently, more scholars tend to
see it from an economic point of view, arguing that China's under-urbanisation can
only be accounted for by its particular industrialisation policy (eg. Kirkby, 1985;
Mingione, 1987; Chan, 1992).
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After taking power in 1949, the Communist regime, as in other socialist countries,
adopted industrialisation strategies modelled upon that implemented in the USSR
under Stalin. This traditional Soviet or Stalinist growth strategy is characterised by:
(a) sustained high rates of domestic saving, which are used to achieve high
accumulation rates and high rates of output growth; (b) unbalanced growth
based on industry, especially heavy industry, often leading to the neglect of
other aspects of the economy; and (c) discriminatory policies against
agriculture: massive "tribute" from the agriculture sector is designed to
finance rapid industrial growth through collectivisation and setting of
commodity prices. (Fallenbuchl, 1970, cited in Chan, 1992: 278-279.).
This strategy was designed to achieve industrialisation as soon as possible so as to
demonstrate the superiority of socialism to capitalism. However, it contained a
potential problem that would thwart this high ambition, i.e., urbanisation. The
massive investment in industry and discriminatory policies against agriculture
created immense incentives for peasants to migrate from rural areas to cities with a
consequence of high rate of urbanisation. However, urbanisation in this context is
deemed "costly", because not only does it increase aggregate consumption by raising
the migrants' consumption levels, but also the urban population requires a much
higher per capita investment in infrastructure. These high consumption costs are of
course at variance with the socialist objective of high accumulation necessary for
rapid industrial growth (Chan, 1992). To prevent this undesired urbanisation,
socialist countries usually impose many constraints to regulate rural-urban labour
mobility. As a result, socialist economies generally have lower urbanisation levels
than those of comparable market economies based on similar per capita GNP.
Socialist China was no exception in this regard. If there is any difference, China
under Mao took the policies of maximising industrialisation and at the same time
minimising urbanisation to extremes. China adopted a draconian household
registration system (Hukou) to control population mobility, which effectively
confined the people to where they were born. Other measures to "economise" on
urbanisation included fuller utilisation of the existing urban working-age population,
suppression of the expansion of urban service employment and personal
consumption in general, promotion of rural industrialisation and increase use of
urban "temporary" workers (Chan, 1992). Meanwhile, the Chinese government gave
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an overriding commitment to achieving high levels of output growth by devoting a
large share of the country's "national income" (net material product, NMP) to
investment at the expense of current consumption and standards of living. As shown
in Table 5.2, except for 1961-2, the period immediately after the disastrous Great
Leap Forward, China maintained high rates of accumulation throughout the period
from 1953-85. For most of these years, accumulation rates were above 25% which
was higher than other socialist countries, reaching a peak of39.3°o in 1958-60.
Table 5.2 China's State Investment Patterns and Output Growth, 1952-85
1953- 1958- 1961- 1963- 1966- 1971- 1976- 1981-
57	 60	 2	 5	 70	 5	 80	 5
Shares of Net Material Product based on current price (%)
Consumption	 75.8	 60.7	 85.0	 77.3	 73.7	 67.0	 66.8	 69.2
Accumulation	 24.2	 39.3	 15.0	 22.7	 26.3	 33.0	 33.2	 30.8
Sectoral shares of state capital investment (%)
Heavy industry 36.1	 54.0	 45.9	 51.1	 49.6	 45.9	 38.5
Light industry	 6.4	 6.4	 3.9	 4.4	 5.8	 6.7	 6.9
Agriculture	 7.1	 11.3	 17.7	 18.7	 9.8	 10.5	 5.1
Transportand	 15.3	 13.5	 12.7	 15.4	 18.0	 12.9	 13.3
communication
Commerce and 3.6	 2.0	 2.5	 2.1	 2.9	 3.4	 5.9
services
Housing	 9.1	 4.1	 6.9	 4.0	 5.7	 11.8	 21.3
Source: Chan (1992: 283)
Table 5.2 also shows that the allocation of state investment in China was
characteristically skewed in favour of heavy industry. In most of the years before
1980 about half of the state capital investments were devoted to heavy industry,
while the share of light indusiiy never rose above 7 per cent. Although 80% of
Chinese population were peasants, for most of the time the share of agriculture in
state investment fluctuated around lO 0 o. Investment in tertiary industries was
similarly suppressed. Investment in housing, seen as a typical non-productive sector,
accounted for between 4 and 11.8° o of total investment before 1980, but jumped to
21.3°c in 1981-5 due to the introduction of the reform policy in the late 1970s (see
Table 5.2).
This industrialisation strategy and capital investment policy it entailed had decisive
implications for China's urbanisation dynamics and policies. Indeed, some believe
that it was the industrialisation imperative that shaped China's urbanisation (eg
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Kirkby, 1985). Needless to say, Shanghai's urban development should be understood
in this national context. As a model city of China's socialism, Shanghai's spatial
growth in socialist era was very illustrative of the spatial consequence of China's
under-urbanisation strategy. By analysing aerial photographs of the city proper, taken
in years 1947, 1958, 1964, 1979, 1984, 1988 and 1993, Mei et al (1998) conducted a
comparative research on Shanghai's spatial expansion in different eras. Figure 5.1 is
a simplified version of spatial expansion of Shanghai's built-up area during the
period 1947-1993. According to Mei et al, the built-up area of Shanghai's city proper
was 91.5 square kilometres. By 1993, this had increased to 241.2 square kilometres.
This means that the intensely urbanised area of Shanghai in 1993 was 2.63 times
larger than that of 1947. The built-up area of Shanghai, therefore, had increased at an
average rate of 3.2 square kilometres per year.
By comparing the average growth rate of the built-up area in different periods, the
research shows that Shanghai's spatial expansion was greatly affected by China's
urbanisation strategy. In early period of China's socialist development, Shanghai's
built-up area expanded rapidly. Between 1947 and 1958, the built-iip area grew by
3.25 square kilometres per year, and between 1958 and 1964 by 3.75 square
kilometres annually. In contrast, during the period 1964 to 1979, when China rigidly
adopted the policy of industrialisation priority at the cost of urbanisation, the growth
rate of built-up area decreased significantly to only 1.31 square kilometres per year.
Since the Chinese government adopted market-oriented policies in 1979, the growth
rate of Shanghai's built-up area began to increase. Between 1979 - 1984, 1984
1988, and 1988 1993, the average annual rates of increase were 3.78 square
kilometres, 6.83 square kilometres, and 5.1 square kilometres respectively.
The impact of China's policies of maximising industrialisation and minimising
urbanisation on Shanghai's spatial development is further illustrated by the
extremely slow growth of Shanghai's residential land use area. Between 1964 and
1979, the growth of Shanghai's residential area was almost zero. In fact, between
1958 and 1979, Shanghai's residential land use areas increased by only 3.02 square












Figure 5.1 Urban Growth of Shanghai during the Period 1947-1994
1
-
Source: Mci et al (1998: 134)
As discussed below, socialist state policy had revolutionary impacts on Shanghai's
urban development, transforming it from a capital-driven capitalist "consumption"
metropolis (xiaofeixing chengshi) into a state-defined socialist "productive" city
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(shengchanxing chengshi). This revolutionary change is analysed from the three
perspectives of economic base, spatial morphology and social structure.
5.3 Economic base
As illustrated in the previous chapter, Shanghai was China's biggest multi-functional
metropolitan city before 1949 functioning as the financial and trade centre of China.
State socialism changed it all. Private financial institutions were not allowed. State-
owned banks were run not so much as commercial companies as extensions of
governmental departments, and as such, all the state-own banks were headquartered
in Beijing, the capital of People's Republic. Similar to the administrative units, these
banks setup a vertically-controlled hierarchy of branches across the country.
China's foreign trade was also monopolised by the government. Nine national
Foreign Trade Companies (FTCs) organised along product lines directly controlled
107 local branches with their headquarters in Beijing. The national FTCs directly
negotiated business with foreign customers for "category I" exports, mainly bulk
products such as petroleum and agricultural products. The FTCs branches, mostly
located in five coastal cities including Shanghai, had the exclusive right to negotiate
exports of Category II and III and fulfil the export orders under category I (For the
categorisation of imports and exports and their management, see Tian, 1996). In
contrast to exports, imports were more tightly controlled at the central level. While
national FTCs controlled about 200o of exports, about 8000 of China's total imports
were directly negotiated by them and fulfilled by their branches (Tian, 1996).
Due to its isolation from the west to which China's economy and particularly
Shanghai's economy had been linked prior to 1949, China's foreign trade remained
at a very low level after 1949. In 1950, China's total exports reached US$ 552
million, while Shanghai's total exports had reached US$ 993 million as early as 1920.
In 1970, 20 years after the communist party came to power, Shanghai's exports rose
slowly to USS 867 million, still below the value that it achieved 50 years before
(Tian, 1996).
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Although Shanghai's foreign trade shrank dramatically in absolute term, it was still
China's most important trade centre accounting for about 3000 of China's total
imports and exports throughout the period 1949-78. However, the situation is quite
different from the one prior to 1949 when Shanghai was China's dominant trade
centre. While the previous position stemmed from market forces, this time it was
administratively induced. Shanghai, due to its favourable location and its historical
position, was chosen by the Chinese government to be China's major trade centre. in
other words, the Shanghai branches of FTCs were given more orders to export and
more import quotas by their head office in Beijing. Although Shanghai's position as
China's trade centre was maintained in this way, its relation to the world market as
well as its hinterland through foreign trade had been changed under this vertically
controlled system. Companies were indifferent to changes in the world market
because they could get orders and quotations from their national FTCs regardless.
Horizontal economic relations between Shanghai and its hinterland that developed
naturally in the market economy in accordance with the factor endowment were
replaced by a vertical command system. As a result, Shanghai's entrepot function
whereby the Yangzi Delta was integrated with the world market largely disappeared.
Shanghai's domestic entrepot function also disappeared. In a centrally planned
economy, production factors such as labour, land, capital and other materials, which
used to be allocated by market forces, were administratively allocated by the various
governmental departments. Due to this strong government intervention, many tertiary
sectors associated with the flow of materials were depressed and some of them
simply disappeared. Under the public-ownership-based, centrally planned system
Shanghai's position as China's financial centre was lost and its trade function was
highly restricted, while its industrial function encouraged by China's industrialisation
strategy expanded quickly.
The restriction of tertiary industry and the further growth of industry rendered
Shanghai's sectoral structure increasingly dominated by manufacturing industry.
From 1952 to 1978, industry's annual growth rate in terms of GDP reached 10.7°c,
while tertiary sectors' was only 4.6°c. As a result, the share of tertiary industry in
Shanghai's GDP shrank from 41.7°c in 1952 to l8.6° in 1978, while industry's
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share increased from 52.4% to 77.4% (han, 19%). Shanghai had been transformed
from a "multi-functional city" to a "uni-functional city", from a capitalist
"consumption city" to a socialist "productive city".
Alongside this sectoral restructuring, a dramatic change occurred within the stmcture
of Shanghai's industry. Before 1949, Shanghai's industry was dominated by light
industry, particularly textiles. In 1949, the textile sector accounted for 62.4% of total
industrial output and heavy industry just 13.6°o (Table 5.3). By the end of First Five
Year Plan (1953-7), the heavy sector had nearly tripled its share to 36.5% while that
of textiles had nearly halved. This trend continued in a slower pace after 1957. By
1976, the heavy sector accounted for 53.4°c of Shanghai's industrial output. This
structural transformation was due to China's heavy-industry-first policy whereby the
lions share of state investment was put into heavy industry. It has been estimated that
investment in Shanghai's light industry accounted for only 4.3 0 o of the city's
industrial investment (Tian,, 1996).
Table 5.3 Shares of Heavy, Light, and Textile Industries in Total Gross Value of
Industrial Output in Shanghai, Various Years 1949-1975 (%)
1949	 1957	 1962	 1975
Heavy industry 13.6	 36.5	 50	 53.4
Light industry	 24.0	 26.9-i
86.4	 . 63.5	 50	 46.6
Textile industry 62.4 J	 36.6
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Howe (1981: 160)
Heavy industries such as steel and petrochemicals which were a major component of
Shanghai's heavy sector were highly resource-intensive. The rapid growth of heavy
industry led to a rapid increase in consumption of raw materials such as coal,
petroleum and iron. From 1949 to 1979, Shanghai's GDP increased by 9.5 times,
while the consumption of energy and steel increased by 24 times and 75 times
respectively (Zhu, 1994). As Shanghai lacks all raw materials, they all had to be
transported in, which fed further the already congested traffic in the city. Shanghai
increasingly looked like a mega-factory while losing its glory as a centre of finance,
trade and commerce in the Far East in the 1 920s and 193 Os.
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5.4 Spatial morphology
The development and land-use pattern of socialist cities differed fundamentally from
that of capitalist cities. In the capitalist city, private property and urban planning are
two major factors in shaping the land use pattern. Urban planning, as the political
input to determining the physical structure of a city, although strong from a legal
point of view, is however highly restricted, since private property rights are strongly
protected by law. In state socialism, state ownership of land and the centrally planned
investment system provide ideal prerequisites for urban planning. Socialist principles
about the urban development such as equal accessibility to all public amenities and
non-spatial segregation were supposed to be implemented totally by political
decision (French and Hamilton, 1979). However, in reality, the implementation of
these socialist principles was not without constraints.
The first and probably the most important constraint is history (French and Hamilton,
1979). Socialism could not be built overnight, and nor could its cities. The socialist
city has to be built upon the physical structure set by the previous social system. As a
result, a socialist city normally has two distinctive parts: the pre-socialist inner city
which might be partially changed under socialism and the socialist outer area which
is located in the periphery of city and which is charactensed by planned uniformity.
Socialist Shanghai's spatial morphology had this character. The basic physical
structure of inner Shanghai, laid down in its colonialist era, had not been changed,
although all the houses were nationalised and the function of many prestigious
buildings had been altered. The biggest physical change was probably the conversion
of the horse-race course into a huge square where political rallies and parades could
take place. The building of large squares in the central city for political reasons was a
common feature in many big cities in socialist countries (French and Hamilton,
1979).
Picture 5.1 is an aerial photography taken in 1937, which shows a clear bird's-eye
view of Shanghai's horse-race course. The horse-race course, built by British in 1862,
was located in the British-controlled international settlement, which was turned into
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Source: Wu (2002: 21)
Picture 5.2 Partial View of People's Square in the late 1990s




Source: Courtesy of Xinfa Xie
Shanghai's centre in early 1900s. In the upper side of the picture, we can see the
Bund standing alongside the Huangpu River with Pudong in the other side of the
river. Due to its size and central location, the horse-race course had become one of
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power in 1949, the horse-race course, seen as a shameful colonial legacy, was
converted into People's Square where politicall rallies took place.
The physical structure and the political function of People's Square had not changed
until l990s when China's market-oriented reform entered its second decade. Taken
in the late 1990s, Picture 5.2 shows a part of the reconstructed People's Square. In
the centre of the square stands the newly built Shanghai's Municipal Government
Building, opposite to which is Shanghai Museum. Around the square is a circular
road - a clear legacy of the horse-race course.
Figure 5.2 New Workers' Viflages in Shanghai. 1952
Urban area
LIJ Workers Village
In contrast to the urban core area, Shanghai's fringe area experienced a great deal of
physical development with a distinctive socialist imprint (Fung, 1981). Not long after
the communist take-over, the city government started to build large-scale housing
pmject for industrial workers in peripheral areas in order to alleviate the high
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population density problem m the central city. The housing project, called "workers
new village" in China, was similar to the mikroraion that became the basic building
block of the Soviet city (Smith, 1996). It comprised a neighbourhood unit of living
spaces in the form of blocks of flats, for perhaps 5,000 to 15,000 people. Within a
short walking distance, people can find a wide range of day-to-day needs services
such as schools, day-care facilities, markets, clinics and other public amenities. To
avoid long-distance commuting between the places of residence and factories, all the
new villages were located in close proximity to the existing industrial districts (see
Figure 5.2). The mikroraion, with its similar or identical blocks of flats and the equal
accessibility to public services for workers, embodied socialist ideology of equality
in living standards. It has been argued that "how far a city as a whole could be
described as socialist in its physical organisation was largely a matter of the extent to
which it was dominated by the mikroraion" (Smith, 1996).
However, these nine workers housing projects completed in 1952 were the only one
that the SMG had ever built in such a large scale. Since then, most housing was built
in the way in which Shanghai's spatial morphology, which was supposed to be
highly planned, ended up with disorganised land use pattern characterised by the
mixture of the residential area and the industrial area.
This mixed land use pattern led us to the second constraint facing urban planners in
socialist countries, i.e., the priority that was given to the industrialisation by the state.
This is particularly the case with China where the government gave an overriding
commitment to the industrialisation-first policy. Under this strategy, urban planning
was highly subordinated to economic planning and the function of urban planning
was to translate economic planning into a physical blueprint (Yeh and Wu, 1996; Wu,
1997). In fact, the subordination was such that planning permission was normally not
a concern for a project manager because it would be given automatically with a
successful application of the project.
As a result of its centrally planned economy, China had a centrally controlled
investment allocation system that was based on the economic sector. Under this
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system, all medium and big projects had to be submitted to the Central Planning
Commission (CPC) for approval and the provincial government only had the
authority for small projects using its own coffers. In this procedure, a project hatched
by the state work unit or the ministry was proposed by its responsible ministry to the
CPC. Upon the approval by the CPC, it would be given a certain amount of money
and together with it a parcel of land which was usually on the urban edge where
unoccupied land was available. The CPC assessed the project on the basis of a so-
called "comprehensive balance" (sectoral vs. territorial; central vs. local; sectoral vs.
sectoral; local vs. local) and the use of land was not its concern (Wu, 1997). The city
where the project would be located was only notified when the project had been
approved. The municipality did not participate in the planning stage, nor did it have
right to intervene with the use of land. The work unit negotiated directly with the de
facto landowner (farmers in most case) to acquire the land for construction. The
involvement of the municipality was minimal apart from issuing the land acquisition
permit (Yeh and Wu, 1996; Wu, 1997).
This kind of development method has been called "sectoral based, project-specific
development" (Yeh and Wu, 1996). Under this system, land was actually held by
various state work units that belonged to different ministries, and the urban landscape
was in fact the by-product of the constellation of various projects. As a result, land
management that wns supposed to be unified under the socialist public-owned land
system was in reality highly fragmented, leaving the municipality powerless in
control over its own landscape.
Figure 5.3 is a simplified version of Shanghai's land use structure in 1990. A decade
after the introduction of market-oriented reforms, the figure still shows clearly the
legacy of the socialist land development method the fragmented use of land in and
around the city proper. Land used for industrial purposes scatters over the city proper.
Even in districts such as Xuhui (southwest part of downtown Shanghai) that is
characterised as a high-grade residential area, where most of the city's leading
The crit&ia fx the medium and b1g projt vary. Befrre the end of 1984, the projt with investment
of RMB 10 million above fell into this category.
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In socialist China, city governments were indifferent to the provision and
maintenance of urban infrastructure for two reasons. First, under the centralised
fiscal system, they had a very limited revenue for their own use because the bulk of
the expenditure came from the central government. So, city governments did not
have enough money to provide urban infrastructure which required a large
investment, even they wanted to (Yeh and Wu, 1996). Second, city governments
tended to spend their limited revenue on local enterprises from which they drew their
own income rather than on collective consumption items such as urban infrastructure
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(Wu, 1997). This reluctance to invest led to the deterioration of urban infrastructure
in urban China.
Because of the lack of urban amenities, particularly the underdeveloped public
transportation, work units always tried to build their projects in the central city in
order to make most use of the existing urban infrastructure. When projects had to be
located in the city edge, work units tended to build their residential areas adjacent to
industrial area so that workers could avoid the long distance commuting. The
associated public services were also provided within the residential area, similar to
the mikroraion but on a smaller scale. These self-reliant communities were very
common in CPC-approved projects. In the investment package of projects approved
by the CPC, there were normally two kinds of investment: productive investment
which was the major part for the project, and non-productive investment which was
allocated proportionally for worker's housing and associated community services. In
other words, to facilitate production, each project had to provide for investment in
services and infrastructure (Wu, 1997, 1998).
This project-specific development, together with the inadequate provision of urban
infrastructure brought about a mixed land use pattern in Shanghai's physical
structure. In the inner city, while more and more service sectors disappeared,
factories and particularly the small factories run by the sub-city government and the
local residents committee were wedged into the residential areas. In the periphery of
the city, self-contained communities were scattered around. As a result, the mixture
of residential areas and industrial areas became a typical feature of Shanghai's pre-
reform built environment (Yeh and Wu, 1996).
5.5 Social stratification
The CCP came to power with the promise that class would be abolished and social
equality would be established in socialist China. True, under state socialism, China
was more equal with respect to income than other developing societies. Research by
Parish (1984) shows in early l970s China's gini index of the inequality in terms of
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household income was 0.25 comparing with 0.46 in twenty-three developing market
states. China was even slightly more equal than the average socialist state. However,
social stratification did exist in socialist China as it did in other socialist countries.
This social stratification was of course fundamentally different from that in capitalist
societies. The difference lay not only in the sheer size of income gap, but more
importantly, in the stratification mechanism. The stratification system in state
socialist societies was basically an outcome of the redistributive economic system,
where the state's bureaucratic concerns overruled market coordination (Szelenyi,
1978). Unlike market economies where the major determinants of social stratification
were individual and familial background characteristics, either ascribed or achieved,
in state socialist societies, an individual's economic and social position depended on
the person's location in the state allocation system.
An important question then, is, what are the major factors affecting a person's
location in the state allocation system? Four major factors have been identified in
China: (1) sector that refers to the position of an individual's employer (work unit) in
the state-collective ownership hierarchy of the society, (2) region, and (3)
individual's political capital and (4) human capital (Wang and So, 1994). In urban
China, however, the focus has been on China's unique system of work units. The
major finding is that people in urban China were socially stratified by the work unit
they belonged to. While there was a high degree of equality within the same work
unit, there was a considerable differentiation across different work units (Walder,
1989; Xiao et al, 1990; Bian, 1994; Bian and Logan, 1996).
A work unit refers to the workplace of an urban resident in China. Work units were
officially classified into three broad categories: profit-making enterprises, non-profit
institutions and party and government agencies. Despite the different functions,
government administration was the core of these agencies. In fact, all work units
were operated directly by the government's system of administration. The work unit
was of course far more than an economic organisation where people earned their
wages. It had always been the central institution through which the communist
regime exercised control over the society (Schurmann, 1968; Whyte and Parish,
1984). Bian (1994) summarises three non-economic functions of the work unit as an
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administrative unit to administer the country, as a political vehicle to control workers,
and as a welfare organisation to distribute goods and services.
Although all work units were public owned, they were segmented by the extent to
which the state claims its ownership rights over the economic properties of work
units. After the socialisation campaign was completed in 1956, the Chinese urban
economy contained three forms of ownership: a predominant state sector, a
dependent collective sector, and a tiny private sector. The properties of a state
organisation (eg. state-owned enterprise (SOE) as a state economic organisation) are
owned by "all the people" of the country. In contrast, a collective organisation's (eg.
collective-owned enterprise (CEO)) properties are owned by its employees. Although
both state and collective organisations were regarded by the party as publicly owned,
to the Chinese leadership the state sector was ideologically "more advanced" because
socialist ideology required the state to control the means of production and
consumption. This ideological affection for state ownership resulted in the state
sector being treated favourably in comparison with the collective sector in retaining
economic resources, business opportunities and incentives (Bian, 1994).
Work units were also differentiated by the way in which they were organised and
operated, both horizontally and hierarchically, by the government administration
(Bian, 1994). In China, the government administration is composed of five
bureaucratic levels: (I) central; (2) province, autonomous municipal city, or
autonomous region; (3) city or prefecture; (4) urban district or rural county; and (5)
urban sub-district or rural township. Within each level, administrative branches (i.e.,
central ministries and local bureaus) are established to control work organisations
and coordinate economic activities. Every enterprise or institution belongs to an
administrative ministry or bureau at one of the given levels of administration. In the
case of Shanghai, there were four levels of administration: central, municipal, district
and sub-district, to which all work units belong.
Every work unit was also ranked bureaucratically. The higher level the work unit
belonged to, the higher bureaucratic rank was given. For example, the central-run
organisations had high bureaucratic ranks, ranging in positions close to the rank of
ministry (for an industrial complex) down to the ranks of division (for single-unit
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factory or branch office). In a centrally planned economy where all resources were
centrally distributed along administrative lines, a higher level of government had
greater ability to acquire economic resources and incentives, and thus allocated them
to the enterprises and institutions under its jurisdiction. As a result, a pattern of
differential resources distributions was formed in which the allocation of resources
and incentives favoured organisations that were operated by higher levels of
government and within each level, by work organisations with a higher bureaucratic
rank (Bian, 1994).
The ownership structure and the bureaucratic structure constituted a complex net of
work unit systems in which every work unit found its own place. Work unit
resources depended on their location in this net - its location in the state allocation
system - rather than on its performance or profitability in a market sense (Walder,
1989, 1992). The area where work units demonstrated their differential ability to
retain resources for their workers was mainly not in terms of wage income, but the
non-cash incomes that were subsidies and incomes in kind such as ration coupon
subsidy and housing subsidy. For most of the lime in socialist China, bonuses as well
as other material incentives were rare because they were branded as capitalist ways.
Wages were then almost people's only cash income.
The wage system in pre-reform socialist China was basically adopted from Soviet
system with various modifications in different periods. Under this system, wages
were regulated by the central government using complex pay scales that varied by
region, industry and occupation (Korzec and Whyte, 1981; Bian, 1994). These scales
also depended on seniority, work performance, political activity and so on. To
promote an egalitarian society, the difference between wage scales was set to be
small - a difference of only several Yuan between two consecutive standards (Korzec
and Whyte, 1981). This centrally - regulated wage system was the most important
factor equalising people's income in socialist China.
Within work unit, egalitarianism was the common norm. The wage difference was
small, and more importantly, workers in the same work unit enjoyed similar access to
the welfare system. Across work units, however, a relatively considerable
discrepancy has been found. Table 5.4 shows how two major structural variables -
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ownership and bureaucratic hierarchy - affected people's wage in different work
units in 1980. First, there was a bias in favour of the state sector. Wage levels were
higher for state workers than for collective workers. Second, wage levels were higher
for organisations run by higher administrative levels. From state sectors run by
central ministries to township collective, the average annual wage level decreased
accordingly from RMB942 to RMB 570 in 1980.
Table 5.4 Average Annual Wages by Structural Variables in 1980




Foreign capital enterprises	 789	 101.3
State enterprises	 859	 110.3
State-collective joint ventures	 748	 96.0




(2) By Bureaucratic Hierarchy (state and collective only)
Total	 754	 100.0
Central ministry	 942	 124.9
Provincial government 	 834	 110.6
County government	 729	 96.7
County collective	 638	 84.6
Urban street collective	 592	 78.5
Township collective	 570	 75.6
Note: *Calculated by dividing the average wage for the category by total average
wage, multiplied by 100.
Source: Bian (1994: 164).
This wage inequality across different types of work units was, however, of secondary
importance compared to the discrepancy of non-cash income, i.e., variations in
access to public goods, such as housing (Whyte and Parish, 1984; Walder, 1986,
1992). In a redistributive economy, non-cash income plays far more important role in
detennining people's total income than the case in a market economy where the
monetization of people's income is a norm. Many goods such as housing that may
cost a very large amount of money in capitalist societies were regarded as public
welfare and therefore provided by the state. Research conducted by Griffin and Zhao
(1993) found that, ten years after the reform policies were introduced by the Chinese
government to eliminate egalitarian structure, subsidies and incomes in kind still
accounted for 39.1°o of urban residents' total income in 1988.
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Due to the importance of non-cash income, accessibility to public goods particularly
housing became the decisive factor affecting people's real income. Again, people's
accessibility to the public goods depended on their work units' capability to obtain
resources from the state, because public goods were allocated through work units.
Compared with the wages that were regulated by the central government, subsidies
and incomes in kind were more dependent on an individual work unit's ability to
negotiate with the government. Housing was a typical case in point. As mentioned
before, housing was often built in the form of specific-project developments in which
investment for housing was included in a package of investment for the whole
project. How much a work unit could get for housing was highly dependent on its
capability to seize business opportunities, and when it got the project, on its
capability of negotiation with the government. Again, high rank work units such as
central-run SOEs occupied more favourable positions in this regard. This was
demonstrated by the fact that people working in the higher rank work units were
more likely to have better housing.
In sum, China and in this case, Shanghai, enjoyed relatively high social equality.
Income distribution among the working-class population was relatively egalitarian
because of the centrally controlled redistribution system. However, earnings from
state owned resources were not distributed directly to producers (workers and
peasants), but were collected by the state and redistributed to individuals according
to their positions in the state's politically defined and ranked bureaucratic system. In
this redistribution system, the state work unit system was critical for people's
incomes and standard of living, because the redistribution was carried out through
work units that were differentiated from the dimension of ownership structure and of
administrative structure. In other words, inequalities among individuals were
mediated through inequalities among work units. People were, therefore, stratified
not so much by their own characteristics as by work units to which they belonged.
5.6 Key state-capital relationships in Socialist Shanghai (1949-1978)
The victory of the Communist party in 1949 brought about a revolution which put an
end to capitalist Shanghai. Under the highly centralised Communist party system and
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the Soviet-style centrally planned economiic system, Shanghai lost its position as an
independent economic unit. The relationship to the west, which had been so critical
for Shanghai's successful economic development since 1842, was completely cut off.
International capital no longer existed. Most of national capital had fled to Taiwan,
Hong Kong and overseas, and the remaining capital was nationalised. Private capital
was then abolished as required by the sociallist ideology.
In contrast, the state, particularly the central state, was the dominant force that
decided Shanghai's fate. The key actors in Shanghai's urban development, therefore,
were the predominant central state and to much less extent the local state, and the
role of capital as an independent actor disappeared in the state-capital relation that
underlies Shanghai's urban development:
Central state
Local state
As discussed in terms of economic base, spalial morphology and social structure, this
state-defined relationship has transformed Shanghai from a capitalist cosmopolitan
city into a socialist "production city". Although it still played a very important role in
the national industrialisation, Shanghai was isolated with the world economy, and
lost its role as the financial and trade centre in the Far East.
The absence of capital in the key state-capital relationship was going to be changed
by market-oriented reforms and open door policies adopted by the Chinese
government in the late 1978. The introduction of capital and the emergence of a new
state-capital relationship that comes with it, will have had a profound impact on
Shanghai's urban development. The next chapter will examine how the reform
redefined the role of the Chinese state (the central and the local), and the impact of
this redefinition on dynamics of Shanghai's urban development.
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Chapter 6
THE CHINESE REFORM AND ITS IMPACTS ON
SHANGHAI'S URBAN DYNAMICS
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 aims to show how China's reform policies redefined the role of the
Chinese state both at the central and local level, and how reform policies affected
dynamics of Shanghai's urban development. Developmental state theoty, particularly
Gordon White's works (1984, 1993) on the developmental state, is employed in
understanding China's reform as a process of redefining the Chinese state. This
redefinition is, however, gradual and partial. While it has changed the state-capital
relationship, the state-party relation remains intact. The change in the state-capital
relation, and of the central-local relation that goes with it, has led to the rise of local
state corporatism. This local state corporatism has sought to build a partnership with
the non-public sector, which led to the emergence of a socialist pro-growth coalition
between the local government and international investors in Shanghai. The chapter
then examines the impacts of China's reform on the mechanism of urban
development from three interrelated aspects: 1) investment source; 2) development
organisation; and 3) urban planning system.
6.2 China's reform and the new political economy
The Third Plenum of the 11tb Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) which took place in December 1978, was in many ways a milestone in the
histoiy of the People's Republic of China. It officially proclaimed the market-
oriented reform and open-door policy which has since dramatically transformed the
Chinese society. As some note (Olds, 1995; Wu, 1997), the adoption of this new
116
policy was primarily internally induced 	 an internal response to the failure of
Maoism.
By the time of Mao's death in September 1976, radical Maoism had led China to
what was officially called "the brink of collapse". In economic terms, after nearly
thirty years of socialist development, the pace of economic advance was erratic with
marginal capital-output ratios in industry deteriorating and labour productivity in
state industry static or declining (White, 1993). In spite of the massive investment in
agriculture in which the Maoists took great pride, agricultural output per labourer
only rose 5 percent in real terms over the whole period 1952-1978 (Nolan 1990: 11).
The incomes of the mass of the population, in both cities and countryside, were
either stagnating or rising very slowly, as were levels of real material welfare, such
as consumption of food and light industrial products, or availability of housing (ibid.).
Such disappointing economic performance resulted in a widespread social
dissatisfaction with the CCP regime which even in the Maoist period, rested heavily
on its ability to improve the living standards of the population (White, 1993).
Different sectors of society became increasingly disillusioned with the promises and
propaganda made by the radical Maoists that "Socialist China has been improving
day by day while capitalism has been deteriorating day by day". This said, however,
the more decisive factor in propelling party leaders towards economic reform was a
political one. Since 1949 China had contmuously experienced the political instability
and conflict which culminated in ten years of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when
the party was virtually at war with itself. Wave after wave of political campaigns
brought in by radical Maoism not only greatly intensified the economic suffering
from the familiar deficiencies of Soviet-style planning, but also disrupted everyday
life, set people against each other and created growing mass resentment. Many
thousands of people including members of the party and state officialdom were sent
to labour camps (The reform leader Deng Xiaoping was himself purged twice after
1949). Popular attitude to politics changed to cynicism, apathy or active opposition.
In a nutshell, in the mid-1970s, there was clearly a widespread social mandate for
change (White, 1993).
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This internally-induced change was, however, gradual and partial as shown in the
Box 6.1 an antithesis of the "big-bang" and "shock-therapy" approaches advocated
so often in Eastern Europe.
Box 6.1 - Chronology of China's Key Reforms
1978 Start of economic reforms and open-door policy
1979 Passage of joint venture law
1980 Creation of four special economic zones in the south-eastern provinces,
Guangdong and Fujian (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen)
1981 Beginning of land reform
1984 Start of corporation reform
Opening of another 14 coastal cities (including Shanghai)
Hainan Island became a special economic zone
1985 Creation of foreign exchange swap centres in Shanghai and Shenzhen
Pearl and Yangzi River Delta opened to foreigners
1987 Start of price reform
Passage of bankruptcy law
1988 Hainan special economic zone upgraded to provincial status
1990 Stock exchanges established in Shanghai and Shenzhen
The development of Pudong, Shanghai officially launched
1992 The service sector opened to foreign investment
1993 Socialist market economy included in the constitution
1994 Tax reform and introduction of single exchange rate
Beginning of banking reform
1996 Foreign banks are allowed to conduct RMB business in Pudong
1998 Reform of SOEs was made the priority
1999 China agreed a deal with the USA, which paves the way for China's
accession to the WTO
Source: adapted from Olds (1995: 230)
It started with a consensus among party leaders that Maoism had failed in achieving
China's socialist development and it should be rid of, but there was no "plan" of
reform in the sense of a clear idea of some ultimate end-state and a series of steps or
phases to reach it. Instead of rushing ahead with a comprehensive, radical
transformation of the entire system that would threaten the vested interests of many
groups, Deng Xiaoping and his allies employed an incremental approach, "taking one
step forwards and looking around before taking another" (Shirk, 1993: 129). As
widely noted in China, their approach to reform is that reform is like wading across a
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river on rocks, implying that they do not know where the next rock is until they step
S
on it.
China's reform was also partial in the sense that the reform has been primarily
confined to the economic domain where the market mechanism was introduced and
expanded gradually while China's political system of communist authoritarian
basically unchanged. This position is vividly reflected in Deng Xiaoping's "Four
Basic Principles" which were written into China's constitution of 1980, that is, while
the economic reform proceeds, China will stick to the principal of "Marxist-
Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, Leadership of Communist Party, Socialism, and
Proletarian Dictatorship".
Strategically, the main feature of China's incremental reform can be best described
as a "dual-track" approach which can be defmed as follows:
I) in one track, the "plan track", the existing central economic plan, and the
distribution of rents under it, are left intact; and
2) in the other track, the "market track", liberalisation is carried out at the
margin, that is, economic agents have both the right and the incentive to
participate in the free market provided that the obligations under the original plan
are fulfilled (Lan, 1998: 52).
Obviously, the distinction between the "big-bang" and "duel-track" strategies lies in
the role played by the pre-existing central plan. While the former tends to replace the
plan by the market in one shot, the latter combines the pre-existing plan and the
newly introduced market. The adoption of the dual-track system is highly path-
dependant, stemming from China's particular pre-reform political economy context
in which the party still honoured the political ideology of socialism on which the
central planning system was based. In order to gain a political consensus within the
party, which is critical to propel economic reform in China, the reformers adopted
this pragmatic way to accommodate the interest groups vested by the old system
(White, 1993; Shirk, 1993). Although the dual-track approach prolonged the reform
Fan (1994: 103) suggests that the torm "piece-meal approach" is a more accurate description than
"gradualism" for China's reform.
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and encountered numerous problems, it was politically very successful, which
allowed Chinese reform to be carried out continuously at least in economic terms.
The two decades of the economic reform from 1979-1999 can be divided into four
main phases, each with its own sub-phases. The first ran from the Third Plenum of
the 11th Central Committee (hereafter XI) held in October 1978, to the Third Plenum
of the 12th Central Committee (hereafter XII) held in October 1984. The first phase
has been called "the era of agricultural reform" which was dominated by the policies
designed for the agriculture sector, although the reform policy started in other arenas
as well. A sweeping series of institutional reforms introduced in this phase
dismantled the previous three-tiered commune system of collective agriculture and
brought a reversion to de facto private agriculture based on the "responsibility
system" in which the peasant household (and not, as before, the production team)
was responsible for production. Although there was clear evidence of a "stop-go" or
cyclical rhythm to the policy process, the first phase of reforms did make significant
progress and has been widely regarded as a resounding success (see Bowles and
Dong, 1994; Cannon and Jenkins, 1990; Nolan and Dong, 1990; White, 1993).
The success of the first phase of reforms created considerable optimism among
reform leaders and they attempted to follow up their success in agriculture by
accelerating reform of the urban/industrial economy. However, this decision ratified
at the party's Third Plenum (XII) in September 1984, led to increasing disagreement
between more conservative and radical reforms over the conduct and ultimate
objective of the reforms, a problem that has never been resolved in the reform
process. The conservatives tried to maintain central planning as the dominant way of
managing the economy while keep the market operating within tight limits. By
contrast, the reformers sought a more radical break with the past, arguing that in an
advanced economy, only markets are capable of guaranteeing a rational allocation of
economic resources and they should become the prime mover of the economy, and
hence, the traditional planning system should be dismantled. The difference between
these two groups widened as the second phase of reform ran into increasing problems
from 1985 onwards, which ended with a tragic culmination in the Tiananmen
crackdown on June 4, 1989, in which hundreds of people were killed and the reform
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leaders including the general secretary of CCP Thao Ziyang were purged (Yu and
Harrison, 1990).
The Tiananmen tragedy began the third phase of China's reform which was brought
to an end by Deng Xiaoping in March 1992. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen
crackdown, party conservatives introduced a course of action, ratified at the party's
Fifth Plenum (XIII) in November 1989, seeking to limit the pace and scope of the
economic reform and eliminate its unacceptable political and social repercussions.
These conservative policies, however, stifled economic development, which
dissatisfied China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping who tried to regain the
momentum of reform by a southbound trip to Shenzhen, in Guangdong province in
which he made a series of speeches calling for a further market-oriented reform.
Deng Xiaoping's "Address of South Tour" started the fourth phase which has lasted
to date. ii, in China's dual-track transition, the first phase can be called "a planned
economy with some market adjustment" and the second phase "a combination of
plan and market", the objective of the fourth phase is to establish "a socialist market
economy", an objective which was ratified at the Third Plenum (XVI) in November,
1993. Fourteen years after the CCP launched the reform policy, it finally established
that what they seek is an economy in which the market would play the central role in
resource allocations.
A series of measures have since been introduced to further the market-oriented
reforms and tackle the problems which have been deemed vital for the establishment
of a healthy market economy, including: 1) overall establishment of factor markets,
i.e., capital, labour, real estate, and technology and information markets; 2) the
reform of the state-run banking system; 3) the reform of the taxation system; 4) the
reform of state owned enterprises (SOEs) (Lau, 1998). These four reform areas had
been either stalled due to the complexity of the problems involved, as in the last three
areas, or been conducted out of the public eye due to the ideological obstacles
towards the relationship between the plan and the market, as in the first area. Now
that the ideological hurdles have been cleared except for the public ownership (de
facto privatisation has been widely undertaken since 1992), China's reform has
entered into uncharted territory, whose consequences remain to be seen.
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There are innumerable of books and articles on China's economic reforms from
various standpoints (e.g. Cable and Ferdinand, 1994; Cannon and Jenkins, 1990; Fan,
1994; Kueh, 1992; Nolan and Dong, 1990; Shirk, 1993; White, 1991, 1993). Here I
will just focus on one major aspect, i.e., the changing role of the state and therefore
the changing relationship between state and economy, since the redefinition of the
role of the state is indeed at the core of the reform, and perhaps more importantly my
research, it is the changing role of the Chinese state that has driven Shanghai's urban
restructuring in the post-reform era. For this purpose, I will draw on developmental
state theory on which my analysis of the changing role of the Chinese state is based.
6.3 Developmental state theory
The developmental state model originated in Japan and later spread to other East
Asian Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs include South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong and are often referred as "Four Little Dragons"). Over the
past decade it has ascended to the status of the leading paradigm for the study of the
East Asian political economies (Amsden, 1989; Chan et al, 1998; Deyo, 1987; Evans
1995; Fallows, 1994; Haggard, 1990; Johnson, 1995; Simone and Feraru, 1995;
Wade, 1990; White and Wade, 1988; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Scholars within this
framework have basically argued that Japan and "Four Little Dragons" did not take
the western-style pluralist democracy as a model for their developments. Instead,
they have developed a new approach to the political economy, a new development
strategy, and created a new Asian political and economic system, possibly a systemic
new theory for capitalism and democracy (Fallows 1994; McCord, 1991; Thurow
1992).
According to Chalmers Johnson (1995: 28), a capitalist developmental state (CDS)
has two characteristics: "the state-guided capitalist developmental system, or to put it
in different terms, a plan-rational economy with market-rational political
institutions." Manuel Castells (1998: 270-271) offers this definition for his "CDS":
A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its
ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by development the
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combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change in
the productive system, both domestically and in relationship to the international
economy.
Xia (2000: 27-30) sums up four important characteristics for a capitalist
developmental state:
1) There is an active role for the state and a collaborative relationship between the
state and the economy. In contrast to the passive role of an instrumental state
perceived by liberalism, the states in East Asia are "active states" or "strong
states". Their roles are far beyond providing a framework for the economy. They
act as agents or transformers in both the economy and society (Caporaso and
Levine, 1992: 181-196). Particularly, they are "market-fostering", "market-
facilitating", and committed to nurturing markets.
2) The government provides an industrial policy. An industrial policy is the
"development, guidance, and supervision of industry" by the government
(Johnson, 1995: 64). According to many studies, the secret of success in East
Asian developmental states is the implementation of "deepening industrial
policies;" that is, the ability and flexibility of the state to "move in and move out
of sectors, to promote this or that industry" (Cumings, 1987: 74, 81).
3) A dictatorship of development exists. A dictator (Park Chung Hee in Korea, Lee
Kuan Yew in Singapore, Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan) or a group of ruling elites
(in Japan) are in control. Fearing that a full democracy might lead these East
Asian countries to spin out of control, the ruling establishment purposefully
delays the process of democratisation (Johnson, 1995). This authoritarianism is
often referred to as a "semi-authoritarianism", "neo-authoritarianism", "soft
authoritarianism" or a "paternalistic authoritarian system" (Johnson, 1987;
Berger and Hsiao, 1988), for it is development-oriented, based on meritocracy,
and enthusiasm for social equity in the process of development. The legitimacy
of such a system is not based on democratic procedures but on its economic
accomplishments and performances.
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4) The executive's dominance over the legislative institutions, or its administrative
guidance is a typical institutional characteristic under a developmental state. In
developmental state theory, the state is always identified with the "executive
authority", "bureaucracy", or some important political-economic organizations at
the national level. The administrative guidance pushes the economy forward.
Basically, there is no place for the legislature and local governments.
These four characteristics are based on research on five well-recognized capitalist
developmental states or areas (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong
Kong). One central interest for academics is whether this model can be applicable to
other countries, especially those that are huge in size and diverse in background, such
as China.
The implementation of China's reform policies in the past 20 years has convinced
many scholars that China has emulated the developmental state model (e.g. Cheng,
1998; Gilley, 1998; Overholt, 1993; Simone and Feraru, 1995; White, 1991; White
and Wade, 1988). The Chinese reform has been led by a government that has been
committed to developing a market system ("the Socialist Market Economy"). China
had a deepening industrial policy run by the Chinese government's economic
"general staff" - The Economic Planning Commission. Like the East Asian NIEs in
their early stages of modernization, China has followed the same one-party
authoritarian system to guide its economic development.
However, these similarities do not conceal two qualities that distinguish China from
the other East Asian NIEs (Xia, 2000). First, China's territory is more than eighteen
times larger, and its population is almost six times greater than the "Four Little
Dragons" and Japan combined. The homogeneity of the economy and population
found in these developmental states cannot be seen in China that is characterized by
its huge size and regional economic heterogeneity. Second, its economic and political
transitions are being carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party of
China and thus are proceeding within the context of a different set of ideological
background conditions. The socialist political and economic legacies (e.g.
egalitarianism, Stalinist bureaucracy, and a centrally-planned economy) have
imposed tremendous constraints upon this transitional process.
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Considering its vastness and its Communist economic and political background, how
has it been possible for China to emulate the developmental state model which is
capitalist in nature and has originated primarily in relatively small countries? This is
the question that has to be answered in the application of the developmental state
theory to China.
6.4 The application of the developmental state theory to China
Since the introduction of reform policies, China has demonstrated two basic
characteristics of a developmental state: a developmental dictatorship (hard
government) and a market-oriented economy (soft economy). This demonstration has
made many East Asia specialists believe that China has followed the developmental
state model, and they tried to interpret China's reform in the context of the
developmental state theory (e.g. Overholt, 1993; Perkins, 1986; White, 1988, 1991).
Among these scholars, Gordon White's (1984, 1988, 1991, 1993) research has been
one of the most systematic.
According to White (1993: 4-5), a "developmental state" is a state which sets out to
promote national development by means of an institutionalised pattern of policy
intervention guided by some kind of "plan" or strategic conception, and plays a
central role in that process. This historically specific type of state, which emerged
particularly but not exclusively in the post-war era of de-colonisation, is distinctive
from the traditional liberal laissez-faire state or even the Keynesian managerial state
in the sense that in the latter case the overwhelmingly important agent of socio-
economic change was outside the state in the form of a capitalist economy and a civil
society.
White (1988, 1993) argues that although developmental states in this broad sense
take a wide variety of forms, in the context of East Asia they have fallen into two
broad categories: "state capitalist" and "state socialist". In the former category,
which includes South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, the state plays a central role as a
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guiding foite for national economic development including direct state involvement
in the economy through the establishment of a substantial public sector. But they
must be called "state capitalist" insofar as the main economic actors are private,
operating in a more or less competitive capitalist economy. By contrast, in the state
socialist category such as China, North Korea and Vietnam, the communist
party/state, directly or indirectly, is the dominant economic actor, virtually to the
exclusion of all others. Although state socialist countries contain enterprises such as
factories and farms which have some degree of nominal independence, they are all to
various degree directly controlled by, and dependent on the party/state.
White then takes a further step to identif' a narrower, more precise sense of the term
"developmental state", as the state in its developmental capacity: those specific
institutions, ideas and policy interventions which embody the socio-economic aims
and actions of a given state. By this definition, he distinguishes the state as a
developmental entity from the state as a political entity, characterised by a particular
set of reigning political ideas, institutions and sources of political legitimacy. This
separation between the developmental and political aspects of a state allows us to
make a distinction between its developmental (primarily economic) capacity and its
political viability. It is also very useful in analysing China's market-oriented reform
in the post-Mao era since the reform has been seeking a new type of socialist
developmental state in this second, more precise, sense. White (1993: 6) says that the
reform:
involves a redefinition of the state's role in the economy in ways which bring
it closer in many ways to the 'state capitalist' model to the extent that it
disengages the state from direct economic involvement and increases the
autonomy of productive enterprises, while retaining an integument of
socialist political ideas and institutions. This project of 'market socialism'
thus involves significant change in the developmental aspect of the state, but
not in its political aspect. The contradiction between these two dimensions of
change is at the root of the politics of economic reform in contemporary
China.
Clearly China under Mao (1949-1976) can be understood as a "state socialist"
developmental state in the above sense. However, it was a state socialist with Maoist
characteristics, which particularly in the Cultural Revolution decade, intensified the
major feature of the state socialist such as a hegemonic party dominance, the
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exclusive state presence in the economy and vehement resistance to markets, and
took them to extreme lengths. It was a form of "socialist development" that went far
beyond mere economic improvement to include a wide range of social and political
objectives, to be achieved through the pervasive intervention of an active party/state
(White, 1993: 24).
As discussed earlier, this kind of Maoist developmental state failed in its
developmental capacity to achieve proclaimed economic goals which undermined the
credibility of the CCP regime. It was in response to the failure of the Maoist
developmental state that the reform policy took place in1978. So far, the reform has
been successful in economic terms. But as White (1993: 6) points out, while
economic success may strengthen the credibility of the current political regime, it
may also bring about changes in social structure and attitudes which in the longer
term undermine the political status quo as witnessed by the political evolution of
South Korean and Taiwan in the I 980s. Paradoxically, therefore, economic success
may lead to political failure.
White's theses of the developmental state are theoretically useful in understanding
the Chinese reform as a process of redefining the Chinese state in the sense that they
help resolve two theoretical problems. First, his defmition of the developmental state
and particularly his categorization of state capitalist and state socialist extend the
application scale of the DST into the socialist state. This theoretical extension
removes the ideological barrier in applying the DST to the socialist state. According
to White, as long as the state plays a central role in promoting national development,
it falls into "the developmental state" no matter which set of ideology the state
advocates. Second, his separation of the economic aspect of the state from the
political aspect of the state is especially designed for the transitional state like China
that has been moving economically to the "state capitalist" model while retaining its
socialist political and institutions.
However, White's approach does not tackle the other problems confronted in
applying the SDT to China, i.e., China's huge size and with it, the huge
differentiation of its regional economy. According to the classic developmental state
model, what is crucial to a developmental state is state capacity, which is defined as
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the ability of a government in getting its job done and includes its capacity to
mobilize society, to extract resources, to steer development and to legitimate the
regime (Wang and Hu, 1993: 235). The secret of the model's success for maintaining
state capacity relies mainly on two important institutional arrangements: the
suppression of local autonomy and the negligible role of legislatures. However,
China's reform started with decentralisation and legislative development. In the past
20 years, the local governments have been given regional property and autonomy,
and the legislatures both at central and local levels were encouraged to expand their
institutions and powers. Different from the other East Asian developmental states,
the Chinese developmental state is defined and sustained by both the legislative and
local political institutions. There is a dual structure from the central to local levels,
between the governments and the legislatures (People's Congresses)
(Xia, 2000: 3).
This "dual developmental state" has a two-tiered structure in which the
developmental role of the central state is nested within the context of the centralllocal
synergism (ibid.). Reform-minded central leaders led by Deng Xiaoping have
encouraged local leaders to explore new policies and experiment with ideas in order
to generate experiences and learn lessons. But since local leaders have come to need
a mandate from the centre, the central state and local states have formed an
interdependent relationship. The mutual needs of both levels of the governments
have helped to establish and maintain equilibrium over the past two decades, despite
the oscillating nature of the central and local power relationship. As a result, as the
following sections will show, the dynamics of China's developmentalism cannot be
solely attributed either to the central or the local governments. It has arisen out of
their interaction, which in turn has mutually strengthened their developmental
orientation.
6.5 Reform as the redefinition of the Chinese state
In the pre-reform Maoist system, the sphere of politics, administration and
economics were intermeshed in practice: the state apparatus dominated the economy
and the party pervaded both. This situation was regarded by the reformers as
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problematic: "first, because direct politicisation of the state bureaucracy (through
Party organisations) impedes the emergence of a more professional form of modern
administration and, second, because excessive involvement by either the Party or the
government administration in the affairs of productive enterprises is economically
harmful" (White, 1993: 43-44). The intention of the reformers, therefore, was to
separate out the institutional spheres of politics, administration and economics, to
define their respective functions more precisely and to redefine the relationship
between them.
The first separation that the reformers attempted to fulfil is between the party and
government (dangzhengfenkan). The authority relationship between the communist
party and the government is at the core of all communist political systems. "It is a
delegation relationship", as Shirk (1993: 55) notes,
in which the communist party is the "principal" and the government is the
"agent". The party has formal political authority over the government but
delegates to the government much of the actual work of administering the
country".
As a result, the relationship between party committees and government departments
at the same administrative level and between party committees at one level and
government departments at a lower lever is one of "direct subordination" (Liu, 1988).
The Chinese political system after 1949 was of course no exception (see Appendix 3
for authority relationships among communist party and government institutions). If
there was any difference from the Soviet system on which it was modelled, the
Maoists took the dominance of the party over government to extreme lengths. "Party
groups" (dang zu), also called party "core groups" were established in all
govermnent agencies and took over the job of actually administering the work of the
agency. At the enterprise level, Soviet party committees always limited their role to
supervision of party members while allowing the manager full responsibility for the
production, whereas the Chinese, after the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, put the
manager under the leadership of the party committee (Ma, 1987). Under this system,
therefore, the organisational lines between the party and government blurred, and the
delegation relationship almost entirely disappeared (Shirk, 1993).
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Acknowledging that such a party-government system greatly impeded economic
development, the reformers have tried to modify the relationship, pulling the party
back to the position where it is supposed to be: to set the overall policy line for the
government and to oversee its implementation. Beginning in 1980 approximately,
most of the bargaining over specific economic policies was shifted to the government
arena. In 1987, specialised party departments overlapping their counterpart
government departments were abolished at the provincial level, having earlier been
abolished at the centre. In enterprises, the party took administrative responsibility
from party secretaries and restored it to managers (ibid.).
None of these changes was, however, intended to destroy the authority of the party
over the government, only to improve the quality of decision-making by putting the
government on a longer leash (Shirk, 1993: 63). Even so, because it involved the
reform of the state's political role which was regarded as an unchangeable area by
the party conservatives, the separation of the party and government triggered
substantial dissension within the party ranks and was carried out only to the extent
that economic policy-making was shifted largely to the government arena. In the
cyclical process of China's reform, whenever the conservative group within the party
leadership strengthened its position, such as in the aftermath of the "Anti-Capitalist
Liberalisation Campaign" in 1986 and the 1989 crackdowns, there was a clear
turnabout in the party's line on the party-government relationship and the party was
urged to restore its active leadership over enterprises, local governments and national
government. As a result, as Shirk (1993:69) says, "Party oversight over the
government bureaucracy continued to be of the tight, centralised, police-patrol type,
and the party retained the authority to select government officials, propose policy
initiatives, and veto policies that emerged from the government side".
The second area of separation is between government/state and the economy
(zhengci fan/am). In the pre-reform era, the economy was run as an administrative
system through a complex system of central ministries and local government
departments. The overwhelmingly dominant state-owned enterprises (SOEs), either
run by the central state organisation or by the local government, worked more like
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the extension of the government than independent units functioning at their own will.
As such, these enterprises were bureaucracy-prone and economically inefficient. The
reformers argued that the state must retreat from its excessive intervention in the
economy and that the enterprise should become an independent economic unit
operating in accordance with the rules of the market. In practice, they adopted an
incremental way to achieve this separation, introducing and expanding the non-state
sector while gradually releasing the SOEs from the grips of their "superior
departments".
Under Maoism, markets were diagnosed and treated as noxious "carriers" of
capitalism, and the non-state sector including the private and even the lower level
collective business such as the community-owned industrial enterprises were
proscribed, pitilessly censured and object to severe punishment. The result of this
private-phobia policy is shown in the Table 6.1. By 1978, there was virtually no
industrial output from private business. Some 77.6 per cent of industrial output was
produced by state-owned firms and the remaining 22.4 per cent by collectives which
were also virtually state controlled. Indeed, the category of non-state sector first
appeared in China's yearbook in 1982 when its development speeded up after the
government's released its grip on the non-state sector. Parallel to the evolution of
government's attitude to the market, the non-state economic sector was recognised
first as what is known in China as "a useful supplement to state ownership" under the
hybrid economy of "a combination of plan and market", and then as "an important
component part of China's socialist market economy". With government slackening
control, the non-state sector grew rapidly throughout the 1 980s and 1 990s.
Table 6.1 Shares of Industrial Output Value by Ownership Type in China (%)
Year	 SOE	 COE	 Township	 Individual	 Other
and Village
1978	 78	 13	 9	 -	 -
1984	 69	 17.9	 11.8	 0.2	 1
1988	 56.8	 18.4	 17.7	 4.3	 2.7
1992	 48.1	 13.2	 24.9	 6.8	 7.1
Source: China Statistical Yearbook '1993.
* In fact, the state's excessive involvement is such that economy as an independent facter in
Shanghai's urbanisation pocess can be ignored in this period as shown m chapter 5.
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While the non-state sector was gradually given more room to grow "spontaneously"
by itself, the focus of industnal reform has been on the SOEs. The bedrock principle
of the enterprise reform was to expand the autonomy of the industrial enterprise.
While this autonomy involved increasing power over a wide range of economic
decisions, financial relations between state and enterprise were at the core of the
reform in that financial relations embody the distribution of power, and defme the
relationship between state and industry. The central thrust of reform was to rectify a
situation in which enterprise finances were controlled by state agencies which
supplied expenditures and siphoned off net revenue, so as to allow enterprises to
enjoy greater control over financial resources and display greater responsibility over
their use (White, 1993; see also Zhang, 1999).
The first phase of reforming industrial finance, from 1978 to 1983, saw the gradual
introduction of a system of profit-retention whereby an enterprise could retain a
certain proportion of its net revenue for discretionary spending on productive
investment, social welfare and wage bonuses, subject to certain official guidelines
(White, 1993: 130). The profit-retention system increased dramatically enterprises'
discretionary funds in the "extrabudgetary" form. It was estimated that overall the
state transferred about 28 billion yuan to enterprises in retained profits from 1979 to
1981 (ibid.). However, the profit-retention system decreased the state's "take",
contributing to an emerging fiscal crisis in 1979-1980 and a rapid decline in the
proportion of state fiscal revenue to national income. Meanwhile, the previous
tradition of financial "politicking" between managers and officials did not change
since most reforms of profit-retention still involved bargaining over the amount and
uses of the retained funds.
In order to oveitome the problems stemming from the profit-retention reform, a
second, more radical stage of reform, "(changing) tax for profit" (ligaishul), was
introduced in April 1983. In this system, the government would have its "take" via a
more market-oriented way of tax rather than profit, and it would allow enterprises to
retain all their after-tax profits and become fully responsible for their own profit and
loss. As White (1993:132) points out:
132
In terms of increasing the economic autonomy of enterprise, 'tax for profit'
was seen as a great improvement on profit-retention: it would normalise
financial relations between state and enterprise in a 'hands-off way by
creating a standardised regulatory framework (in the form of differential tax-
rates), thereby removing the previous annual 'politicking' between state
agencies and enterprises over rates of profit-retention and reducing the
intermediary powers of the industrial departments in the process.
However, the "tax for profit" reform ran into numerous serious problems resulting
from a complex interplay of economic and political factors. The underlying problem
lay in the fact that enterprise reform involves issues that went beyond the enterprise
itself and even beyond the economic domain. Its success relied heavily on the
success of reforms of relevant areas such as prices and basic factor markets. When
the "tax for profit" was introduced, the basic factor markets and product markets
were basically absent and most prices were controlled by the state. Without a rational
price system at the macro level, profit were neither a good indicator to judge
enterprise's performance nor a reliable base for government taxation.
In the spring of 1987, the "tax for profit" system finally gave the way to a "contract
responsibility system" (CRS) (chengbao zerenzhi) in which enterprises' performance
target, output quota to the state and financial obligation to government were all
specified in a contract thrashed out by the negotiation between the enterprise and the
government. It was seen as a regressive step. Instead of introducing a universal
standard (tax-rates) which would help to disengage the enterprise form its
bureaucratic superiors, it perpetuated the previous bilateral, "hands-on" type of
relationship which left considerable discretionary powers over the enterprises in the
hands of state industrial and financial departments (White, 1993).
Notwithstanding the continuous reform of the macro-economy in which SOEs were
increasingly subject to the free market, the overall performance of the SOE sector
remained consistently weak, fundamentally because they still operated under a kind
of "soft budget constraints" endemic in socialist public ownership economy in
which managers compete for the investment from the government and take no
responsibility for the inefficiency resulting from the over-production (For detail
about "soft budget constraints" in socialist countries, see Kornai, 1980). The new
wave of SOEs reform did not come until 1992 when the CCP made another
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ideological advance in interpreting "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics". Under
the socialist market economy, it was claimed that public ownership could be
achieved in many forms (Report of the 14th Chinese Communist Party Congress,
1992). Among those forms are the "shareholding companies" advocated by the
government as the modern enterprise system whereby companies are still controlled
by the state as long as the state holds over 51 per cent of shares. Furthermore, it was
argued that as long as the key economic sector remains public owned, then the whole
economy would be still in the hand of the state. Following this theory, government
put forward the current policy of reforming the SOEs, that is, "managing the larger
SOEs and letting go the smaller ones" whereby the government will concentrate on
1,000 large SOEs and let go thousands of medium and smaller ones (Lau, 1998).
Both the "corporatisation" and "managing the larger" policies will, of course, involve
the widespread privatisation of the smaller SOEs, the merger of some, and a
significant increase in closures, which could destabilise society in which there have
been an estimated around 16-18 million urban jobless and more than 100 million
seasonally out of work in the countryside (Central Daily News, January, 28, 2000).
However, after having tried a variety of reform policies, the CCP seems determined
to carry out the current policy of reforming the SOEs, regardless of the possible risks
ahead.
Twenty years of economic reform has brought about changes in the nature of the
Chinese developmental state, and particularly in the relationship between state and
economy. Based on the above analysis, we can look into these changes from four
perspectives: the pattern of ownership, the nature of productive institution, the
relationship between state planning and markets, and the economic role of state
organisations (White, 1993). The ownership structure was changed to the extent that
the Chinese economy is now virtually a mixed economy in which the state sector
continues to decline. In both rural and urban areas, the non-state sector has
blossomed, and the foreign fund enterprise is the most rapidly increasing sector. A
recent report by the World Bank-owned International Finance Company shows that
China's private sector contributed 33°o of Chinese GDP in 1998 while the state
A Taiwanese newspapa that has normally one page devoted to the collection of news in mainland
China.
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sector contributed 37% and the mixed-owned sector 30% (Financial Times, 11 May
2000).
Turning to the nature of productive institutions, changes in agriculture were
relatively thoroughgoing as the introduction of the "responsibility system" (zerenzhi)
brought about a reversion to household farming. In industry, however, the SOEs
failed to change in their fundamentals, both in terms of their continuing
subordination to state agencies and their internal organisation.
There were, however, fundamental changes in the balance between state planning
and markets. Since the central plan has been basically frozen at the original levels,
the output produced outside the plan (in the "market track") has grown rapidly and
the proportions of output that are sold and purchased at plan prices have declined
continuously. Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 present the values of the transactions in each of the
agriculture, industry and retail sectors, that are conducted at plan, guide and market
prices respectively. It is clear that by the early l990s, most of the transactions were
conducted at market prices. The plan has been phased out for many goods. In other
words, the price reform based on the dual-track approach has been successful and the
dual-track system has been converted into a market-track based system.
Table 6.2 Phasing out the Plan Track: Agricultural Products (% of output
value)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
plan	 94.4 37.0 35.0 29.4	 24.0	 35.5	 31.0	 22.2	 12.5	 10.4
price
guide	 0.0	 23.0 21.0 16.8	 19.0	 24.3	 27.0	 20.0	 5.7	 2.1
price
market 5.6	 40.0 43.7 53.8 57.0 40.4 42.0 57.8 81.8	 87.5
price
Table 6.3 Phasing out the Plan Track: Industrial Goods (% of output value)
1978	 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989	 1990 1991 1992 1993
plan	 100.0 64.0 -	 -	 -	 44.6 36.0	 18.7	 13.8
price




13.0 -	 -	 -	 40.0	 36.5 45.7 73.8 81.1
price
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Table 6.4 Phasing out the Plan Track: Total Retail Sales (% of output value)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
plan	 97.0 47.0 35.0 33.7	 28.9	 31.3	 30.0	 20.9	 5.9	 4.8
price
guide	 0.0	 19.0 25.0 28.0	 21.8	 23.2	 25.0	 10.3	 1.1	 1.4
price
market 3.0
	 34.0 40.0 38.3
	 49.3	 45.5	 45.0	 68.8	 93.0	 93.8
price
Source: Lau (1998: 66-67)
Finally, there have been concomitant changes in the economic role and behaviour of
state agencies. In terms of the balance of power between state economic organs and
productive units, it has shifted substantially in favour of the latter. The state has
retreated considerably, both intentionally and unintentionally, from society in general
and the SOE in particular. The economic departments of the government became
more likely to behave in the way their western counterparts did. At the local level,
we saw the rise of the corporate state behaving in accordance with "growth machine"
politics (To be discussed in the next section). Apart from the retreat of the central
government from its intensive intervention in the economy, this is mostly due to the
major shift of power relationships between the central government and the provincial
government, which is the topic of the next section.
In sum, the overall picture after two decades of reform is mixed, substantial change
coexisting with substantial continuity. While it can be argued that a new type of
economy in which the market plays the decisive role in resource allocations has been
nearly achieved, the new form of developmental state and a new relationship
between state and economy are still uncertain. It is a "half-way house" in which the
new and old developmental states and economic systems are intertwined (White
1993: 77). The cause of the "half-way house" lies in the nature of Chinese reform:
while changing the developmental aspect of state, the political aspect of the state
remains intact Whether or not this asymmetrical reform can be finally successful is
beyond this research, but this "half-way house" has already had a significant impact
on China's urban development in general and Shanghai's urban restructuring in
particular.
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6.6 Decenfralisation and the new role of the provincial/municipal
government
Alongside the changing relationship between state and economy, there has also been
a major shift of economic power within the state: the decentralisation of power from
central to local government at the provincial level and below. Indeed, the
marketisation of economy and the decentralisation of state power can be seen as two
sides of a coin, unfolding hand by hand in the process of China's reform. Again I
will analyse the decentralisation by looking at the fiscal relationship between centre
and localities.
6.6.1 Fiscal reforms
The pre-reform Chinese fiscal system was called "unified leadership, level-by-level
management". "Unified leadership" meant that the central government determined
provincial expenditure budgets and that provincial governments had little freedom to
make their own decision. "Level-by-level management" meant that the profits of
enterprises run by central ministries went to the central government, and the profits
of locally run enterprises went to local governments (Shirk, 1993: 155). It was a
system of centralised fiscal authority with some degree of defacto decentralisation to
the provincial level and below. However, there was no division of authority and
responsibility between central and local governments. Funds had been decentralised
through the "level-by-level management", but fiscal responsibility had not. The
system was one of "eating from the big pot" (chi da guo fan). Whenever unexpected
economic developments landed provinces in financial straits, the Ministiy of Finance
(MOF) was expected to bail them out. According to the same principle, if the central
budget was hand-pressed, the MOF could reclaim funds from the provinces by
renegotiating the terms of annual sharing contracts.
The reforms introduced inl98O, popularly called "eating in separate kitchens" ([en
zao chjfan) were intended to clarify the responsibilities as well as the resources of
each tier of government The new contractual sharing system was seen
fundamentally different from the old one in three respects:
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1) Revenue shares were fixed for five years so that provinces could profit
from increased in revenue and plan ahead. 2) Provinces were responsible for
balancing their own budgets by adjusting their expenditures to match their
revenues; they could no longer rely on bailouts from the centre. 3) Provinces
had budgetaiy authority to arrange the structure and amount of local spending;
they ceased to receive mandatory fiscal targets from the central ministries
(Shirk, 1993: 166).
The new system was applied flexibly to the thirty provincial-level governments,
establishing different rules for different regions. Among those, two rules are
particularly relevant:
1) Guangdong and Fujian, regarded as in the forefront of reform, were
granted the most generous plan. Guangdong would give the centre 1 billion
yuan per year, and Fujian would receive as a subsidy 150 million yuan per
year. The amounts were fixed for five years. The provinces could keep
everything above these amounts.
2) The metropolises of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, which provided the
lion's share of central revenues, were placed on the most restrictive plan. In
contrast with the most provinces, the percentage of total revenue they were
required to remit to the centre were revised every year. In 1980 Shanghai
remitted 88.8 percent, Beijing 63.5 percent, and Tianjin 68.8 percent (Shirk,
1993: 167).
Although the revenue-sharing system encountered numerous problems in practice
such as the unfeasible "fixed rates" in rapid changing macro-economic situations, the
economic overheating accompanied by inflation, shortages, and the segmentation of
the national market by local protectionism, it had been successful in achieving its
main objective: to clarify the authority and responsibility over the revenue and
expenditure between central and local governments so as to greatly stimulate the
local governments to develop their local economies while guaranteeing steady
increases in central income. Therefore, although there were many changes made to
the revenue-sharing system (RRS), all involved tinkering with the specificity of the
system (particularly the sharing ratios for the centre and individual provinces) and
the basic principle of the system remained intact and it continued to function until
1993.
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However, in the early 1990s, over ten years after the RRS was introduced, the fiscal
situation was worrying for the central government. Although the absolute revenue
had been increasing steadily, the share of central disposable revenue, which is the
ratio of the sum of centrally-collected revenue and remittances from provinces
through revenue sharing to total budgetary revenue, declined considerably. By 1992,
the centre's share of disposable revenue was 38.6 pement, compared to 46.8 percent
in 1979. Meanwhile the share of central expenditure dropped from more than 50
percent during 1979-84 to 28.3 percent by 1993 (Thang, 1999: 121). Greatly
concerned with the declining financial strength, the central government introduced
the tax-sharing system (TSS), which, together with taxation reform was the core
elements of a comprehensive reform package rectified by the Third Plenary (XVI) in
November 1993.
The TSS, which is commonly used in the market economies, assigns in a permanent
and unequivocal manner, specific sources of revenue to the central and sub-national
governments to finance their respective spending responsibilities. Taxes are now
divided into three categories according to the recipient of their revenue, namely
central taxes, central-local shared taxes and local taxes. The central taxes include
customs duties, consumption and VAT levied by customs, consumption tax, income
tax from central enterprises, profit remittance of central enterprises and so on so forth
(For detail, see Zhang, 1999: 132). Eighteen taxes come under the local revenue
category. Among those are business tax, income tax from local enterprises,
individual income tax, urban land use tax, land value-gains tax and so on. The share
taxes which are the most important in terms of size of revenue include VAT,
resource tax and securities trading stamp tax. Although there are some problems in
implementation, particularly the remaining ambiguous division of expenditure
responsibilities between the centre and localities since its introduction, the TSS
system has been a great step towards institutionalisation of link between revenue and
expenditure, and between power and responsibility, which laid the foundation for
further market-oriented reform.
6.6.2 The new central-local relationship
The fiscal reforms, together with the decentralisation of property rights and other
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administrative decentralisation policies such as approval of capital construction
projects and foreign joint ventures, retention of foreign exchange earnings and the
like, have had a profound impact on China's central-local relationship. Since the
reforms, local governments have been given more autonomy, among which two
institutional changes are particularly important for local governments in counter-
balancing the centre (Xia, 2000). First, local governments now enjoy property rights,
and are also "principals", just as the centre is in relation to the state-owned
enterprises. The centre no longer can treat the local governments as agents as is the
case with the central government ministries and state-owned enterprises. Second, the
Provincial Peoples' Congress now has some legislative autonomy. Because the
provinces have been allowed to initiate legislation according to their own needs, the
provinces are able to define the rules of their own games, providing they are not
challenging the equilibrium of the whole system.
However, the strengthening position of local governments does not mean that the
central government has lost control over local governments. Instead, the centre has
still the capacity to define the parameters of the central-local relationship. The centre
controls the power of appointment and dismissal that determines the political careers
of local leaders. It also has control over key economic resources. For example, it can
provide funds to and implement favourable policies for a province. This can be a big
boon to the local economy, as the Pudong case shows (see Chapter 8). Besides, the
centre controls the military and the ideological and propaganda apparatus and relies
on them to make the centre's threats creditable.
As a result, the two levels each possess some resources that are essential to central
control and local autonomy, but neither the centre possesses enough to command nor
the local governments possesses enough to take an independent path (Lieberthal and
Oksenberg, 1988). Instead, both need the valuable resources that each provides. For
the centre it is coercion; for the provinces, it is their intermediary role in the Chinese
structure. Therefore, they form a mutual interdependence and are indispensable to
each other. Interdependence characterizes the relationship with the balance generally
in favour of the centre.
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It is worth noting that the above analysis of the central-local relationship is
theoretical. Due to China's vastness and the huge regional differentiation, it is almost
impossible to provide a clear-cut framework accounting for the relationships between
the centre and 31 provincial, and many local units. In the reality, some localities have
received more favourable policies and privileges (like the SEZs), and some have not;
in some provinces, the centre has taken more aggressive actions to try to boost local
developmentalism through appointing competent and reform-minded leaders (such as
Zhao Zhiyang to Sichuan, Jiang Zemin and Thu Rongji to Shanghai), in other
provinces, the centre took no action (cases in Thejiang in the 1980s and Shaanxi)
(Cheung, et al, 1998). There has been no universal pattern with regard to the
localities-localities relationships in China.
6.6.3. Shanghai's shifting relationship with the Centre
The previous two chapters have shown the importance of Shanghai's relation to the
national government in the development of Shanghai. The city's prosperity and well-
being in the pre-1949 era throve on a relative independence from the bureaucratic
national government.
The communist victory in 1949 gave rise to a completely new central-local
relationship where the local government was turned into little more than an agent of
the central government. Shanghai, due to its importance in China's political economy,
was gripped tightly by the central government and was turned from a financial and
commercial centre into the biggest industrial city in China. The situation did not even
change in the I 980s when the policy of decentralisation proceeded nationwide.
Shanghai's experiences in China's fiscal reforms in 1980s shows the attitude of the
central government towards Shanghai. In 1980, when the policy of "eating in
separate kitchens" was introduced, Shanghai together with Beijing and Tianjin was
left out. These three municipalities were required to adhere to the old fiscal
arrangement with the Centre, which left them with little autonomy as well as with a
small revenue base. Shanghai, in particular, as widely considered to be the most
poorly treated under this fiscal arrangement because its share of total revenue was the
lowest among the three municipalities: while Beijing and Tianjin were allowed to
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keep about 30% of their revenue for local spending, Shanghai was only able to retain
a little over 10% of its revenue (Lam, 1996).
The Centre's tight control of Shanghai and Shanghai's rearguard position in China's
strategy of reform in 1 980s had affected the city's economic and social development
(White, L. 1989). Many view the Centre's "exploitation" of Shanghai as one of
important factors that resulted in Shanghai's rather modest growth in 1980s when
southern China, particularly Guangdong, surged ahead in economic development. It
has been noted there were extensive discontent and complaints with the Centre's
treatment of Shanghai among ordinary people and even among the cadres in
Shanghai (Lam, 1996). This led to the rise of local interests articulation in Shanghai
in the l980s - a phenomenon emerged in the first time since the Communist took
power in 1949.
Under the communist regime, both party cadres and the governmental officials were
under the strict control of the Party (Dangguang Ganbu). Local political leaders,
appointed directly by the Centre through party system, were not so much leaders of
local government who were accountable to the local people, as the agent of the centre
whose major concerns were how to accomplish the assignments given by the centre.
Shanghai's eminent position in China's political economy meant its leaders were
more likely to be promoted to the centre than other local leaders. This prestigious
position of Shanghai's leaders was, however, accompanied by policies and measures
that worked to the city's disadvantage. When there were conflicts between personal
political careers and the local interests, the latter was destined to fall into the victim
of the struggle. Lucian Pye (1981, xi-xvi) notes,
Shanghai's political leaders have consistently failed to assert the special
economic and cultural interests of their city. Indeed, quite to the contrary, they
have over considerable periods advocated policies and programmes
diametrically opposed to the interests and the welfare of the people they
presumably represented.
Power devolution since reform gave localities more independent interests and local
leaders became increasingly concerned with the local development and prosperity.
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Local leaders' shifting role made them tolerant towards local interest articulation,
which was regarded as localism and strictly suppressed under Maoism. The 1980s
witnessed the growing recognition of local interests in Shanghai, and also their
increasing legitimacy. By 1988, the notion of local interest had become so firmly
established that a commentator for Liberation Daily (Jiefang Ribao, one of
Municipal Party Committee newspapers) urged Shanghai to press the Centre to give
it more autonomy. He pointed out that Shanghai was not treated favourably because
it had not fought fiercely enough with the Centre for its own interests (Jiefang Ribao,
30 May 1988, p. 2).
Concerned with Shanghai's declining position in China's economy, local leaders
themselves were lobbying extensively to get the Centre's support for the
revitalisation of Shanghai. These efforts made some progress in changing the Central
policy towards Shanghai. By 1984, Shanghai's retention of local revenue had
gradually increased to 23.5% from only 11% in 1980. From 1988 to 1993, a new
fiscal arrangement allowed Shanghai to keep all the local revenue after remitting a
fixed sum to the central government, thus giving Shanghai more breathing space to
develop her economy (Ho and Tsui, 1996). Meanwhile, the establishment of three
economic zones - Hongqiao Economic and Technological Development Zone
(ETDZ), Minhang ETDZ and Caohejing High-tech Park - was finally approved in
1986, seven years after the SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian were approved by the
central government.
Despite the successive efforts made by local leaders in l980s, Shanghai's
reinvigoration did not come until 1990 when the central government made another
strategic move in furthering China's reform. As a huge country with enormous
geographical diversities, China is constantly looking for useful local experience that
can serve as a developmental model for the whole nation. Similar to the opening of
Guangdong and Fujian in 1979, Deng Xiaoping attempted to use Shanghai to
stimulate China's economic reform and, at the same time, to establish another
success story to boost his stature and to strengthen his own political power in the
aftermath of the 1989 political crisis. During his spring festival visit to Shanghai in
February 1990, Deng made several speeches wanting to speed up the development of
Shanghai. Soon afterwards, Shanghai received a package of special policies from the
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Centre for the development of Pudong - the area to the east of Shanghai's city proper.
At the 14th Party Congress held in October 1992, Shanghai was given an official
mission to develop as a "dragon head and three centres" to lead the Yangzi River
Basin and China at large into the twenty-first century (Yeung, 1996). The three
centres refer to Shanghai as an economic centre, a financial centre and a trading
centre. Shanghai thus became the national focus of economic reform and
development.
The ups and downs of Shanghai's economic development in the past two decades
show that in today's China the political decision by the Centre is still the decisive
factor for a city's future. In 1980s, Shanghai was strategically given the position of
rearguard in the Chinese reform, while southern China, the national focus of the
Chinese reform and open door policies, acted as the forefront player. While the
efforts by Shanghai's leadership in l980s were fairly successful in reinvigoratmg the
city within the existing policy constraints and catching the attention of the Centre,
these new ideas and policy adjustments did not lead to a large-scale effort to build up
Shanghai as China's leading economic centre until 1990. Since 1990, there has been
a convergence of interests between Shanghai and the Centre. This led to a relatively
harmonious central-Shanghai relationship in 1 990s, in contrast with the troublesome
relationship between Shanghai and the Centre in 1980s.
6.6.4 A socialist pro-growth coalition in Shanghai
Apart from the changes in the central-local relationship, the reform has also brought
in a new behaviour pattern to the provincial municipal government. Before the
reform, the local leaders were somewhat like directors of workshops who had little
power over revenue and spending. Indifferent to local development, their major
concern was how to fulfil the production plan assigned by the central planning
commission. Reform policies such as the fiscal reforms gave them a great incentive
to develop their local economies and the wherewithal to do it. They were eager to
expand the local economy because it earned them more tax revenues, which had at
the same time become increasingly important for their political credibility since the
economic development was the most important and visible standard whereby their
leadership capabilities were assessed. As a result, a new behaviour pattern of local
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government has emerged. Local government's behaviour has become increasingly
entrepreneurial, and the local leaders act like the bosses of their own firms. Oi (1995:
1132) has such an observation on this peculiar behaviour of the post-reform Chinese
local governments:
Local officials act as the equivalent of a board of directors and sometimes
more directly as the chief executive officers. As the helm of this corporate-
like organisation is the communist party secretary.
This new behaviour pattern has been called "local state corporatism" (Oi, 1992, see
also Walder, 1995). With the shrinking of public sector, this local state corporatism
has sought to build the partnership with the growing non-public sector, particularly
the foreign-funded enterprises, in order to stimulate economic growth. As a result, a
pro-growth coalition has emerged. While this pro-growth coalition bears similarities
to the one in the United States in many aspects, the difference between these two
coalitions are significant due to different political economic systems.
For local governments, there are two ultimate goals in building pro-growth coalitions:
to enhance political legitimacy and to stimulate economic growth. These two goals
implicate two dimensions of coalition building: the political dimension and the
economic dimension (Zhang, 2002). In liberal democratic societies, political
legitimacy is achieved through public election and shown in public power. Business
communities are well organised in liberal democratic countries, and more often than
not, they are the most influential interest groups in shaping the local political contour
because of their role as the resource controllers. It is politically necessary for local
politicians to build coalitions with business groups in order to win public elections.
More strong imperatives for coalition building lie in the economic dimension. In
liberal democratic societies, economic growth relies fundamentally in private sector
because it is the private sector that controls economic resources. The private resource
ownership means that local govermnents have to build coalitions with business
groups (the resource controllers) for economic growth. As economic performance
has been always the key factor in elections, the economic growth will in turn enhance
local government's political legitimacy. Therefore, in liberal democratic societies,
the economic dimension of coalition building is closely intertwined with the political
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dimension of coalition building, and together, they force local governments to seek
partnership with the private sector.
While two dimensions of coalition building cannot be separated in liberal democratic
societies, they are separable in a transitional socialist society such as China. This is
mainly due to the fact that China's reform is gradual and asymmetrical. With its
socialist political institutions unchanged, public election is not the way to give
legitimacy to the government. Chinese officials, from the president to mayors, are
not elected but rather are assigned through a complicated political system that is
controlled by the Communist Party. In Shanghai, for example, although the
municipal government is nominally accountable to the local assembly, the Shanghai
Party Committee is still the top decision-maker. While the mayor who is nominated
by the Centre and elected by the local assembly is usually the vice-Secretary in the
party committee, the Secretary who is appointed by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and usually a member of the Political Bureau which is the
paramount decision-maker in China is the defacto boss.
Despite the decentralisation, the Chinese political system is still highly centralised,
and showing loyalty to higher level government is crucial for promotion. The central
government judges the performance of local officials based on two criteria: political
conformity to the central government and achievements in local economic
development. The party-controlled appointment and promotion system means that
showing political loyalty always gets high priority in local officials' decision making.
It has been observed that key local officials such as the party secretary and mayors
should be seen more as central agents rather than as local representatives (Lam,
1996). It is particularly so for political leaders of Shanghai - the largest city and the
economic centre of China. This explains why the city had to submit 87°o of its local
revenue to the central government for 40 years.
Apart from the political system, the so-called "approval economy", the legacy of the
centrally planned economy, remains pervasive in China. Despite the administrative
decentralisation, there is still a threshold control. Any over-threshold matter has to be
approved by the ministry concerned in the central government. For example, any FDI
venture whose total investment surpasses USD 30 millions has to be submitted to the
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State Council for their final approval. Under this administrative system, some critical
urban redevelopment projects such as the development of Pudong would have been
impossible without the endorsement of the central government.
Since the reforms, the central government has significantly reduced its direct
involvement in local redevelopment projects. However, through the unchanged
political system, the central government still holds critical power, and as such
indirectly controls local development issues. China's unchanged political system also
means that the political dimension of pro..growth coalition building is weak in
Chinese cities, because local leaders' jobs come from superior officials rather than
from local elections, which contrasts to the practice in U.S. cities.
While the political dimension of coalition building is week, the economic dimension
of coalition building has got strengthened in Chinese cities since the reforms. The
reforms have been changing the relationship of the municipal government and non-
public sectors. Although public ownership is still the main form in China's economy,
the non-public sectors have been growing rapidly. Take Shanghai's industry for
example. Measured by percentage of total gross output value of industry in Shanghai,
the share of SOEs dropped from 89.6% in 1980 to 30.1% in 1997, while the share of
non-public enterprises increased from 1.1% to 5 1.9% (SYS, various years). Of all
forms of ownership, the foreign-funded enterprises have grown most rapidly. By
1997, it had been the biggest part of Shanghai's industry with its share of total gross
output value reaching 38.9%, comparing with SOEs' 30.1%. It is clear that the public
sector no longer dominates production in Shanghai. The municipal government has
to seek partners from non-public sectors in making development decisions. As
international capital has become a key player in Shanghai's economic development,
the SMG has to accept game rules exercising in international society. Local policies
- from tax incentives, land provision, and a public-funded infrastructure service to
the advocating of "to do things in accordance with international rules" - all reveal
local government's efforts to recruit foreign investors into the pro-growth coalition.
The leadership of the pro-growth coalition is a complicated issue. From the economic
dimension, in both Chinese and U.S. cities, the leadership of the coalition depends
largely on the extent to which the leading party controls production resources. In the
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U.S., the private sector often takes leadership in the pro-growth coalition because of
predominant private ownership in production. In China, despite marketisation and
privatisation for over twenty years, public ownership is still a major form of
ownership, and the public sector controls some key development resources such as
land and financial institutions. Therefore, despite the growing challenge from the
non-public sector, the public sector still takes leadership in the pro-growth coalition
in Chinese cities.
However, leadership is more than just an economic issue. Public sector's leadership
in the coalition is politically unchallengable due to the politics monopolisation by the
Communist Party in China. The Chinese authoritarian system not only ensures public
sector's leadership in the pro-growth coalition, but also makes the pro-growth
coalition extraordinary strong comparing with that in U.S. cities.
In liberal democratic societies, apart from governments (federal and local) and the
private sector (business interests groups), community power such as community
organisations and social movements is also a player in urban development.
Comparing with governments and private sector, community power is the weakest
player due to the lack of control over resources. But the public election gives it a
political leverage whereby it could affect voters' choice, and as such, indirectly gain
its influences in the decision-making of urban development. In urban redevelopment,
various groups such as environmentalist organisations, racial movement
organisations and community organisations against displacement contribute to
prevent the "growth machine" from going too fast, although they are often
unsuccessful.
While the weakness of community power in U.S. lies in the economic dimension of
coalition building, a weak community power in China results from community
groups' loss of election power in urban politics. With no election power to leverage
government officials, community groups have never been members of the coalition.
In fact, social organisations dependent fmm the Communist Party are barely allowed.
Party politics is virtually absent in Chinese society, and civic society is still in an
inchoate state. As a result, China's asymmetrical reform has given rise to a situation
where the vast majority of the populace is united by the goal of growth, and where
148
there is virtually no opposition voice. Without opposing forces, the power of this pro-
growth coalition composed of the local government and international investors is
overwhelming. It is this interest coalition, to be discussed in detail in the chapter 7
and 8, that has been transforming Shanghai's urban patterns rapidly and relentlessly.
6.7 The impact of reform on the mechanism of urban development
As discussed in Chapter 5, urban development in the pm-reform era was a by-
product of national industrialisation based on the central planning system. The
reform changed the overall socio-economic and political environment within which
urban development takes place. This overall change has had a profound impact on
the mechanism of urban development, which can be understood from three
interrelated aspects: 1) investment source; 2) development organisation; and 3) urban
planning system (Wu, 1998: 262).
6.7.1 Diversification of investment sources
In China's statistical system, the indicator that can be used to show the sources of
finance for urban development is the total investment in fixed assets, which refers to
the volume of activities in construction and purchases of fixed assets in monetary
terms (SSB, 1998). According to the National Statistical Bureau (1998), investment
in fixed assets is classified by channel of management as investment in capital
construction, investment in innovation, investment in real estate development and
other investment in fixed assets, and by source of funds as state budgetary
appropriation, domestic loans, foreign investment, self-raised funds and others.
As a result of decentralisation, the state budgetary appropriation has dropped rapidly
in China as a whole. While the state budgetary appropriation accounted for 28.1
percent of the total investment in fixed assets in 1981, it accounted for only 2.8
percent in 1997. On the contrary, self-raised funds (SRF) and foreign investment
have increased their proportions drastically. In 1997, their share of the total reached
55.7 percent and 10.6 percent respectively (SSB, 1998).
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The changes in investment structure in Shanghai represent a typical case. Since 1978,
SRF as well as foreign investment has increased dramatically. In 1997, SRF and
foreign investment accounted for 46.1 percent and 15.8 percent of the total
investment in fixed assets respectively, while the share of the state investment was
only 1.4 percent (SSB, 1998).
The dramatic increase of SRF and foreign investment is of course more than just
investment diversification. It reflects a profound transformation in China's political
economy - from sectoral dominance to localisation as discussed earlier. SRF refers
to "funds received by construction enteiprises from their responsible institutes, local
governments, and within enterprises of the purpose of investment in fixed assets"
(SSB, 1996: 197). The significance of SRF lies in not only its sheer size, but more
importantly, its use. As indicated, SRF is collected and used outside the control of
conventional economic planning. The fund-raisers - usually local governments and
enterprises can decide the use of the funds without the approval of the Central
Planning Commission (CPC) (Wu, 1998). Thus, the rapid rise of SRF means the
shrinkage of the "plan track" economy and the rise of local government as the key
player in urban development.
Nowadays, municipalities are not only keen to collect the SRF, but more willing to
use them for the provision of urban infrastructure and public services (Yeh and Wu,
1996; Wu, 1998). Before the reform, although the municipality was responsible for
the urban infrastructure, it was reluctant to invest in these "non-productive" items.
Given the fact that central enterprises were directly controlled by central ministries,
the municipality tended to spend its limited revenue in local enterprises from which it
drew its own income rather than the urban infrastructure that were shared by both
central and local enterprises. The fiscal reform and particularly the introduction of
TSS broke the vertical fiscal linkage between supervisory departments and
subordinate enterprises. It is now in the city government's own interest to provide
good urban infrastructure and amenities, which have become an important factor in
attracting external investment on which the development of the local economy
increasingly relies.
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6.7.2 Reorganisation of urban land development
In socialist China, all production materials including land were owned by the state
and the CPC managed the allocation of resources in the name of the state. Under this
system, land was administratively allocated to work units when their projects were
approved by the CPC. Because urban land was administratively allocated without
payment, tax, or rent, state work units tended to occupy as much land as possible.
This syndrome of thirst for land led to a prevailing shortage within the land use
system as well as the inefficiency of land use (Tang, 1994).
Attempting to tackle these problems, immediately after 1978 the central government
introduced the "comprehensive development" that was organised by the city
government (Yeh and Wu, 1996). Instead of individually acquiring land and
separately constructing facilities, the city government acquired large tracts of land
and constructed urban infrastructure, factories and service facilities comprehensively.
Since the developments took place comprehensively, better efficiency could be
achieved. Enterprises that intended a new project were encouraged to propose their
plans to the city government as well as the CPC. City governments could then turn
the plans into comprehensive development programmes. By this arrangement, the
city government would be more in control of its own land development. However,
comprehensive development was not market-oriented although the property of
housing and service facilities was sold at development cost to work units which had
signed contracts with the city government. It was a kind of development bounded by
the contract between the work units and the city government, which had no
flexibility in response to the market.
The market-oriented reforms of the whole political economy in l980s called for the
setting up of land market whereby a highly efficient land use system can be
eventually achieved. In order to avoid head-on collision with the sensitive state-
ownership of land, which is written into the Constitution of the PRC, the government
invented a pragmatic solution - the separation of the land use right from the
ownership of land per Se. While the state remain the owner of land, use rights of land
can be sold, assigned and transferred. The paid transfer of land use rights was made
official by the Seventh People's Congress in 1988. In was stipulated that the state -
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in practice, the municipality - should monopolise the lease of urban land, which
means that all the land including administratively allocated land must first be
acquired by municipalities before their use rights can be transferred (State Land
Administration Bureau, 1991; Wu, 1998).
The pragmatic land leasing system therefore effectively created a de facto land
market system composed of a primary and a secondary land market. The primary
land market refers to the transfer of land use rights from the state to the user through
land leasing. This is known as "conveyance" (churang) in China, which is
monopolised by the state. The secondary market refers to the transfer of land use
rights among users through land transactions (zhuanrang) (Yeh and Wu, 1996: 337).
It is the secondary market that conveys the real meaning of the market, operating as
the equivalent of a land market in the west.
The establishment of the de facto land market has had profound effects on the
production of the built environment (Wu, 1998). First, there has been a significant
shift in the land development mechanism from a centrally-plan-based, vertically-
controlled system into a market-oriented, horizontally-controlled one. Since city
governments were empowered as the defacto managers of state land, they can decide
the amount and location of land leasing. Enterprises are now required to propose
their projects to the municipality for urban planning permits before projects can be
submitted to the CPC. The municipal government that used to be "hollowed out" by
various central ministries can exert more influence on urban form than ever before.
Secondly, the land leasing system has uncovered the hidden price of land and led to
the restructuring of urban land use pattern (Wu, 1997). In the pre-reform era,
although land was regarded as a non-productive factor that was administratively
allocated, the value of land could not disappear. If we regard the ground rent as "a
reduction from the surplus value created on the side" (Smith, 1996: 62), then it is
also present in state socialist societies although it is intangible. For example, it is
well known that a shop in a central location can sell more goods than one in a less
favourable place. The existence of the rent can be illustrated by the very fact that the
output of shops differs due to the different location. However, shops are indifferent
to the rent under the state socialist system in which the state appropriates all the rent.
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Rent only matters when shops' own interests are made related to their output by
introduction of a new reward system such as a "responsibility contract" in which
shops have been allowed to retain a certain proportion of this profits (Yeh and Wu,
19%; Wu, 1997). But because of the absence of the land market, this rent had been
hidden in the prices of other commodities associated with the land - for example, the
cost of renting a counter in a state-run department store. Renting a counter in inner
city area cost more than in peripheral area. This hidden rent was capitalised by the
establishment of the land leasing system, because the differential rents have since
been marked in monetary form in the defacto land market. A land rent gradient has
thus emerged in Chinese cities, which is similar to western cities with land rent
declining from the city centre.
With the rise of land rent gradient, inefficient urban land use patterns such as the
occupation of factories in the city centre became unsustainable. In the past, without a
market price to refer to, bargaining in land transactions was extremely prolonged and
daunting. The complicated de facto occupation made relocation-involved
redevelopment in the inner city almost impossible (Yeh and Wu, 1996). An emerging
land market enables redevelopment projects to take place on a large scale in the
central city. Factories that were crammed in the central city can be relocated to the
suburbs where large tracts of land are available and where land is cheaper by selling
their land at high prices in the market. This is exactly what happened in Chinese
cities in early 1990s. Parcel after parcel of land occupied by old housing and
industries in the city proper have been changed to commercial and residential use. As
it will be discussed in the next chapter, a central business district, office building
complexes and luxurious residential areas, which were absent in the past, are now
flourishing in Shanghai.
The land leasing system also enables city governments to invest in urban
infrastructure and amenities. In the past, with a very limited budget in hand, the
municipality did not have enough funds to improve the urban infrastructure even if it
wanted to do so. The city government now can afford to retrieve land and then lease
it to the land user who can pay the highest price in the land market. The land leasing
system has provided the city government with a new and substantial revenue source
which was not available in the past when land was allocated free of charge. Indeed,
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income from land leasing has become one of major resources in city government's
annual revenue. In 1993, some US$ 1.8 billion was raised in Shanghai from the
leasing of land and the money was spent on improving urban infrastmcture as well as
compensating residents (Chan, 1996). The massive infrastructure projects that carried
out in Shanghai in recent years, such as the underground railway, the elevated
highway system, and the new tunnel and cross-river bridges, would have been
impossible without the funding from land leasing.
Figure 6.1 Urban Development Process in the Centrally-Planned Economy of
China Before Economic Reform in 1978
















Figure 6.2 Urban Development Process in the Transitional Economy of China
After Economic Reform in 1978
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Source: adapted from Yeh and Wu (1999: 381)
Thirdly, land reform has created a peculiar dual track system in which
administratively allocated process coexist with the land leasing method. The
administrative mechanism is still the dominant way of acquiring urban land,
particularly for the public sector and SOEs. However, the amount of land acquired
through the market mechanism of negotiation, tender and auction has increased
rapidly. In the case of Shanghai, since the first land leasing in 1988, a total of 4,581
pieces of land with an aggregate area of some 145 square km had been leased by the
end of 1998 (Shanghai Real Estate Market '1999). Given the fact that the central city
covers about 300 square km (municipal Shanghai covers about 6,340 square km) and
the leased lands tend to be located in the city centre, a high proportion of land in
Shanghai has been put onto the market. Ten years on, the overall picture of this dual
track land reform is quite peculiac three types of land development, i.e., project-
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specific, comprehensive and market-based real estate development, coexist currently
in urban China. Figure 6.1 and 6.2 show the transition of urban development process
since 1978.
6.7.3 The new role of urban planning
Prior to the reform, urban planning was subordinate to the top-down economic
planning. Nominally, its function was to translate economic development goals into a
physical blueprint. In practice, it played the role of servant to national
industrialisation. Urban planning, and the municipal government whose interests it
represented, had little discretion in shaping the urban form and planning the future
development. Wu (1998: 270) has a good description of the relationship between
economic planning and urban planning in socialist China:
.development goals were created from economic planning; resource
allocation was bargained and set through the economic planning system;
conflicts in interests were mediated through a process of 'comprehensive
balancing' in economic rather than urban planning; development control was
based on 'project registration' rather than planning permits.
This subservient status of urban planning resulted from the centralised and sectoral-
based organisation of urban development. The reform policy has transformed
China's political economy and subsequently the dynamic of urban development,
which resulted in the fundamental changes in terms of urban planning system versus
economic planning. Alongside with the reform pmgress, the status of urban planning
was gradually strengthened by a series of government policies and legislative
measures from 1978 on. In 1980, the State Council promulgated the Provisional
Regulation for the Preparation of Urban Plans, which stressed that municipalities
were responsible for preparing urban plans. In 1984, the Regulation of Urban
Planning was announced and in 1989 the regulation became the Urban Planning Act
(UPA) (Wu, 1998)
The enactment of UPA is a milestone in China's development of urban planning
system. It rules that all development projects including state ones within a city
planning area must first submit their proposals to the city government for
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consideration. Obtaining "a site selection permission" issued by the municipality is
now a pre-condition for projects to be registered in the CPC (Wu, 1998). The UPA
also set up a development control system, which allows the municipality to enforce
urban plans directly on urban land all construction projects must apply for a land-
use planning permit and a building permit from the municipal planning authority.
The change of sequence and the establishment of the planning control system
symbolise the fundamental change of urban planning from a collateral to economic
planning into a market-oriented urban physical control apparatus.
Again, however, the new urban planning system is tinged with Chinese
characteristics. While the municipality has now real power in the urban planning
process, two major problems of urban planning in the centrally planned economy -
administrative discretion and insufficient public involvement - remain (Wu, 1998).
The Chinese planning authority has similar power to its western counterpart, but it
bears much less constraints than the latter. As a result, the municipality is more
willing to revise their master plans and do so with less resistance. Vety often,
municipalities lower their planning standards to cater for international capital for
which all cities compete. In the extraordinary strong growth machine politics, urban
planning, unleashed from the grip of economic planning system, has been turned into
a municipally controlled "local-growth-oriented device" which often finds itself
becoming a bargaining counter in the negotiation table (Wu, 1998: 271).
6.7.4 The impact of international capital on the mechanism of urban
development
Since China opened its door to the world capitalism, foreign capital has played an
increasingly important role in transforming the dynamic of Shanghai's urban
development. Foreign investment has become one of the major sources in fixed
assets investment in Shanghai. In 1997, foreign investment accounted for l5.80 o of
the total investment in fixed assets (SSB, 1998). Unlike SRF, which is a form of
internal capital which is more or less subject to the government control, foreign
investment represents a kind of external resource which is internationally rootless
and which runs completely beyond the reach of Chinese government. This external
capital, which acts completely in accordance with the rule of the market, posed a
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huge challenge to the old method of urban development which was geared to the
centrally planned economy. This challenge compelled and sometime forced the
government to adopt a more market-oriented approach to urban development.
Take capital construction procedure for example. Capital construction procedure
refers to "the work procedure that a capital construction project must adhere to from
the planning stage to project completion" (cited in Wu, 1998: 266). This procedure
was of course designed to gear with the project-specific method. However, it was
disregarded in the case of foreign investment. Not uncommonly, planned
international investment was largely unknown to the planning authority until a very
late stage in the process, because foreign investors tended to negotiate directly with
senior officials in the government during such occasions as visits and conventions.
This case-by-case approach, on the one hand, put the planning authority into a rather
passive position. On the other hand, foreign investors complained about the
prolonged bureaucratic procedures. In order to institutionalise foreign investment
procedures, the SMG set up a brand new department - Shanghai Foreign Investment
Commission (SFIC) in 1987. It was claimed that the SFIC would deal with the
foreign investment "in accordance with the international rule" (anzhao guojiguanli
banshi) - a popular government slogan in 1990s. The SMG hoped that the
establishment of SFIC would, by quickening the bureaucratic procedure, improve
Shanghai's soft investment environment which had become an important factor in
attracting international capital.
External investment also had an important influence in the adoption of the land
leasing system. Far earlier before the establishment of urban land market, foreign
investors had been charged for the land use. The Sino-Foreign Joint Venture Law
enacted in 1979 stipulated that foreign funded enterprises should pay land use fees.
With the significant increase of foreign investment, the Chinese government was
under mounting pressure to treat foreign investors as the same as the domestic ones
by introducing a non-biased land market system. This kind of pressure was certainly
not confined to one area. Indeed, apart from driving the overall behaviour of Chinese
local state towards entrepreneurialism, international capital has made a great
contribution in transforming China's urban development mechanism. The transition,
as argued in this thesis, is not solely internally-induced, nor is it solely externally-
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driven. It is the combination of internal and external factors that underlies the new
dynamics of urban development.
This chapter has shown that the situation where the state alone was responsible for
Shanghai's urban development has been changed by the reforms introduced by the
Chinese government in the late 1978. The state has retreated from economic domain,
and thus, we have seen the emergence of a new state-economic relation. The central
state has slackened it grips on the local state, and so, we have seen the rise of local
state corporationism. With the retreat of the state, capital has re-emerged in the state-
capital relationship and played an increasingly important role in shaping Shanghai's
urban patterns. It is the increasingly important role of capital in Shanghai's urban
development that I turn to in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
ThETERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND URBAN
RESTRUCTURING IN POST-REFORM SHANGHAI
7.1 Introduction
This chapter examines Shanghai's dramatic urban restructuring since 1978. It starts
with an analysis of Shanghai's changing mode of integration with the world economy
in terms of trade, labour and capital. The increasingly importance of the inflow of
FDI is scrntinised by focusing on investment of the Fortune-listed World Largest
Corporations in Shanghai. This fundamental shift in its mode of integration with the
world economy has had a profound impact on Shanghai's urban restructuring. With
the shrinking of the role of the state, the chapter shows that Shanghai's urban
restructuring has been increasingly fuelled by international capital in economic,
spatial and social terms. The chapter is concluded by depicting a new state-capital
relationship that has been underlying Shanghai's urban restructuring in the post-
reform era.
7.2 Shanghai's economic development since 1978: links with the
world economy
7.2.1 GDP growth
Shanghai's economic development after 1978 can be divided into two periods with
the launch of development of Pudong in 1990 being a watershed. The first period
1979-1990, over 12 years, was one when economic growth raced ahead in
Guangdong and other southern areas and Shanghai acted merely as a "rearguard" in
economic reform. Shanghai's dominant position as China's industry, trade and
commercial centre was fading and its manufactured products, which used to be the
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symbol of good quality were losing ground in the domestic market. Annual economic
growth averaged 7.5°o, which was below the domestic market (Yeung, 1996). This
was followed by the present period of rapid growth after Pudong was launched in
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Shanghai's economy did not fare vely well in the first period, mainly because of its
rearguard position in China's overall development strategy. As mentioned in Chapter
6, Deng Xiaoping and his allies adopted a "piece-meal" approach to the reform and
open-door policy. This "piece-meal" approach also had a spatial connotation. In
order to confme the "risk" of reform, reformers set up four Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) in Fujian and Guangdong, which is adjacent to Hong Kong and Macao, and
in which a series of policies towards marketisation and decentralisation were
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pioneered. Given the fact that Shanghai's revenue was one-sixth of the national total,
and that one-third of the central government expenditures came from Shanghai in the
late 1970s (Yeung, 1996). Shanghai was too important to be a pilot area and was
given a rearguard role throughout the I 980s. As indicated in Chapter 6, while
Guangdong was granted a generous plan in the revenue-sharing fiscal reform
introduced in 1980, Shanghai was required to remit 88.8°c of its total revenue to the
central government.
With the tight grip of the central government, Shanghai's economic performance was
lacklustre and lacked vitality. While Shanghai experienced a moderate economic
growth, Guangdong quickly outpaced Shanghai in economic term. As a result,
Shanghai's share of China's GDP declined continuously from 7.5% in 1978 to a
record low of 4.100 in 1990, while Guangdong's share increased from 5.1% to 7.9° o
(see Table 7.2 and Figure 7.1). The same tendency can be found with Shanghai's
industrial output, which fell from 12.1% of China's total in 1978 to 6.9% in 1990,
and value-added of the tertiary sector, which dropped from 5.9% to 4.2%.
This trend only stopped when the central government chose Shanghai as the
launchpad for the new round of reform policy. Symbolised by the Pudong project,
Shanghai became the symbol and focus of China's reform in the 1990s as had
Guangdong in the 1980s. Since then, Shanghai's economic growth has dramatically
quickened, registering double-digit annual growth for 7 consecutive years (1992-
1998). Consequently, Shanghai's share of China's GDP rebounded from 4.1°o in
1990 to 4.6° o in 1998, and its share of value-added of the tertiary sector increased to
6.8%. By 1998, Shanghai's GDP had reached RMB 368.8 billion with per capita
GDP of RMB 28,240, a stark contrast with 1978 when GDP was RMB 27.3 billion
and per capita GDP was RMB 2,498 (SSB, 1999).
Alongside the astonishing quantitative expansion of the economy, Shanghai's mode
of integration with the world economy has been fundamentally changed. Integration
with the world economy refers to the specific forms, intensity, and duration of the
relations that link the urban economy into the global system of markets for capital,
labour and commodities (Friedmann, 1986). As Friedmann argues that the character











Table 7.2 Share of Shanghai and Guangdong in China's GDP, Industrial
Output and Value-added of the Tertiary Sector, 1978-1 998
Share of Shanghai in China's 	 Share of Guangdong in China's
year	 GDP	 Industrial Value-	 GDP Industrial Value-added
output	 added of the	 output	 of the
tertiary	 tertiary
sector	 sector
1978	 7.5	 12.1	 5.9	 5.1	 4.7	 5.1
1979	 6.7	 11.9	 6.2	 5.0	 4.6	 5.8
1980	 6.9	 11.6	 6.8	 5.4	 4.3	 6.4
1981	 6.7	 11.5	 6.7	 5.9	 5.0	 6.8
1982	 6.4	 10.9	 6.5	 6.3	 5.1	 7.0
1983	 6.0	 10.3	 6.3	 6.1	 5.1	 6.5
1984	 5.4	 9.6	 5.6	 6.1	 5.3	 6.4
1985	 5.2	 8.9	 4.8	 6.2	 5.5	 6.1
1986	 4.8	 8.5	 4.6	 6.8	 6.4	 7.3
1987	 4.6	 7.8	 4.6	 6.8	 6.4	 7.3
1988	 4.3	 7.2	 4.2	 7.4	 7.2	 7.7
1989	 4.1	 6.9	 3.7	 7.8	 7.5	 8.0
1990	 4.1	 6.9	 4.2	 7.9	 8.0	 8.6
1991	 4.1	 6.9	 4.3	 8.2	 8.9	 8.5
1992	 4.2	 6.6	 4.4	 8.6	 9.4	 8.5
1993	 4.4	 6.3	 5.1	 9.4	 9.9	 9.3
1994	 4.4	 5.5	 5.5	 9.4	 9.4	 9.8
1995	 4.2	 4.9	 5.5	 9.8	 8.5	 11.1
1996	 4.3	 4.7	 6.1	 9.6	 8.3	 11.3
1997	 4.5	 4.7	 6.6	 9.8	 8.5	 11.6
1998	 4.6	 4.8	 6.8	 10.0	 9.0	 11.2
Source: Sung (1996: 181); SYS, 1999; SYC, 1999; SYG, 1999.
Figure 7.1 Share of Shanghai and Guangdong in China's GDP: 1978-1 998
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integration into the world economy, it is imperative to see how Shanghai has become
more integrated with the outside world before we can look into Shanghai's urban
restructuring.
7.2.2 External frade
Prior to the reform, Shanghai was chosen to be China's major centre of international
trade with export value via Shanghai customs accounting for 30% of the national
total exports in 1978 (han 1996). With the introduction of China's market-oriented
reform and the decentralisation of powers to export that came with it, Shanghai has
lost its position as the national centre for foreign trade although its absolute value of
imports and exports has increased considerably. This was mainly due to the sharp
rise of Guangdong's share, which accounted for 46.8% of the national total in 1994
while Shanghai's share was only 15.3% (Sung, 1996: 190).
However, Shanghai is still the most important regional trade centre to articulate the
Yangzi Delta with the world economy. This position has been strengthened since the
opening up of Pudong in 1990. From Table 7.3, we can see that the value of imports
and exports via Shanghai by non-local finns, which is equal to the difference
between the value of imports and exports via Shanghai customs and the value of
imports and exports conducted by the local firms, always outweighed the value
conducted by local firms. The annual growth rate of such value has dramatically
quickened since 1990, reaching 42.4°c in 1995.
More importantly, due to the more rapid growth of foreign trade than GDP over the
past two decades, Shanghai's inward-oriented economy which was entrenched under
the state socialism has been changed towards a more outward-oriented one. As Table
7.4 shows, the ratio of exports to GDP, an indicator showing the extent to which an
economy is dependent on the world market, has been rising since the reform,
reaching a peak of39.7°o in 1994, then dropped slightly to 36.3°c in 1997.
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Table 7.3 Foreign Trade via and of Shanghai: 1985-1995 ( unit: USS million)
via Shanghai's	 Shanghai's	 via Shanghai's customs - Shanghai's
customs	 foreign trade	 foreign trade
Year	 value	 annual growth rate ( 00)
1985 14873	 4991	 9882	 -
1986 16066	 5066	 11000	 11.31
1987 15635	 5961	 9674	 -12.05
1988 18654	 7160	 11474	 18.61
1989 19437	 7848	 11589	 1.00
1990 17289	 7428	 9861	 -14.91
1991 20409	 8044	 12365	 25.39
1992 25145	 9756	 15389	 24.46
1993 30931	 12732	 18199	 18.26
1994 36246	 15819	 20427	 12.24
1995 48137	 19057	 29080	 42.36
1996 52870	 22263	 30607	 5.25
1997 58683	 24764	 33919	 10.82
Sources: SYS, 1996, 1997, and 1998; Statistical Yearbook of Shanghai Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade, 1996.
Table 7.4	 Shanghai's GDP and Exports: 1981-1997
Year	 GDP	 Exports	 Average exchange rate Exports/GDP














































































































1997	 336.02	 14.72	 8.29	 36.3
Source: SYS, 1998; Statistic Yearbook of China (SYC hereafter), 1998.
Although Shanghai is still in general an inward-oriented economy compared with
Guangdong whose ratio of exports to GDP reached 95.4°c in 1994 (Sung 1996),
Shanghai's economy depends on the world market much more than previously.
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7.2.3 Foreign workers and visitors
Apart from the increasing integration with the world commodities markets, the
international flow of labour has also been greatly intensified. Prior to the reform, it
was very rare to see a foreign tourist on the street, let alone foreigners working in
Shanghai. By November 1999, there were 15,000 foreigners and 6,000 people from
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan working in Shanghai (Shanghai Window', 25 Nov.
1999). Those foreigners come from all over the world with top 5 origins being Japan,
USA, Korea, Singapore and Germany. They are employed in some 2,200 enterprises
and organisations, most of them are working as senior managers, or chief
representatives, chefs and bakers of western restaurants and foreign language
teachers. Taking into account those living but not working in Shanghai, the figure is
even higher. According to the Shanghai External Affairs Office, there were 38,000
foreigners who held a "temporary resident card" in 1999, up from about 10,000 in
1994 (Debenham Tie Leung, 2000)
With its colonial history and unique urban landscape, Shanghai has become a magnet
for international tourism since 1978. Foreign visitors (excluding those from Hong
Kong, Macao and Taiwan) increased drastically from 0.17 million in 1978 to about
1.3 million in 1997. As shown in Table 7.5, foreign visitors rose even faster in the
l990s than the 1980s. The number of foreign visitors doubled in the decade of the
1980s, whereas it almost tripled in seven years from 1990 to 1997.
Table 7.5 Number of Foreign Visitors in Shanghai in Selected Years
	1978	 1980	 1990	 1995	 1997
	
Number(l0,000 17.07	 21.07	 46.06	 107.55	 129.99
person- times)
Source: SYS, 1998.
Another indication showing Shanghai's growing interdependence with the outside
comes from its telecommunications which have been getting increasingly
internationally-oriented. Over the past 20 years, international long distance calls
increased seismically from just 29,700 in 1978 to 48.1 million in 1997 (see Table
7.6). The ratio of international long distance calls to domestic long distance calls,






































which reflects the extent to which the city's telecommunication is internationalised,
rose dramatically during the same period. The peitentage was only 0.47° o in 1978,
reached a peak of 16.8°o in 1989, and then dropped gradually to 8.8°o in 1978. The
decrease in the I 990s was due to the even faster increase of domestic long distance
calls as the result of the spread of telephones for ordinary households.
TabLe 7.6 Comparison Between Domestic and International Long CaH in
Shanghai: 1978-1995
Year	 Domestic long	 International long	 International long distance
distance call (10
	 distance call (10 000) call / Domestic long distance
000)	 call(%)
1978	 637.30	 2.97	 0.47
1979	 735.50	 6.97	 0.95
1980	 323.15	 9.95	 3.08
1981	 365.14	 11.09	 3.04
1982	 390.51	 11.73	 3.00
1983	 463.20	 15.80	 3.41
1984	 588.26	 24.44	 4.15
1985	 741.20	 39.90	 5.39
1986	 803.80	 59.60	 7.41
Source: adapted and calculated from SYS, 1996.
7.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment
The driving force of the intensifying intemationalisation of Shanghai's commodity
and labour movement is the foreign direct investment (FDI) which poured into
Shanghai attracted by Shanghai's strategic position in Chinese market. FDI is the
most obvious indicator that a place has begun to integrate with the world capitalist
economy, and the volume of FDI can tell us to what extent a place has integrated
with the world economy.
China started to accept FDI after adoption of reform and open-door policy in 1978.
In the initial years of China's open policy, the SEZs were the major destinations for
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FDI. For example, from 1979 to 1989 SEZs accounted for 20.5°c of national realised
FDI value while Shanghai's share was 8.1% (Nyaw Mee-kau, 1996). Table 7.7
shows that Shenzhen's annual FDI outweighed Shanghai's in term of contractual
value until 1992 when Shanghai's FDI dramatically increased (75O0 annual growth).
From 1992 on, Shanghai became the major recipient of FDI in China. In 1994, China
as a whole received 17% of the global FDI and accounted for one-third of the total
FD I in developing countries, and Shanghai accounted for 12.1% of national FDI
(Nyaw, 1996). That meant Shanghai hosted around 2.1% of the global FDI in 1994.
By the end of 1996, contracted FDI in Shanghai had totalled US$ 45.3 billion of
which some USS 16 billion had been realised.
Table 7.7 Contractual FDI of Some Major Cities in China: 1985-1995 (unit:
US$ 108 )
China	 Beijing	 Shanghai	 Guangzhou	 Shenzhen
value % of value % of value % of value % of
China	 China	 China	 China
1985 59.3
	 -	 7.1	 12.0	 4.8	 8.1	 10.3	 17.3
1986 28.3	 4.2	 14.8	 3.0	 10.5	 3.2	 11.1	 5.1	 18.1
1987 37.1
	
6.2	 16.8	 2.5	 6.7	 2.1	 5.8	 5.7	 15.3
1988 53.0	 1.4	 2.7	 3.3	 6.3	 3.9	 7.4	 4.3	 8.1
1989 56.0	 0.8	 1.5	 3.6	 6.4	 4.0	 7.2	 4.7	 8.4
1990 66.0
	
1.2	 1.8	 3.8	 5.7	 4.7	 7.2	 6.8	 10.3
1991	 119.8	 2.9	 2.4	 4.5	 3.8	 7.1	 5.9	 10.9	 9.1
1992 581.2	 14.8	 2.5	 33.6	 5.8	 45.0	 7.7	 25.0	 4.3
1993 1114.4	 62.8	 5.6	 70.2	 6.3	 68.4	 6.1	 49.7	 4.5
1994 826.8	 45.3	 5.5	 100.3	 12.1	 68.6	 8.3	 28.3	 3.4
1995 912.8	 27.4	 3.0	 105.4	 11.6	 67.3	 7.4	 34.6	 3.8
Sources: SYC, 1996; Collection of Statistics of Coast Open-cities, SZEs and Key
Cities, 1995.
Compared with the other cities in the coastal region, FDI in Shanghai has two
particular features. First, Shanghai's FDI is less Hong Kong originated and more
internationally-oriented. Since China opened its doors, investment from Hong Kong
has been the dominant resource. Up to 1997, FDI from Hong Kong accounted for
41 . 1 0 o
 of total FDI actually utilised in China. This is particularly the case with
Guangdong where over 60°c FDI comes from Hong Kong (GSB, 1999). It has been
noted that the rapid economic growth of South China was largely driven by small-
and medium-size and labour-intensive investments from adjacent Hong Kong and
Macao (Sit and Yang, 1997). Shanghai's colonial past and its role as a strategic
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location for the Chinese market with a relatively better trained labour force, and good
infrastructure attracted foreign investment from a wide geographical region. While
Hong Kong is still the biggest contributor to Shanghai's FDI accounting for 39.4°o of
total contracted FDI by 1997, investment from America, Japan, Singapore and so on
also play a significant role in the formation of Shanghai's FDI (Table 7.8).
Table 7.8 Contracted FDI in Shanghai by Country: for the year ending 1997
(US$: million)
Total Hong USA Japan Singapore Taiwan UK Germany
Value 29082 11470 3233 2254	 1839	 1644	 1047 624
%of	 100	 39.4	 11.1	 7.8	 6.3	 5.7	 3.6	 2.1
total
Source: SYS, 1998.
Second, while joint ventures tend to be small- and medium-sized in south China, the
big foreign invested enterprises with a total investment of USS 10 million or more
play a significant role in Shanghai. Large TNCs' interests in Shanghai is
demonstrated by the fact that of the World's Largest 500 Corporations listed in
Fortune in 1998, 254 have already landed in Shanghai. Among those 254
corporations, 144 have set up enterprises, 26 foreign banks and insurance firms have
established affiliates and 84 have had their own representative offices in Shanghai.
By August 1999, 144 TNCs alone had invested US$ 9.4 billion which accounted for
more than one fifth of total contracted FDI in Shanghai. Of the US$ 9.4 billion
investment, some US$ 8.1 billion (86.2%) was invested in Pudong New Area.
Therefore, the analysis of investment by Fortune 500 corporation in Pudong is very
indicative of the whole picture of investment by these corporations in Shanghai.
By September 1999, a total of 98 world large corporations listed in Fortune's 500
World Largest Corporations (August 3, 1998) had invested in Pudong, setting up 181
enterprises (projects) (see Table 7.9)
Based upon the timing of investment made by these corporations, three periods can
be identified (see Table 7.10 and Figure 7.2). Prior to 1992, although Shanghai had
attracted hundreds of millions of dollars in FDI, the world largest TNCs showed little
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Table 7.9 Investment of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong (USS: million)




1	 1	 General Motors	 U.s.	 5	 1606.5	 820.0
2	 2	 Ford Motor	 U.S.	 1	 4.3	 3.4
3	 3	 Mitsui	 Japan	 4	 26.9	 26.4
4	 4	 Mitsubishi	 Japan	 1	 284	 14.2
5	 5	 Royal Dutch/Shell Group 	 Brit.fNeth.	 1	 0.2	 0.1
6	 6	 Itochu	 Japan	 1	 1	 1
7	 7	 Exxon	 U.S.	 1	 0.7	 0.7
8	 9	 Marubeni	 Japan	 1	 3	 1
9	 10	 Sumitomo	 Japan	 3	 3.1	 3.1
10	 12	 General Electric	 U.S.	 2	 0.6	 0.4
11	 13	 Nissholwai	 Japan	 1	 2.3	 2.3
12	 14	 Intl. Business Machines	 U.S.	 3	 1.7	 1.6
13	 18	 Daewoo	 S. Korea	 4	 193.4	 186.4
14	 21	 Hitachi	 Japan	 2	 167.7	 52.4
15	 23	 Matsushita Electric	 Japan	 5	 171.5	 137.2
Industrial
16	 24	 Siemens	 Germany	 5	 106.1	 60.4
17	 26	 Mobil	 U.S.	 1	 0.3	 0.3
18	 30	 Sony	 Japan	 2	 410.6	 287.4
19	 35	 Unilever	 Brit./Neth.	 2	 1.2	 0.7
20	 36	 Nestle	 Switzerland	 1	 5.1	 5.1
21	 39	 Boeing	 U.S.	 1	 0.3	 0.3
22	 40	 Texaco	 U.S.	 1	 2	 1
23	 41	 Toshiba	 Japan	 1	 0.4	 0.4
24	 47	 Hewlt Packard	 U.S.	 3	 44.9	 44.9
25	 49	 E. I. Du Pont De Nemours	 U.S.	 2	 25.3	 20.3
26	 52	 Fujitsu	 Japan	 1	 10	 2.9
27 53	 RWE Group	 Germany	 1	 0.2	 0.2
28	 54	 NEC	 Japan	 1	 1200	 342.9
29	 65	 Renault	 France	 1	 0.3	 0.3
30	 71	 SK	 S. Korea	 1	 12.0	 5.9
31	 77	 BASF	 Germany	 4	 237.0	 173.7
32 80	 Bayer	 Germany	 3	 45.6	 22.9
33	 82	 Nichimen	 Japan	 1	 1	 1
34	 93	 Motorola	 U.S.	 1	 12.0	 6.7
35	 105	 Hyuaxxlai	 S. Korea	 2	 1.5	 1.3
36	 111	 Industrial Bank of Japan	 Japan	 1	 21.1	 21.1
37	 115	 Kanematsu	 Japan	 1	 1
38	 120	 Daiei	 Japan	 1	 0.7	 0.7
39	 121	 Sananmg	 S. Korea	 2	 5.2	 2.8
40	 125	 Intel	 U.S.	 2	 30.2	 30.2
41	 135	 Thyssen	 Germany	 1	 0.7	 0.7
42	 137	 Volvo	 Sweden	 2	 1.7	 0.8
43	 148	 Canon	 Japan	 3	 31.6	 16.6
44	 149	 Sanwa Bank
	 Japan	 1	 0.4	 0.4
45	 150	 Johnson & Johnson	 U.S.	 2	 0.7	 0.3
46	 165	 Kansai Electric Power	 Japan	 2	 0.8	 0.8
47	 168	 Sakura Bank
	 Japan	 1	 0.5	 0.5
48	 176	 Bell South	 U.S.	 4	 174.4	 77.8
49	 181	 DIAGEO	 Britain	 1	 70	 70
50	 186	 Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank	 Japan	 1	 0.2	 0.2
51	 188	 Loews	 U.S.	 2	 0.6	 0.6
52	 192	 Atlantic Richfield	 U.S.	 1	 4.4	 1.1
53	 196	 Toho Mutual Life Insurance Japan	 2	 1.6	 0.8
54	 202	 Chiyoda Mutual Life	 Japan	 2	 0.4	 0.3
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Insurance
55	 207	 Chubu Electric Power 	 Japan	 1	 0.2	 0.2
56	 209	 Xerox	 U.S.	 1	 1	 1
57	 210	 Imperial Chemical Industries Britain 	 2	 1.5	 1.5
58	 215	 Tokio Marine & Fire 	 Japan	 3	 5.3	 2.9
Insurance
59	 220	 UAL	 U.S.	 1	 0.8	 0.4
60	 222	 Supervalu	 U.S.	 1	 0.2	 0.1
61	 230	 Bristol-Myers Squibb
	 U.S.	 1	 0.3	 0.3
62	 238	 Toyota Tsusho	 Japan	 1	 0.3	 0.3
63	 245	 Sanyo Electric	 Japan	 1	 10	 10
64	 253	 PG&E Corp.	 U.S.	 11	 67.2	 51.1
65	 255	 US West	 U.S.	 1	 0.6	 0.3
66	 261	 Minnesota Mming & MFG	 U.S.	 1	 0.2	 0.2
67	 264	 Taisei	 Japan	 1	 1.1	 0.3
68	 266	 Sprint	 U.S.	 1	 1
69	 269	 Eastman Kodak
	 U.S.	 2	 1142.8	 915.1
70	 273	 Isuzu Motors	 Japan	 2	 1
71	 274	 Sharp	 Japan	 3	 292.6	 177.4
72	 278	 Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch- 	 Germany	 1	 1429.9	 857.9
Krupp
73	 297	 Archer Daniels Midland	 U.S.	 1	 0.3	 0.3
74	 303	 Taiyo Mutual Life Insurance Japan	 2	 2.2	 2.2
75	 315	 Lufthansa Group	 Germany	 1	 0.2	 0.2
76	 316	 Man	 Germany	 3	 1.5	 1.2
77	 318	 Time Warner	 U.S.	 1	 6	 3
78	 324	 Winn-Dixie Stores	 U.S.	 2	 0.5	 0.3
79	 333	 Tohoku Electric Power 	 Japan	 2	 4.2	 4.2
80	 339	 Deere	 U.S.	 2	 2.4	 0.9
81	 341	 Smithldine Beecham	 Britain	 1	 30.4	 21.3
82	 348	 Southern	 U.S.	 1	 1.7	 1.7
83	 360	 Otto Versand	 Germany	 1	 0.7	 0.2
84	 371	 Pohang Iron & Steel	 S. Korea	 1	 186.5	 186.5
85	 384	 Rockwell International	 U.S.	 2	 16	 11.2
86	 386	 Daido Life Insurance	 Japan	 1	 7.5	 1.9
87	 390	 Henkel	 Germany	 1	 8.0	 6.0
88	 391	 JardineMatheson	 China(H.K.) 3	 1.5	 1.5
89	 396	 Ricoh	 Japan	 2	 46.6	 26.8
90	 403	 Kawasho	 Japan	 1	 0.2	 0.2
91	 423	 Fuji Heavy Industries	 Japan	 4	 9.4	 7.1
92	 447	 Snow Brand Milk Products Japan 	 1	 0.4	 0.4
93	 454	 Gillte	 U.S.	 2	 95.2	 58.9
94	 459	 Showa Shell Sekiyu	 Japan	 2	 4.3	 2.5
95	 470	 Inchcape	 Britain	 3	 3.6	 3.3
% 471	 Cathay Life	 Taiwan	 1	 0.4	 0.1
97	 472	 Peninsular & Oriental Steam Britain 	 1	 0.7	 0.7
Nay.
98	 498	 Konntsu	 Japan	 2	 1.8	 1.5
Total	 181	 8086.9	 4281.6
Note: 'Corporations are ranked by revenues they made in 1997.
2Cocporations may make their investment aa their subsidiaries which are located in third
places. For instance, Nestle made its investment in Pudong through its subsidiaries in Hong
Kong.
3Foreign corporations set up a joint ventiae or a wholly foreign owned enterprises by proposing
a project to the Chinese authority for approval. In this sense, a project literally means a
foreign-invested enterprise.
4Fotal contracted mvestment includes those invested by Chinese companies.
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interest in investing in Shanghai. The year of 1992 marked a turning point when
China's reform and opening-up was accelerated by Deng Xiaoping. In the four years
1992-1995, 96 enterprises (53°o of the total) were established by Fortune 500
corporations. The financial crisis of 1996 in Southeast Asia slowed down the pace of
investment by the Southeast Asian countries and particularly Japan. However, due to
the continuous capital inflow from America and Europe, 78 enterprises were set up
from 1996 to September 1999.
Table 7.10 The Number of Projects Funded by Fortune 500 Corporations in
Note: *up to September 1999
Source: Wang (2000: 16)
Figure 7.2 The Number of Projects Funded by Fortune 500 Corporations in
Pudong: By Year
Unsurprisingly, in terms of national origin, most investment both in number and
value came from the U.S., Japan and Germany - countries that have the most
corporations listed in Fortune. Investment by these three countries made up 82° o of
the total number of established enterprises and 95.5°c of the total contracted foreign
investment (see Table 7.11). Japan had 68 projects (37.6°o), followed by America's
60 (33.l°o) and Germany's 21 (ll.6 0 o). However, in terms of value, American
corporations made the biggest contribution (38.5°o) followed by German (32.9°o),
while Japan contributed 24.1° o of the total investment. This indicates that projects
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invested by Japanese corporations tend to be relatively small compared with those
invested by American and German.
Table 7.11 Investment by Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong: By Country
(US$: million)




Japan	 68	 37.6	 1033.4	 24.1
America	 60	 33.1	 1650.1	 38.5
Germany	 21	 11.6	 1411.0	 32.9
Korea	 10	 5.5	 110.8	 2.5
Britain	 8	 4.4	 29.9	 0.6
Others	 14	 7.7	 46.4	 1.4
Source: calculated from the Table 7.9
In terms of investment structure, 92.7% of the total investment went to secondary
industry (see Table 7.12). Although over half of the projects were invested in tertiary
industry, the total investment in the tertiary industry was only about US$ 312 million
(7.3% of the total). This is mainly due to the fact that key areas in the tertiary
industry such as RMB business in banking industry, group policy of insurance, retail
and so on are not opened to foreign investors, while almost all sectors in the
secondary industry has long welcomed foreign investment. The tertiary investments
were also much smaller with an average investment of US$ 3.2 million. The average
investment of all projects by the Fortune 500 corporations in Pudong was as much as
US$ 23.7 million, while the average industrial investment reached US$ 47.8 million.
Table 7.12 FDI Structure by the Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong (USS:
million)
No. of % of Contracted	 0o of Average
projects total	 foreign	 total	 investment
investment
Secondary industry 	 83	 45.9	 3970	 92.7	 47.8
Tertiary industry	 98	 54.1	 312	 7.3	 3.2
Of which the real estate 7
	 3.9	 133	 3.1	 19
Total	 181	 100	 4282	 100	 23.7
Source: Wang (2000: 17)
If we classify projects with investment of US$ 10 million or more as the large
projects (as they do in Shanghai), then 49 projects (27.loo) invested by these
corporations fall into this category (see Table 7.13, Figure 7.3). Among these 49
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Table 7.13 FDI Structure of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong: By Amount
of Investment (US$: million)
No. of project % of total Contracted foreign investment % of total
>10	 49	 27.1	 41.72	 97.4
5-10	 12	 6.6	 0.36	 0.8
1-5	 39	 21.5	 0.52	 1.3
<1	 81	 44.8	 0.22	 0.5
Source: Wang (2000: 18)
Figure 7.3 FDI Structure of Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong: By Amount
of Investment (US$: million)
>10	 5-10	 1-5	 <1
Table 7.14 Four Mea Joint Ventures in Shanghai (US$: million)
Investor	 Date of	 Total	 Contracted
establishment ccntracted
	 foreign
_______________ _______________________ of JV
	 investment investment
Shanghai Genal	 GM (US); Shanghai Motor	 May, 1997	 1521	 760.5
MotorsLtd.	 Industry (Group) Co. Ltd.	 __________ ________ _________
Kodak Co. (China) Eastman Kodak (US);	 March, 1995	 1138.2	 1061.2
Ltd.	 ______________________ ___________ _________ __________
Shanghai Hua	 NEC (Japan); Shanghai Hua	 May, 1997	 1200	 342.9
Hong NEC	 Hong (Group) Co. Ltd.
ElectronicCo. Ltd. _____________________ ___________ _________ __________
Shanghai Krupp	 Fried. Krupp AG Hoesch-	 Octobor, 1998 1429.9	 857.9
Stainless Steel Co. Krupp (Germany), Shanghai
Ltd.	 Pudong Sted (Group) Co. Ltd. ___________ _________ __________
Total__________________________ _____________ 5289.1	 3022.5
Source: personal interview in 1999 with Chan Fang, Secretary to the Vice-Director of Shanghai
Pudong Administration.
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projects, 4 have been called "mega-projects" with a total investment of US$ 1 billion
or more (see Table 7.14). These four "mega-projects" alone accounted for 70.6% of
the total contracted foreign investment by Fortune 500 corporations. Among these
four "mega-projects", Shanghai GM Ltd is the biggest with total investment of US$
1.521 billion of which US$ 0.76 billion is invested by GM. Located in Pudong
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone, Shanghai GM Ltd. is the biggest Sino-American
joint-venture in China. With a planing production capacity of 100,000 cars a year, it
targets at the burgeoning Chinese automobile market. The first car, branded as
"Buick", was produced in December 1998. A total of 23,000 "Buick" was produced
in the year of 1999 (Wang, 2000).
In contrast with the small projects, these big joint-ventures tend to be technology-
intensive with areas involved automobile, information technology, bio-medical, new
materials and the like areas where foreign capital is most wanted by the SMG to
upgrade Shanghai's outdated industiy. However, it is important to note that nearly
half the projects funded by these world largest corporations are small projects with
investment below US$ 1 million. This indicates that the investment of many world
largest corporations in Shanghai is still in the experimental stage, and Shanghai holds
a lower position in their global organisation of production at present.
The above analysis of investment by Fortune 500 Corporations in Pudong has also
pointed to a major different between Shanghai and China's southern provinces in
attracting FDI. While South China has been used by the small- and medium-sized
capital from Hong Kong as an export processing base to relocated their labour-
intensive industries, the big TNCs investing in Shanghai are targeting the burgeoning
Chinese market. Shanghai, for them, is the beachhead through which a selling
network across the whole of China can be developed. Indeed, this different strategic
view of TNCs towards Guangdong and Shanghai is the major reason why
Guangdong was rapidly transformed into an outward-oriented economy whereas
Shanghai is still generally an inward-oriented economy.
After 20 years implementation of reforms and the open door policy, Shanghai, which
was virtually isolated from the outside in 1978, is now a major node in coastal China,
which firmly links up with the world commodities, labour and particularly capital
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markets. This fundamental change in its mode of integration with world economy has
had a decisive impact on Shanghai's urban restructuring in economic, social and
spatial terms, which are discussed below.
7.3 Changes in Shanghai's economic base
Shanghai's urban restructuring occurred, first and most importantly, in the economic
domain. In this section I look at two major aspects of its economic restructuring:
ownership structure and sectoral structure.
73.1 Ownership structure
As discussed in Chapter 5, three decades of nationalisation policy under the state
socialism led China to a virtually one ownership economy - state-ownership. This
was particularly the case with Shanghai which was designed to be a model socialist
city. This one ownership structure has been changed since other sectors including
private and foreign invested-enterprises were reintroduced by the reform. Take
industry for example. As shown in Table 7.15, there was no "other" enterprises at all
in Shanghai's industry in 1978. After reform, the "other" enterprises started to
appear, and the increase of its number speeded up drastically in 1990s. In 1997, there
were 6,118 other enterprises accounting for 25% of the total number of Shanghai's
industrial enterprises, up from 1581 (l2°o of the total) in 1990.
Table 7.15 Number of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in Shanghai,
1978_1997*
SOEs	 COEs	 Othersb	 Total
Year Number 0 of	 Number 0 of	 Number 0 of
total	 total	 total
1978	 3372	 42	 4590	 58	 0	 0	 7962
1980	 3164	 44	 3914	 55	 71	 1	 7149
1985	 4176	 39	 6141	 58	 339	 3	 10656
1990	 4517	 34	 7122	 54	 1581	 12	 13220
1995	 3713	 23	 7871	 50	 4293	 27	 15877
1997	 3245	 14	 14623	 61	 6118	 25	 23986
Notes: a Includes all enterprises operating at the village level and above. Excluded
are those operating below village level and those operated by individual
households.
176
b Others include private and state-collective, state private, collective-private,
foreign-invested enterprises, and enterprises operated by overseas Chinese
and Hong Kong/'Macao/Taiwan industrialists.
Source: Mok (1996: 206); SSY, 1998: 178.
An intriguing observation from Table 7.15 is that the number of enterprises in the
state sector, particularly the SOEs remained nearly unchanged, but their share of the
total number of enterprises in Shanghai dropped sharply from 42°c in 1978 to 14°o in
1997. It means that industrial restructuring has been achieved mainly by expanding
the non-state sector - a fact that reflects China's dual-track reform strategy as
discussed in the previous chapter.
With the dramatic expansion of the non-state sector, particularly with the
increasingly significance of foreign-invested enterprises, Shanghai's industrial
ownership structure underwent a significant change as shown in Table 7.16. In 1980,
all aspects of industry were overwhelmingly dominated by the state-sector while the
"others" category was negligible. As the reform proceeded, the share of the state
sector declined rapidly in all aspects. By 1997, while the state sector still accounted
for over 50 % in terms of number of enterprises and of number of workers, it was the
non-state sector that accounted for the majority of gross value of industrial output
and of total pre-tax profits. Again, we can see the most significant change occurred
in 1990s when foreign-invested enterprises expanded dramatically at the expense of
the state sector. In 1997, the foreign-invested enterprises had a 38.2 0 o share of total
pre-tax profits, a 38.9°o share of gross value of industrial output, although they
accounted for 14.0% and 20.5% of number of enterprises and of workers. This
indicates their much higher level of productivity.
Nearly 20 years after the reform, the non-state sector has grown from nearly zero into
a neck and neck position with the state sector, and foreign-invested enterprises' have
become a major component of Shanghai's industry. More profoundly, the foreign-
invested enterprise is the most efficient sector in Shanghai's industry. In all the
There are three types of foreign-funded enterprises in China: the wholly-foreign owned, the co-
operative joint ventures and the equity-based joint ventures. Enterprises set up by mvestcis from
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao enjoy the same status and fall into the category of foreign-funded
enterprises in statistics.
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Table 7.16 Comparison of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector in
Shanghai, 1980-1997
Sector	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995	 1997
00 share in number of enterprises
SOE	 39.8	 32.1	 26.1	 23.4	 13.5
COE	 59.1	 64.0	 58.8	 49.6	 61.3
Others	 1.1	 3.9	 15.1	 27.0	 25.2







0o share in number of workers
64.4	 60.4	 47.9	 34.7
32.2	 28.3	 23.5	 31.0
3.4	 11.3	 28.6	 34.3
0.2	 1.7	 13.9	 20.5
% share in gross value of industrial output
SOE	 89.6	 87.7	 80.4	 42.8	 30.1
COE	 9.3	 10.4	 9.5	 12.2	 18.0
Others	 1.1	 1.9	 10.1	 45.0	 51.9
Foreign- 0.1	 0.3	 5.2	 29.3	 38.9
invested
% share in total pre-tax profits
SOE	 91.6	 85.6	 78.6	 42.8	 30.0
COE	 7.6	 12.3	 10.0	 7.9	 14.3
Others	 0.8	 2.1	 11.4	 49.3	 55.7
Foreign- 0.1	 0.3	 5.9	 29.0	 38.2
invested
Note: Foreign-invested enterprises include investment from Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan.
Source: Mok (1996: 211); SYS, 1998: 196-201.
Table 7.17 Efficiency Indicators of Industrial Enterprises by Ownership Sector
in Shanghai, 1997
Sector	 Alter-tax	 Overall industrial	 Liquid asset
profits/cost	 labour productivity turnover (times)
(yuan/person)
SOE	 4.16	 28099	 1.29
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efficiency indicators listed in Table 7.17, all kinds of foreign-invested enterprises
compare very favourably with the SOE's and COE's.
It can, therefore, be reasonably expected that the tendency for the state sector's share
to decline while the non-state sector expands will gather further momentum in the
years to come. As the government carries on the policy of "keep the large and let go
the small" to reform its ailing SOEs, it will be inevitable that the non-state sector,
particularly the foreign-invested sector, will continue to gain ground, and even take
the majority share in terms of employment, which will have profound social
implications (to be discussed later on).
The dichotomy of the prosperous non-state sector vis-à-vis the declining state sector
is, of course, not only the case with industry. It is true of all economic sectors in
Shanghai. In 1998, Shanghai's GDP reached RMB 368.8 billion of which 283.8
billion was produced by the state sector and 85 billion by the non-state sector. The
ratio of state to non-state evolved from 99:1 to 77: 23. The non-state sector's share of
Shanghai's GDP has increased dramatically from just 1% in 1978 to 23.1% in 1998
(Shanghai Economy Yearbook pocket edition, 1999). Apart from the dramatic
quantitative expansion, the non-state sector and particularly foreign-invested
enterprises have played a significant role in transforming Shanghai economy's
sectoral structure.
73.2 Sectoral structure
San Er Vi strategy
In thirty years under the state socialist ideology from 1949 to 1979, Shanghai had
been changed from a capitalist "consumption city" into a socialist "production city".
As Table 7.18 shows, in 1980 Shanghai's economy was dominated by secondary
industry with its share of GDP reaching 75.7%. Acknowledging that this industry-
biased sectoral structure hampered the economy's healthy development, the SMG put
an ever increasing emphasis on the development of the tertiary sector, launching a
series of policies to encourage investment both from home and abroad in the tertiary
sector. In its Eighth Five-year Plan (199 1-95), the SMG set up a principle of san, er,
yi for the ranking of priorities for tertiary, secondary and primary sectors in
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development (Hung, 1991;). San, a Chinese abbreviation for the tertiary sector, was
ranked at the top as it was the sector most desirable for drastic expansion. Er, an
abbreviation of the secondary sector, needed to be actively readjusted. Yi, which
referred to the primary sector, was to be stabilised.
Detailed plans for tertiary development placed emphasis on the growth of
commercial and advanced service sectors, particularly the FIRE (finance, insurance
and real estate) sector (Han, 2000). In terms of commerce, the plan was to make
Shanghai the largest trade centre and shopping paradise in China, by enlarging
commodity flow, improving commercial stmcture, readjusting the spatial distribution
of shopping outlets and so on. For financial sector, the goal was to make Shanghai
the financial centre of China and the Far East by attracting more domestic and
foreign fmancial institutions to set up their offices in Shanghai.
Tertiary sector's extraordinary growth may show the positive impact of this san eryi
strategy. In the period 1978-97, the growth of Shanghai's tertiary sector, compared
with that of other economic sectors, was the most rapid with its annual growth rate of
14.3% (Han, 2000). By 1997, the value of the tertiary sector had reached RMB 153
billion with its share of GDP reaching 45.5% - more than double the share of 1980.
Table 7.18 Shanghai: GDP Changes by Industry (1980,1985,1990,1997) (unit:
100 million RMB)	 _____________ _____________ __________
________________	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1997
_______________ value	 0	 value	 o	 value	 %	 value	 %
	
311.9	 100	 466.8	 100	 756.5	 100	 3360.2	 100
Primary industry	 10.1	 3.2	 19.5	 4.2	 32.6	 4.3	 75.8	 2.3
Secondary industry 236.1 	 75.7	 325.6	 69.8	 482.7	 63.8	 1754.5	 52.2
Tntiaryindustry	 65.7	 21.1	 121.6	 26.0	 241.7	 31.9	 1530.0	 45.5
Sources: SYS, 1986,1998.
The change in Shanghai's economic sectoral structure is also reflected in the change
of Shanghai's employment structure shown in the Table 7.19. Employment declined
the fastest in primary industry. In 1980, primary industry employed 2.12 million
people, accounting for 29° o of total work force. By 1997, its employment had
dropped to 1.08 million people, accounting for only 12.8°c of total. Employment in
Shanghai's tertiary sector increased steadily in the I 980s and its increase quickened
throughout the 1990s. By 1997, its employment had reached 3.24 million, with its
share of total employment being 38.3 0 o. Secondary industry increased its share of
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employment from 48.6% in 1980 to 59.3% in 1990. Throughout the 1990s, with the
rapid expansion of employment in the tertiaty sector, the industry steadily lost its
work force from 4.67 million in 1990 to 4.16 million in 1997.
Table 7.19 Shanghai: Changes in Employment Structure by Industry in 1980,
1985, 1990, 1997 (unit: 10,000 persons)
Primary	 Secondary	 Tertiary
Number	 00 of total Number
	 % of total Number	 % of total
1980	 212	 29.0	 355	 48.6	 164	 22.4
1985	 127	 16.4	 445	 57.3	 203	 26.2
1990	 87	 11.0	 467	 59.3	 233	 29.6
1997	 108	 12.8	 416	 49.1	 324	 38.3
Source: SYS, 1998.
The rise of the producer services sector
The rapid expansion of the tertiary sector in both GDP and employment terms is a
major element of the sectoral restmcturing of Shanghai's economy in the past two
decades. When the tertiary sector is broken down, however, more profound changes
occurring within the sector can be found.
In 1980, the tertiary sector was dominated by consumer services with the wholesale,
retail and catering business accounting for 48.1% of total value. This consumer
service oriented tertiary sector has since changed dramatically. While consumer
services such as the wholesale, retail, catering business and transportation and
telecommunication services continuously contracted, producer services such as
banking and insurance and real estate expanded rapidly. From 1980 to 1997, the
value of the banking and insurance sector increased from RMB 7.8 billion to RMB
30.0 billion with its share growing from 11.9% to 30% of the total value. It is now
the biggest sector in Shanghai's tertiary industry. The real estate sector whose value
was only RMB 0.4 billion with its share being 0.6% in 1980 has grown into a major
sector with its value and share being RMB 147.5 billion and 9.6% respectively in
1997 (Table 7.20).
The rapid rise of producer services in Shanghai's economic structure has had
significant implications for the city's overall economic, spatial and social
transformation. Producer services, central components of which are insurance,
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banking, financial services, real estate, legal services, accounting, and professional
associations, are services produced for firms rather than individuals (Sassen, 1991).
Unlike consumer services, which are bought by final consumers, producer services
are intermediate outputs.
Table 7.20 Shanghai: GDP Changes in Tertiary Industry by Group (1980,
1990. 1997 (unit: RMB 100 million
1990	 1997
value	 %	 value	 %
241.7	 100	 1530	 100
62.4	 25.8	 227.9	 14.9
51.8	 21.4	 380.8	 24.9
71.1	 29.4	 459.6	 30.0
3.8	 1.5	 147.8	 9.6
1980
_________________________ value %
Th-tiary industry	 65.7	 100
* Transprtation, communication 	 15.5	 23.5
	
Wholesale, Retail and catthng business 61.6	 48.1
Bankingandlnsurance	 7.8	 11.9
Real estate	 0.4	 0.5
Note: * Main sects
Source: SYS, 1995, 1998.
A major development within the world economy since the 1970s has been that
producer services were the fastest-growing sectors in advanced countries, whereas
consumer services have levelled off. Sassen (1991) argues that it is producer services
that constitute the leading edge of the real shift of advanced countries from a
manufacturing to a service economy. While the growth of consumer services is only
a phase of economic development based on the centrality of mass production and
mass consumption, the rise of producer services represents the emergence of a new
post-industrial economy. This economy, globally integrated yet spatially dispersed,
relies fundamentally on the economic sectors such as financial, insurance, accounting
and the like that produce the control capability. The more globalised the economy is,
the more it relies on the producer services, and the more these produce services
concentrated in several world major cities. At the present, New York, London and
Tokyo where producer services are disproportionately concentrated, are so-called
global cities that function as the command centres for global economy. However, this
concentration of producer services is also present in lower hierarchy cities which
function as control centres for regional economies.
The recent increase in share of producer services in the economic structure of
Shanghai can not be understood as being similar to what happened in cities of
advanced countries, given the fact that China is still far from fully integrated with the
world economy. However, it is a clear indication that Shanghai's capability of
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controlling economic activities has been greatly strengthened, and so has its position
as a regional economic centre. This position is not administratively given as was it
before the reform, but is the result of the evolution of market economy. Furthermore,
the spatial and social implications associated with the rise of producer services,
which have developed fully fledged in global cities, has begun to unfold in Shanghai,
as I will discuss in the following sections.
The impact of FDI on Shanghai's economic sectoral restructuring
The incentives given by the SMG provide a policy environment in which economic
restructuring can be achieved. The underpinning force of the transformation of
Shanghai's economic sectoral structure came, however, from the inward investment,
particularly FDI.
The structure of Shanghai's FDI can be divided into two periods with the year 1990
as the turning point. The transformation of FDI structure reflected the interaction of
government policy and global capital. In the early I 980s, unlike Guangdong,
Shanghai, with its broad industrial base, was more interested in attracting modem
technology to renovate its industries than in bringing in labour-intensive industries or
in doing export processing for Hong Kong (Tian, 1996). Shanghai's policy towards
FDI was also more rigid in areas such as local participation and the forced foreign
exchange requirement. As a result, a great deal of FDI had gone instead to
neighbouring cities that offered much more flexibility.
Meanwhile, in the tertiary sectors, because little was open to external investors, FDI
was focused on the catering sector, particularly on luxury hotels which entailed a
huge amount of investment. The tightened screening policy towards manufacturing
FDI and the relatively big projects in the tertiary sector led to a tertiary sector
dominated FDI structure in the 1980s. In 1985, contracted FDI in the tertiary industry
reached US$ 674.8 million, accounting for 95°o of total FDI, whereas FDI in
secondary industry was US$ 35.9 million, accounting for only 5°o (see Table 7.21).
Lagging behind in attracting FDI, the SMG started to change its policy in the second
half of the l98Os, becoming more willing to accept small-scale export-oriented FDI.














Caohejing were set up, in which foreign invested enterprises enjoyed a set of
preferential treatments. Meanwhile, rising domestic labour costs and the real
appreciation of their currencies in some Asian NlEs, such as Taiwan and Korea,
made China more attractive to manufacturing FDI flows. All of these changes
resulted in the rapid growth of FDI in secondary industry. By contrast, most of the
tertiary sector including finance, insurance, landrent, retail, wholesale and
telecommunication were still monopolised by the state-owned enterprises because
they were regarded as the key industries which have important impacts on the whole
economy of China. Indeed, the government had become more selective in its
approval of service activities since 1986 when a national austerity policy was
adopted to curb the overheated economy (Tian, 1996).
Table 7.21	 Shanghai: FDI by Sector 1985-1996 (unit: US$ million)
1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 19%
Agriculture
Number	 2	 3	 0
Contracted value 0.2	 1.6	 0
%oftotalvalue 0	 1	 0
Secondary Industry
Number	 50	 175 189
Contracted value 36	 181	 360
% of total value 5	 50	 96
Tertiary Sector
Number	 42	 21	 12
Contracted value 675	 177	 15
%oftotalvalue 95	 49	 4
Source: Tian (1996: 170); SYS, 1997.
18	 320 1040 1101 933	 793
101	 1547 4520 6236 6480 6135
23	 46	 64	 62	 62	 55
As a result, the share of FDI in tertiary industry shrank rapidly, and by 1990, the
structure of FDI had been dominated by the secondary industry. While contracted
FDI in tertiary industry declined sharply from US$ 675 million in 1985 to US$ 15
million in 1990, FDI in secondary industry increased rapidly to US$ 360 million with
its share of total FDI reaching a peak of 96°c in 1990.
FDI in Shanghai started a new phase of dramatic increase in volume as well as a
change in its structure in 1990 when the central government launched the
development of Pudong. In the package of preferential policies given by the central
government for the purpose of developing Pudong, one major element was to open
184
more tertiary sectors to foreign investors. Foreign banks were allowed to set up
branches in Shanghai, and the retail and property sectors were also opened to the
foreign investors. Encouraged by these policies, FDI flows to tertiary sectors
increased rapidly, a trend that was further strengthened in 1992 when Shanghai,
together with several major cities, was granted the right to open even more tertiary
sectors to external investors. By 1995, some thirty sectors of the service industries,
including banking, real estate, advertising, culture, recreation, information
consultation, catering, design, decorations, education and health care, had been
opened up to foreign investors (Tian, 1996: 172).
As shown in Table 7.21, since 1990, the contracted value of FDI in the tertiary sector
has risen dramatically, up from USS 15 million in 1990 to a peak of US$ 6236
million in 1994. Although FDI in industry has also increased sharply, due to the
more rapid growth of FDI in the tertiary sector, the share of FDI flowing to the
tertiary sector has risen continuously. By 1993, its share of the total contracted FDI
had surpassed industry's share, reaching 64° o, while industry's share declined from
96% in 1990 to 36%. In terms of the contracted value of FDI, the tertiary sector has
been the biggest component in Shanghai's FDI structure.
Breaking down the tertiary sector, we fmd that it is FDI in FIRE sectors, the typical
producer services, that have played the most significant role in transforming
Shanghai's FDI structure. As shown in Table 7.22, the sectoral distribution of FDI
within the service sector has experienced a considerable change since 1990. This is
mainly due to the introduction of a new policy whereby more and more service
sectors opened up to foreign investors. Before 1990, hotels had been the dominant
sector in the distribution of FDI in tertiary industry. Although, from 1980-1989, 96°c
of the FDI in tertiary flowed into the real estate sector, 98°c of FDI in real estate was
allocated to hotel projects (Tian, 1996:172). In 1990, the wholesale, retail and
catering sectors (in fact, it was the hotel and restaurant, because retailing was not
opened until 1992, and the wholesale sector has never been opened to foreigners)
still dominated tertiary industry.
The change occurred in 1991 when the finance and insurance sectors were partially
opened to foreign investors, and again in 1992 when foreign real estate companies
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were allowed to invest in the domestic housing market. As a result, the sectoral
distribution of FDI within tertiary industry has become dominated by the FIRE
sectors. In the peak year of 1992, the FDI flowing to FIRE sectors accounted for 900o
of the total constructed FDI in the tertiary industry.
Table 7.22 Contracted FDI in Shanghai's Tertiary Industry', 1980-1996 (USS
million)
Transportation, 	 Wholesale,	 Real estate	 Finance,
telecommunication, retail and	 insurance2
post	 catering
Value	 % of	 Value % of Value % of Value % of
total	 total	 total	 total
1980-89 16.0	 1	 11.8	 1	 1564	 96	 --	 -
1990	 0.4	 2.7	 10.0	 67.6	 2.9	 20	 --	 -
1991	 9.9	 9.8	 3.0	 3	 63.3	 62	 20.1	 20
1992	 36.4	 2.4	 104.1	 6.7	 1298.2	 84	 88.8	 6
1993	 42.7	 1	 432.0	 9.6	 3411.2	 76	 519.6	 12
1994	 995.3	 16.0	 605.1	 9.7	 3695.1	 59.3	 N. A. N. A.
1995	 317.7	 4.9	 496.2	 7.7	 4870.5 75.2	 N. A. N. A.
1996	 1.9	 0	 229	 3.7	 4024.2 65.6	 N. A. N. A.
Note: 'the main sector
2FDI in fmance and insurance was only allowed after 1991.
Sources: Tian (1996: 173); SYS, 1997.
Foreign banks and insurance companies were only allowed to enter Shanghai in 1991.
Although the market was partially open to foreigners in the sense that foreign bank
branches were only allowed to do foreign currency businesses with foreign-funded
enterprises (FFEs), and foreign insurance firms were unable to sell policies to
companies or other "group" entities, foreign fmancial institutions were rushing in.. In
1991, USS 20.1 million FDI flowed in to the Finance and Insurance sector,
accounting for 20°c of total FDI in tertiary industry, up from nil in 1990. By the end
of 1998, a total of 124 representative offices of foreign financial institutions
including representative offices of foreign banks, foreign insurance companies, and
all institutions providing financial intermediary services had been set up in Shanghai
(Shanghai Economic Yearbook, Pocket Edition, 1999: 139). Table 7.23 shows a list
of 40 Foreign-funded financial institutions that had set up their operational offices at
the branch level in Shanghai. In 1998, Pudong was chosen as a pilot area where
foreign banks were allowed to conduct RMB business with FFEs. By the end of 1999,
24 foreign banks had been granted rights for RMB business in Pudong.
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Table 7.23 Foreign-Funded Financial Institution at the Branch Level in
Shanghai: up to 1997
Country or region Institutions 	 Year starting
operation
Japan (9)
	 The Daiwa Bank	 1993
The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank *	 1992
The Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.
	 1994
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi * 	 1991
The Fuji Bank	 1995
The Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan 	 1995
The Industrial Bank of Japan *	 1991
The Sanwa Bank *	 1991
The Asahi Bank *	 1995
The Sakura Bank *	 1994
The Sumitomo Bank *	 1994
Korea (3)	 The Commercial Bank of Korea*	 1995
The Korea Development Bank 	 1996
Hanil Bank *	 1996
U. S. A. (3)	 Citibank *	 1991
Bank of America *
	
1991
American International Assurance Co. Ltd. 	 1992





Thailand (3)	 Bangkok Bank	 1993
TM International Bank Co. Ltd.	 1996
Chia Tai International Finance Co. Ltd.
	 1993
Hong Kong(3)	 Po Sang Bank	 1994
The Bank of East Asia * 	 1920
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Co. Ltd.*	 1865
Germany (2)	 Commerzbank *	 1994
Dresdner Bank *	 1993
Singapore (2)	 Overseas-Chinese Banking Co. Ltd. * 	 1927
Development Bank of Singapore Ltd.*	 1995
Holland (2)	 ABN-AMRO Bank * 	 1993
ING Bank	 1995
Australia	 Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.* 1993
U.K.	 Standard Chartered Bank*	 1858
Italy	 Banca di Roma	 1996
Canada	 Royal Bank of Canada
	 1993
Switzerland	 Credit Suisse First Boston *	 1995
China, France	 The International Bank of Paris and Shanghai*	 1993
China, France
	 Shanghai Associated Finance Co. Ltd.
	 1991
China, Japan,	 Shanghai International Finance Co. Ltd. 	 1991
Hong Kong
Note: those who had been granted the right for RMB business in Pudong.
Source: collected from fieldwork in 2000
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The above analysis gives us an overall picture that the pace of Shanghai's economic
sectoral restructuring has quickened since 1990, and shows that the process has been
increasingly fuelled by FDI. The transformation of the structure of FDI from one
dominated by industry to one in which the service sector is the biggest sector, and of
the FDI structure within tertiary industry from consumer service-focused into a
producer service dominated has made a great contribution to Shanghai's economic
sectoral restructure which underwent the similar transfonnation. The transformation
was carefully monitored and encouraged by the government who gradually ushered
FDI into the intended areas in order to upgrade Shanghai's economic structure
towards a more service-oriented one. The interaction of the government policy and
inward investment is further reflected in Shanghai's spatial restructuring which is
discussed in the following section.
7.4 Transformation of Shanghai's spatial morphology
Under state socialism, the socialist mode of production and reproduction brought
about a peculiar urban spatial morphology that was distinctive from capitalist cities.
One major feature of this socialist spatial structure was the mixture of residential and
industrial areas. The distinction between residential and industrial areas, which was
pervasive in capitalist cities, became blurred in socialist cities, and work-unit based,
self-contained communities stemming from the project-specific development method
dominated cities' spatial organisation.
Market-oriented reforms transformed the way that the city's land was developed, the
emergence of a land market gave rise to a land rent gradient which made possible
urban spatial differentiation. The mixed land use pattern was broken down and a new
spatial structure based on a market system started to emerge. The first crack in the
old spatial structure came from public housing provision.
7.4.1 Housing commercialisation
Under state socialism, workers and staff only received a very low monetary wage,
mainly for food and clothes. This labour reproduction had to rely on services in kind
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provided by the work unit through state investment Housing, as the basic
requirement for labour reproduction, was usually provided directly by work-units
that received money for housing investment from their superior governmental
departments. The main problem of this housing provision was that housing
investment was unable to maintain a sustainable cycle (Wu, 1996). Housing as well
as other service facilities was regarded as "non-productive" sectors that did not have
a direct economic return. From the standpoint of the state, a vicious circle was
involved in housing provision: the more housing that was built, the heavier the
fmancial burden for the state. In order to maintain a high rate of accumulation and to
maximise the output of industries, the state deliberately suppressed expenditure on
"non-productive" sectors such as housing. As a result, a housing shortage was
pervasive in all Chinese cities and Shanghai in particular. In 1978, the living space
per capita in Shanghai was only 4.5 sq. m., and in addition, 56 % of the housing was
shanty and old-lane houses, most of which did not have independent kitchen or toilet
(Chen, 1994).
Confronted with the severe housing shortage, the government initiated housing
reforms in late 1 970s. On the production side, the reforms were intended to mobilise
the work units to invest more money in housing provision. With the decentralisation
and the reform of SOEs, work units had more autonomy and resources in the hand,
so had they got more responsibilities for their own welfare. The sources of
investment in housing provision were diversified and SRF (self-raised fund),
substituting for state investment, became the major source. In 1980, state investment
accounted for 65.7% of the total investment in housing provision, of which
investment from the central government accounted for 20.5% and the investment
from the local government 45.2°c, while SRF accounted for 34.3%. By 1990, the
share of SRF in the housing investment rose to 69.3°o while the state investment
dropped to less than 2000 (Chen, 1994).
The success of housing reforms, however, depended on the establishment of a
housing market whereby housing investment can have a decent return. Based on this
perception, the government introduced a housing commercialisation scheme whereby
housing can be gradually shifted from the welfare domain to the market. Initially,
work units were allowed to develop commercial housing housing that is put onto
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the market. Fearing that it would disturb the normal function of state work units, the
government put forward regulations whereby real estate companies were set up and
became the major producer of commercial housing (Wu, 1996). After 1991, all the
commercial housing sold in the market was produced by real estate companies (SSB,
1997).
Given the fact that housing provision is at the core of the socialist welfare system,
which can not be changed without changing the whole political economy, the
commercialisation of housing gradually unfolded alongside the development of other
reform policies. As show in Table 7.24, in 1990, a decade after housing reform, the
total housing developed was 4,210,100 sq. m. of which 573,000 sq. m. was put onto
the market, which meant that 13.6% of the total housing was commercialised and the
majority of the housing was either administratively allocated or sold at a heavily
discounted price. Not surprisingly, the pace of housing comrnercialisation
dramatically quickened in the 1990s. By 1998, 76.5% of the total new housing was
commercialised.
Table 7.24 Housing Commercialisation in Shanghai in 1990s
Total housing	 Commercial housing The rate of
(1,000 m2)	 (1,000 m2)	 commercialisation (%)
1990	 4210.1	 573.0	 13.6
1991	 4776.9	 975.1	 20.4
1992	 5434.8	 1122.5	 20.7
1993	 6165.0	 3073.0	 49.8
1994	 8735.7	 3198.7	 36.6
1995	 12689.0	 5297.7	 41.8
1996	 15094.8	 9923.0	 65.7
1997	 16842.0	 11761.4	 69.8
1998	 16240.3	 12420.0	 76.5
Source: SYS, 1997; Shanghai Real Estate Market '1998.
From Table 7.24, we can see that 1993 was a turning point for housing
commercialisation when the commercialisation rate increased sharply to 49.8o from
20.7°c in 1992. This is mainly due to the devolution of power from the SMG to the
level of sub-city government (district and county). In addition to the newly
established Pudong New Area, the SMG administers 13 municipal districts and 6







structure (in the case of counties, there is a governmental level of township),
administrative powers were concentrated on the SMG.
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In order to speed up the pace of urban redevelopment, the SMG launched a series of
devolution policies in April 1992, involving issues such as revenue and taxation, FDI,
urban development, and management of construction projects (SEYEPA, 1993). In
the case of land leasing, sub-city governments were empowered to approve land
development projects with investment of US 5 million and below. In addition, all
projects involving the redevelopment of run-down areas were to be approved by sub-
city governments. Furthermore, the sub-city governments could keep 85% of the
income from land-leasing for the purpose of redeveloping dilapidated areas
(SEYEPA, 1993).
These policies of devolution made sub-city governments enthusiastic to redevelop
the dilapidated areas located in their districts. In 1992, the number of land lease
soared to 201 from only 8 schemes in 1991 (SEYEPA, 1992, 1993). Among these
201 pieces of land, 95 were those leased for the purpose of redeveloping dilapidated
areas (ibid., 1993). According to plans, these 201 leased land had a total buildable
area of 8.9 million square metres of which 3.5 million square metres were devoted to
residential and 5.1 million square metres to office and hotel (ibid., 1993: 72). The
rapid increase of land lease, therefore, contributed greatly to the commercialisation
of Shanghai's housing.
The opening up of the domestic housing market to foreign investors in late 1992 also
helped quicken the pace of housing commercialisation. Shanghai's housing market
was previously fragmented into internal and external markets. The internal market
was monopolised by Chinese developers and only local residents were eligible to buy.
Foreign developers were only allowed to engage in the external market where the
buyers were confined to overseas Chinese and foreigners. In order to quicken the
redevelopment of run-down areas, in December 1993 the SMG put forward a new
policy whereby foreign investors were allowed to purchase old residential land (the
right of use) and develop properties for the local market. In 1994, only 5 pieces of
land were leased to foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) in 1994 to develop properties
for the domestic market. This was increased to 39 in 1997 with a ground floor area of
826,000 square metres (Shanghai Real Estate Market '1998).
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7.4.2 The establishment of the quasi-land market and leased-land based urban
redevelopment
Alongside the establishment of housing market is that of land market. Housing
markets and land markets are two sides of one coin. In theory, a housing market
cannot be set up without the development of a land market In accordance with the
national reform process, the SMG adopted a gradual approach to establishing a land
leasing market. First, while state work units still enjoyed the privilege of free land
allocated administratively, foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) were required to
acquire the land use right through land leasing. The land lease scheme was initiated
in 1988 (see Table 7.25). However, the pace of land leasing was initially very slow.
In 4 years from 1988-1991, only 12 pieces of land were leased to the FFEs. The
power devolution in 1992 which empowered sub-city governments to manage the
leasing of land located in their districts dramatically quickened the pace of land
leasing. In 1992, 205 pieces of land were leased to the FFEs with a total area of 20.7
million square metre (see Table 7.25).
Table 7.25 Land Lease in Shanghai: 1988-1998
Total	 1988-	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998
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Total
No. of land	 4581	 12	 205	 254	 623	 497	 764	 1304	 1326
lease
Area of land	 14503. 980.4	 2071.6 4961.1 1894.4 1203.5 898.3	 1430.8 1063.7
Ieased(104 m2) 6
Land leased to FFEs
Number	 1863	 12	 205	 244	 455	 258	 207	 220	 262
Land area	 11436	 908.4	 2071.6 4914.9 1568.0 640.3	 378.7	 461.4	 421.1
Land leased to FFEs for the internal property market
Number	 104	 -	 -	 -	 5	 18	 19	 39	 23
Land area	 272.6	 -	 -.	 -	 9.4	 78.7	 66.8	 82.6	 35.1
Land leased to domestic enterprises for 6 purposes*
Number	 1911	 -	 --	 -	 -	 87	 301	 651	 872
Land area	 1377.1 -	 -	 -	 -	 70.0	 246.2	 522.8	 538.1
Land leased to domestic enterprises in Pudong
Number	 703	 -	 -	 10	 163	 134	 113	 114	 169
Land	 1417.7 -	 -	 46.2	 316.9	 414.6	 206.6	 364.0	 69.5
Note: p refers to land leased to domestic entaprises for purpose of commercial, tourism,
entertainment, fmance, service and housing.
Source: Shanghai Real Estate Market '1999
In 1993, the SMG started to lease land to domestic enterprises in Pudong New Area.
In 1994, 163 pieces of land were leased to domestic enterprises in Pudong. The
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success of land leasing in Pudong encouraged the SMG to apply the policy of land
lease to the whole city. From 1 Januaiy 1995, projects involving the land acquisition
in six economic sectors including commercial, tourism, entertainment, social service
and commercial housing had to acquire their land by the way of land leasing. This
has been called land leasing for six purposes (neizi lulei yongdi). The policy was
particularly designed for projects invested by SOEs which had so far still acquired
the land through administrative channels. The policy resulted in a huge increase in
land leasing. In 1995, 87 pieces of land were leased to domestic enterprises for the
six purposes. In 1998, this figure increased sharply to 872 accounting for 65.8°o of
the total number of land leases.
Since the first land leases in 1988, the scale of land lease has been greatly extended,
from FFEs only to both FFEs and domestic enterprises, and from Pudong to the
whole city. By the end of 1998, a total of 4,581 pieces of land with an area of 145
million square metres (145 km2) had been leased. Considering that the urban core s of
Shanghai covers no more than 400 km 2 and the leasing of land tends to be
concentrated in the city centre, a quite high proportion of Shanghai's land has been
put onto the market. However, this does not necessarily mean that all land parcels
were leased at a full market price. In fact, 99 per cent of the land parcels were leased
at non-market prices negotiated between the local government and developers while
only 1 per cent went through a bidding process (Editorial Committee of China Real
Estate Yearbook, 1997). The figure demonstrates the high levels of local government
intervention, and thus the immaturity of Shanghai's commercial land market.
In China, for a company to lease a piece of land, it has to propose a project to the
governmental department concerned (in Shanghai's case, the Planning Commission
for domestic companies, and Foreign Investment Commission for FFE5). After the
project is approved (lixiang), the company can then apply to the land authority for
the permission of land lease. This method of leasing a piece of land has been known
as "land for project" (xiangmu yongdi). In this way, land leasing is bound with the
* "Urban core" is n statistically used, it refers to the defacto urban built area. China's statistical
system is administration-based. Therefore, statistically, Shanghai's urban area changes with the
change of its administration division.
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project that will be based on the leased land. In other words, land is leased for the
puipose of the project.
Without exception, urban redevelopment projects are based on leased land and
foreign investors have played an important role in Shanghai's urban redevelopment.
Out of the total 4,581 pieces of land leased, 1,967 (43°o) were leased to foreign
investors. In terms of land area, some 117.1 km 2 land (80%) went to FFEs. Aniong
these leased land, a high proportion of land was used for urban redevelopment
projects. For example, in 1992,95 out of 201 pieces of land were leased for the urban
redevelopment of dilapidated areas, and all these land were leased by foreigners
(SEYEPA, 1993)
Alongside the rapid increases of land leasing came a booming property market in
Shanghai. In 1991, there were 94 real estate companies in Shanghai with total
investment of RMB 759 million in commercial housing. In 1996, the number of real
estate companies increased to 3,282 with total investment in commercial housing
reaching an astonishing RMB 45,479 million. Foreign funded firms have become a
major player in the local real estate industry. By the end of 1996, real estate
companies in Shanghai had a total net value (deducting debt) of RMB 55.37 billion,
of which foreign invested companies accounted for 28.3% or RMB 15.67 billion
(Wu, 1999).
7.4.3 The emergence of new urban patterns
The establishment of the land market and the rapid development of Shanghai's real
estate industry have had significant impacts on Shanghai's spatial structure. Firstly,
the mixed land use pattern has been transformed into a more differentiated pattern of
land use in accordance with the market. Commercial housing was built under new
land development methods such as comprehensive development and later real estate
company-led, market-based developments (see Chapter 6). Unlike the "specific
project" developments whereby the support services such as housing were regarded
as an attachment to the project and was usually built adjacent to the factory, new
development methods built housing in clusters composing residential areas which
195
were differentiated from industrial areas and which were usually located in the edge
of the central city where tracts of land were available.
The housing commercialisation rate of 76.5 0 o in 1998 indicated that the market-
based method had became the dominant form for urban land development and a land
market or at least the quasi land market had been established in Shanghai. Once the
market forces were unleashed, the "invisible hand" started to transform Shanghai's
land use pattern according to its own rules. The government's policy of relocating
industry and of redeveloping the mn-down areas greatly speeded up the process of
transformation. As a result, Shanghai's urban landscape became increasingly similar
to that of western cities based on the rent gradient. This rapid transformation has
been illustrated by the fact that hundreds of factories and hundreds of thousands of
people has been moved to the fringe area. Indeed, as shown in Table 7.26, the
relocation was such that I 980s saw the upsurge of suburbanisation in Shanghai.
Table 7.26 Population Changes in the Core and Fringe Areas of Shanghai (unit:
million)
Year	 Core area	 Fringe area	 Total
1949	 4.143	 -	 4.143
1982	 4.520	 1.964	 6.493
1990	 4.365	 3.032	 7.397
Source: Ning and Yan (1995: 591)
If the densely built-up area of 1949 is seen as the core area of Shanghai, and the area
built up after 1949 as the fringe area, then we can see that the populations of both the
core and the fringe areas increased prior to 1982. This trend indicates that Shanghai
had experienced a period of "urbanisation" during the period 1949-1982. Since 1982,
however, the population of the core area has declined absolutely, while the
population in the fringe area has continued to increase. Between 1982 and 1990, the
population of the core area decreased by 3.43°o, from 4.52 million to 4.365 million,
whereas that of the fringe area increased by 54.4°o, from 1.964 million to 3.032.
Figure 7.5 shows the population changes in Shanghai proper from 1982-1990. Apart
from some small pieces that had population increases, most of core area lost
population significantly.
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Figure 73 Population Changes In Central Areas of Shanghai: 1982-1990
Source: adapted from Ning and Yan (1995: 591)
While in the west suburbanisation results from the exodus of people who want to
escape from mn-down urban areas, the Chinese version of suburbanisation is mainly
driven by the relocation of industry and the redevelopment of dilapidated areas, both
of which are led by the government which is keen to generate a new urban image.
Although the relocation normally means more living space for the displaced, many of
them are reluctant to move out of the central city where the urban amenities tend to
be more developed than in the relocation areas. In spite of people's reluctance, this
government-led subuibanisation is rapid and relentless, and with sub-city
governments empowered to manage the land leasing in 1992, it has been greatly
intensified in 1990s.
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In the twelve years from 1979-90, a total 4 million sq. m. of old residential housing
most of which were dangerous dwellings and simple shelters were dismantled, and
with it 120,000 households were relocated (Gu and Liu, 1997). This government-led
relocation scheme has been greatly speeded up since 1992 when sub-city
governments were given great incentives to redevelop the dilapidated areas by land
leasing.
As shown in Table 7.27, a great leap occurred in 1993 when the amount of housing
demolished increased from 1419 thousand sq. m. in 1992 to 3648.8 thousand sq. m.,
and the relocation of household rose from 38,200 to 86,600. Throughout the 1990s
(1991-98), some 23.3 million sq. m. of housing were demolished with over half
million households relocated. Given the average figure of 2.8 persons per household
(SYS, 1998: 26), in 8 years from 1991-98, some one and half million people were
relocated. Considering the overwhelming majority of relocation occurred in the city
proper which has a population of around 10 million, it is fair to say that about 15% of
the city population have been resettled in the 1 990s. Such a scale of relocation in
such a short period is unrivalled in China and even unprecedented in the world urban
development history. It probably can only happen in this special context, i.e., the
strong entrepreneurial and ruthless local government made by China's "half way
house" reform and together with the immense penetration of global capital.
Table 7.27 Housing Demolition in Shanghai: 1991-1998










Note: 1 from August to December.
Source: Gu and Liu (1997); Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1998, 1999.
World Bank (1994) called this government-led relocation scheme as "Involuntary Settlement"
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With the moving out of mdustries comes in the service sectors and with relocation of
working class people the urban white collar. In the place of factories and run-down
areas, modern, stylish office buildings and luxury housing sprouted. Six prestigious
areas for office buildings have emerged in Shanghai (see Figure 7.6):
1. Luiiazui Central Finance District As SMG's pet project, it is built on the area
completely cleared by the government. By 1999, 16 brand new high-rise
buildings have been completed. According to its master plan, by the time of
completion, there will be a total floor space of 4.18 million sq. m., 75 0 o of which
will be the office and hotel buildings. As a Chinese version of La Defense, it is
going to be Shanghai's biggest area for prime office buildings with state-of-art
telecommunication facility and other urban infrastructure (China Real Estate
Market, 1997).
2. Bund area: As China's most famous colonial waterfront, the Bund was
historically the major producer service complex in the Far East, where hundreds
foreign financial institutions were concentrated. In 1995, the SMG launched a
relocation programme to try to restore its historic glory. Since then, dozens of
government departments and public sectors including the SMG itself that
occupied those prestigious buildings after the communists came to power have
been relocated, while several hundred financial organisations, some of which,
interestingly enough, used to be located in the Bund like AlA, ABN AMRO,
have moved in (Shanghai Real Estate Market '1999). Under the strong
intervention from the SMG, it has become Shanghai's financial centre again.
3. Honggiao Development Zone: Built in early 1990s, it is Shanghai's first
office building complex. Close to the airport, it was then Shanghai's most
popular Grade A office building area. It is now the most mature office building
area in Shanghai with a very developed business support industries such as hotels,
shopping malls, restaurants and the like. Having Shanghai's most luxurious
residential area - Gubei New Area located in a walking distance, it has become






4. Nanjing West Road and Yanan Road: This office building area was
developed surrounding Shanghai's top international hotels such as Portman Ritz
Canton, Hilton and iC. Mandarin. The Shanghai Centre, a vast multi-use
complex comprising 472 luxury apartments, 25,000 sq. m. of prime office space,
a theatre, a trademark exhibition atrium and a deluxe 5 star hotel, is the most
famous office building in this area, particularly within American companies.
Managed by a foreign company, it has the most expensive rent in Shanghai, USS
80 per sq. m. per month in 1996 (China Real Estate Market, 1997)
5. Huanghai Road and Xu Jiahui: Located in the former French Concession, it
was historically a luxury area for the "high society" in colonial Shanghai. It is
still regarded as the area with the most delicate western taste. Served by
Shanghai's first underground line, it is one of the most accessible areas and has
become a popular area for office buildings.
Figure 7.6 Six Prestigious Areas for Office Buildings in Shanghai
I1ft
I
Source: adapted from Shanghai Real Estate Market '1997.
Apart from the horizontal reshaping of spatial structure, Shanghai's skyline has
changed rapidly as well. Before reform, skyscrapers were rare in Shanghai. The 24-
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No. of buldings
stories Park Hotel built in the 1920s dominated Shanghai's skyline for nearly 60
years. Throughout the 1980s and particularly after the 1993-95 property boom,
hundreds of new high-rises sprang up around the city. It now has Asia's tallest TV
tower and one of the tallest buildings in the world - 88-stories Jinmao Building. In
1996, there were 733 buildings over 20 stories with over 11.62 million sq. m. floor
space. The following Figure 7.7 shows this astonishing change in the urban skyline
of Shanghai from 1978 to 96, measured in the number of buildings over 8 stories
(Wu,, forthcoming).
The dianging urban skyline of Shangh, measured in no. of







7.5 Social resfratification of Shanghai
Shanghai's economic and spatial restructuring has been accompanied by dramatic
changes in city's social structure. Two decades of market-oriented reforms have
made people richer. The city's average per capita GDP increased dramatically from
RMB 2738 in 1980 to RMB 25750 in 1997. In terms of comparable prices,
Shanghai's per capita GDP in 1997 almost quadrupled from 1980 (SSB, 1998).
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However, during this period, Shanghai was also dramatically socially restratified.
Unlike the pre-reform era when society enjoyed the economic equality entailed by
socialist ideology, income inequality has been widening since the reforms,
particularly after Shanghai's market-oriented reform was speeded up in 1990. Table
7.28 shows Shanghai's growing gap between the richest and the poorest, measured
by the ratio of the highest income (the tenth decile) to the lowest income (the first
decile). In 1990, per capita annual income was RMB 1404 for the first decile and
RMB 3468 for the tenth decile. While the former's income increased by 2.9 times to
RMB 4097, the latter's income increased by 4.6 times to RMB 16042. Consequently,
the ratio of the highest income to the lowest income rose steadily from 2.5 in 1990 to
3.9 in 1997.
Table 7.28 The Growth of Income Inequality in Shanghai: 1990-1997 (unit:
Yuan)
Lowest income	 Highest income	 Highest income /
(first decile)	 (tenth decile)	 lowest income
1990	 1404	 3468	 2.5
1991	 1536	 4186	 2.7
1992	 1785	 5044	 2.8
1993	 2334	 7567	 3.2
1994	 2986	 11630	 3.9
1995	 3507	 13838	 3.9
19%	 4027	 15725	 3.9
1997	 4097	 16042	 3.9
Source: SYS, 1998.
It is worth noting that the statistics in Table 7.28 covered only the urban households
- those that are officially registered residents. Non-local people including foreigners,
people from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, most of whom are members of highly
paid "transnational elite", and the badly paid floating population were excluded from
the statistics. Therefore, real income inequality would be much higher than that
shown in the Table 7.28.
The fundamental force underpinning the process of social restratification comes from
the reform policy which gradually replaced the socialist egalitarianism. "To be rich is
glorious" and "Let some get rich first" are probably Deng Xiaoping's most popular
slogans in China. Power decentralisation, the introduction of economic incentive in
SOEs, particularly the reform of the wage system whereby the enterprises got more
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discretion about income distribution and the monetization of the social benefits such
as the housing commercialisation and so on, all contributed to the growing income
inequality which eventually led to the social restratification.
Surveys conducted by research team from the Institute of Economics, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences in 1988 and 1995 found that the most important factor
affecting urban income distribution in China as a whole has been the systematic
transition from income distribution in kind in the planned economy to income
distribution in cash in the market economy.
Table 7.29 Urban Household Income Inequality and Its Sources in China
1988	 1995
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)




Cash income of retirees 	 6.83	 0.335	 9.8	 12.69 0.303
	
12.99
Income of non-workers 	 0.47	 0.433 0.9
	 -	 -	 -
Subsidies and incomes in kind
Ration coupon subsidy 	 5.26	 0.13	 2.9	 -	 -	 -
Housing subsidy in kind	 18.14	 0.311	 24.2	 9.61	 0.495	 16.07
Other net subsidies and	 15.68 0.208	 14	 1.19	 0.259 1.04
income in kind
Rental value of owner-	 3.9	 0.338	 5.7	 7.51	 0.413	 10.47
occupied housing
Income from	 0.74	 0.4 13
	 1.3	 0.72	 0.175 0.42
private/individual enteiprises
Income from property	 0.49	 0.437 0.9
	 1.34	 0.490 2.20
Other (private transfers, etc.)
	 4.06	 0.377	 6.6	 2.92	 0.362 3.57
Total income	 100	 0.233	 100	 100	 0.296 100
Source: Zhang (1997)
Note: (1): The income share of the ith component.
(2): The index of inequality in the distribution of the ith source of income. For
total income it shows the Gini coefficient. For the other rows it shows the
concentration ratio, of the corresponding income source.
(3): The percentage of total inequality contributed by the ith source of income.
Table 7.29 shows that: 1) The urban population's income components have changed
greatly. While subsidies and incomes in kind accounted for around 39.l 0 o people's
total incomes and cash income 44.2°c in 1988, the share of the former plummeted to
'An extensive survey of 20,000 urban and rural households was conducted in 1988 under the
sponsorship of the Ford Foundation, and another survey, this time of 15,000 households, was carried
out in 1995 with the support of the Ford Foundation and the Asia Development Bank (Zhang, 1997)
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10.8% and the latter rose sharply to 64°c in 1995. 2) The most important factor
behind the growing gaps in urban incomes has been the rise in incomes from
employment from 33.9°o in 1988 to 52.9°c in 1995, ajunip of 19 percentage points.
3) The impact of subsidies on income disparity was significantly dampened. The
total contribution of various subsidies to income inequality was 41.100 in 1988. By
1995, it had dropped by about 22 percentage points. Urban incomes are depending
more and more on the market, rather than on the methods of distribution that were
more common in the past, such as planned distribution or in-kind distribution.
While the same trend can be found in Shanghai (Lu, 1997), I would like to analyse
this growing gap from point of view of economic restructuring discussed earlier in
this chapter. In other words, I try to find out how the economic restructuring
increasingly fuelled by FDI contributed to the income inequality that led to
Shanghai's social restratification.
First, the restructuring of Shanghai's economic base, particularly the rise of non-state
sector is a major factor behind the growing income inequality. One of the first groups
to get rich were the self-employed who set up their own small business such as stalls
in the street markets and groceries. At the time when the income distribution in SOEs
was still dominated by socialist egalitarianism with negligible differences between
workers and managers, non-state enterprises like foreign invested operated frilly in
accordance with the rule of the market. Having few subsidies in kind, the employee's
income depended on their performances and the profits they made. The income gap
between the managerial stratum and the workers was much wider than that in SOEs.
With the rapid expansion of the non-state sector, employment in the non-state sector
soared. In 1997, the number of people employed in the non-state sector increased
from almost nil in late 1970s to 712,500, accounting for l6.4° of total staff and
workers employed in Shanghai's economic units. In areas such as manufacturing
industry that were opened up earlier to the foreign investors, the share of the
employment in non-state sectors has increased even more rapidly. As shown in Table
7.11, non-state sectors employed 34.3°c of total workers in Shanghai's industry in
1997 compared with the 1.30o in 1980, while SOEs' share in number of workers
declined to 34.7°c from 69.8°o in 1980. As in the west, managers and professionals
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in these non-state sectors can earn as much as ten times what the workers and staff
earn. This managerial stratum, even in a small proportion, say 5°c, comes to form the
upper end of income spectrum. With the reform of SOEs deepening, growing number
of SOEs have adopted a salary system similar to that in non-state sectors and, as such,
the disparity between managers and workers has been getting wider. More and more
managers in SOEs have entered the high income category.
Second, the transformation of Shanghai's economic sectoral structure, particularly
the rapid rise of producer services strengthened further the tendency of income
polansation. The polarisation of income is a common phenomenon in global cities
resulting from the shift to service economy with producer services at the core (Sassen,
1991). Although the recent rise of producer services in Shanghai's economic
structure can not be understood in the same sense, it does make a significant
contribution to the income polarisation. Due to the unavailability of statistics, it is
not possible to get a full picture of the extent the rise of producer services has
polarised people's income. But it is clear that the producer services, particularly the
FIRE sectors have been the most highly paid jobs and the people working in these
sectors are young, high-educated, and quite a lot of them are bilingual (Mandarin and
English). Statistics also show that most of the top highly paid sectors are producer
services (Table 7.30).
Tab!e 7.30 Shanghai's Top Ten Highly Paid Sectors in 1997 (unit: Yuan)
Average annual wages of
staff and workers
Finance and insurance	 21507
Information and consultant services
	 19456
Business brokerage	 18412
Power, gas and water production and supply
	 16789
Radio, film and television	 16734
Real estate	 15540
Culture and art	 14774
Excavation 14694
Transportation, storage, postal and telecommunication 13608
Government institution, party and social organisation 13608
City-wide average	 11425
Source: SYS, 1998.
* In Chinese statistical system, the income data is collected by economic sects rath than
occupations.
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In 1997, only 2 sectors from industry were registered into the top ten sectors in terms
of average annual wages of staff and workers, and the other 8 sectors were all from
service sectors. The top three sectors financial insurance (21507), information and
consultant services (19456) and business brokerage (18412) were typical producer
services.
Attracted by the high pay, people particularly graduates have flocked into these
producer services and Shanghai has experienced a rapid growth of the white collar
population in its workforce in the past two decades. In early 1990s, one of the most
talked topics in local mass media was the "white collar phenomenon". A survey
conducted by KC Consulting International Inc., a joint venture between Fudan
University and Koo & Chow Company of US, in 1994 gave an estimated 1.5 million
white collar workers which accounted for about 40% of Shanghai's total employment,
up from 29.8% in 1982 and 36.2% in 1990 (Shanghai Star, 23 September 1994).
The survey also predicted a rapid increase of 1.5 million in the next 6 years making a
total 3 million white collar workers in 2000.
While economic restructuring led to the upsurge of white collar population from
which the upper end of social stratum emerged, it also resulted in the downgrading of
some of the traditional industries which contributed to the rapid growth of
unemployment. The reform broke down the "iron rice bowl" system in which people
had a job for life and enterprises had no right to sack the employee. However,
unemployment was still unusual throughout 1980s, because of the complexity of the
issue which, like the housing commercialisation, could not be carried out without the
reform of other associated institutions which was proceeding at a relatively slow
pace in Shanghai in 1 980s. With the speeding up of reform and particularly of its
economic restructuring, Shanghai's unemployment rate started to rise and its pace
picked up in 1990s.
As Figure 7.6 shows, Shanghai's unemployment rates in the late 1970s were
relatively high. This was due to the sudden return of the hundreds of thousands of
people sent down to the countryside during the culture revolution period and it was
A local English newspap.
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quickly soiled out by the government. Throughout I 980s unemployment rates were
mainly kept under 1 per cent. The unemployment rate started to rise in late 1980s and
in 1993 it jumped to 2.4°c from the previous 1.7% (SSB, various years). During this
period, some traditional labour-intensive industries such as textiles suffered the most
due to the rapid economic restructuring involved. The textile industry used to be a
major sector in Shanghai's industry accounting for 20°c of industrial SOEs' turnout
in its heyday. With the opening up of the market and inflow of the efficient
technology-intensive FDI enterprises, the local textile industry lost ground quickly.
From 1990-95, the number of textile SOEs plummeted from 500 to 180, production
capacity contracted by 30°o, and the number of employees halved, dropping from
0.55 million to 0.28 million (Textile Union, 1998).











The official unemployment rate, though accelerating in 1990s, is very much
underestimated due to the exclusion of the "laid-off workers" in SOEs. The "laid-off
workers" refers to employees in SOEs who are made redundant but still keep their
labour contract with the enterprises. This "laid-off" phenomenon is the relic of the
implicit unemployment that was pervasive in a socialist economy that claimed there
were no jobless people in its society. The market-oriented reforms have made the
implicit unemployment explicit. However, due to the incremental approach to the
reforms, SOEs are still held the obligation to take care of their workers even they are
made redundant. Indeed, the "laid-off" phenomenon is a compromise between the
resilient planned economy and growing market forces. With the acceleration of the
207
SOE reforms, the population of "laid-off workers" increased dramatically outpacing
the increase of unemployment. In 1995, there were 368,000 "laid-off workers" in
Shanghai accounting for 8.100 of total employment in uthan areas while the official
number of unemployment was 143,600 (2.7%) (S. Wu, 1997). In other words,
Shanghai's real unemployment rate has been more than 10% in recent years.
Even this figure is heavily underestimated if we take the floating population into
account. Floating population here refers to non-local people who move to Shanghai
for whatever reasons. The majority of them are peasants from backward interior
provinces coming to seek jobs in Shanghai. According to China's statistics system,
the floating population is not included in Shanghai's statistics despite its vast number.
The floating population is a new phenomenon stemming from China's reform. In the
past, peasants were confined to the farm land by the government and under the strict
resident registration system the spontaneous moving of people on a large scale was
rare. The reforms gradually unleashed the vast population of peasants. Attracted by
job prospects, more and more peasants flocked to China's coast region areas which
have been economically way ahead of the central and west China. This economic-
oriented domestic migration started in early 1980s and reached its culmination in
early 1990s (Wang, 1995). Although no official statistic is available, it is widely
accepted that there are some 80 million floating population in China.
The SMG has conducted six surveys on floating population. These surveys show that
the floating population has increased dramatically from 0.5 million in 1982, reaching
a peak of 2.81 million in 1993. The last survey conducted in September 1997 gave a
figure of 2.76 million floating population indicating a stable tendency since 1993
(Shanghai Economic Yearbook, 1998). Of those 2.76 million people 74.5 per cent
were those who had come to seek a job. Unsurprisingly, the majority of them had a
very limited education background.
As shown in Table 7.31, 78°o of those who came to Shanghai for economic reason
had education of junior and primary school and 5.7 per cent are illiterate and semi-
literate. According to the 1993 survey, 84.500 of the floating population working in
Shanghai used to be peasants in their home (Wang, 1995). With such an educational
and occupational background, the jobs available to them are normally unskilled
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physical ones that are shunned by the local people. Excluded from the social welfare
that applies only to officially registered residents, more often than not, they found
themselves working in low paid jobs such as cleaner, waiter waitress and manual
labour on construction sites. Even for the same job in the same factory they are
discriminatorily treated. It is quite usual that a non-local worker earns half of what
his/her local colleague earns. 1997 survey shows that the average annual wage of
floating population in Shanghai was RMB 7812, far below Shanghai's average level
of RMB 11425 (Wang, 1995). Not able to afford the high rent in the central city, in
1993 65.4% of the floating population lived in the urban fringe area, and 16.2 %
lived in a temporary shed (ibid.). It is the floating population, economically deprived,
socially and spatially excluded from the local society, that make up the bottom of
Shanghai's social stratum.
Table 7.31 Education Background of Economic Immigrants to Shanghai in
1997
% of total
Tertiary education and above	 4.4
Senior school	 11.9
Junior and primary school
	 78.0
Illiterate and semi-literate 	 5.7
Source: Shanghai Economic Yearbook (SEY), 1998.
Partly because of the lack of statistics, partly because of the sensitive issues involved,
social stratification is one of the areas less explored in Shanghai's recent urban
development. However, as the above analysis shows, there is enough evidence that
Shanghai's society has been increasingly stratified since the reform. Due to China's
gradual reform, Shanghai's local private capital, though growing rapidly in 1 990s, is
still in a fledgling stage. The capital role has been mainly fulfilled by investors from
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and other countries, which are viewed as the global
capital playing with the SMG representing the interests of SOE in the local market.
Interestingly, therefore, both ends of the social spectrum, the richest and the poorest,
are outsiders. The global capitalists embodied by the expatriates and overseas
Chinese who assume the managerial positions in the thousands of Shanghai's foreign
invested enteiprises occupy the upper end of Shanghai society, while the floating
population occupy the bottom. Taking away these two groups, we have a picture that
the official statistics present, i.e., a less polarised Shanghai. However, even this
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"official Shanghai" has been increasingly polarised. On the one hand, with the rise of
producer services, more and more local people have been professionalised and as
such shifted upwards along the social ladder. On the other hand, we found an
increasing number of the laid-off workers slipping downwards to the bottom of the
social spectrum.
7.6 The emergence of a new state-capital relationship
The reform policy adopted by the Chinese government in December 1978 started a
new era for Shanghai. Shanghai's relation to the central govenmient as well as the
world economy has since been dramatically changed. With the marketisation and
decentralisation entailed by the reforms, the municipal government regained a
relatively significant autonomy from the central state. With its opening up to the
world economy, transnational capital came back to Shanghai again.
China's reform led by the central government unfolded gradually, however.
Shanghai's urban development did not speed up drastically until 1990 when the
central government launched the development of Pudong (East Shanghai),
demonstrating its determination to revitalise Shanghai into a world class city as it
was in I 920s and 1 930s. Seeing Shanghai as the gateway to the huge Chinese market
as it always is, foreign direct investment poured in and greatly changed Shanghai's
urban structure, economically, spatially and to a less extent socially. In 1996, the
share of foreign-funded firm's gross output value in Shanghai's industry reached
34.8°c of the total, while the share of the state-owned enterprises, which had once
dominated, dropped drastically to 38.8°c. Compared with transnational capital which
has become a major player in Shanghai's urban development, internal private capital,
although unleashed gradually by the government, still plays a minor role.
To sum up, we have seen, from the analysis of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the
emergence of a new state-capital relationship since 1978. In this post-Socialist period,
the municipal government has emerged as a key player in Shanghai's urban
development, and in the side of capital, we see the comeback of international capital
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as an important actor in shaping Shanghai's urban patterns. Thus, his new state-
capital relationship that has been underlying Shanghai's current urban restructuring
can be depicted as following:
Central state	 Local state
International capital
This chapter has shown that under this new state-capital relationship, Shanghai's
urban structure has been dramatically transformed in terms of its economic base,
spatial morphology and social fabric since 1978 and particularly since 1990. This
new state-capital relationship assumed a special form -- the pro-growth coalition
between the local state and international capital -- in Shanghai's urban redevelopment
prujects that have taken place in the number of hundreds during the 1990s. The next
chapter will examine the formation of this pro-growth coalition by focusing on the




DEVELOPMENT OF LUJIAZUI CENTRAL FINANCE
DISTRICT: THE FORMATION OF A PROJECT-BASED
PRO-GROWTH COALITION
8.1 Introduction
The chapter examines the roles of the central government, the local government and
international capital in the development of the LCF'D. It focuses particularly on the
interaction of local government and international capital, and the process of formation of
a pro-growth coalition between them. Drawing on interviews, the chapter shows that
patterns of engagements between the local government and foreign investors can be
characterised by a process of learning. When both learn there is an interest convergence
in such urban redevelopment project as the deve'opment of LCFD, they can work
together and form what can be called a project-based, implicit pro-growth coalition. It is
this pro-growth coalition, which underlay hundreds of redevelopment projects across
Shanghai in 1990s, that has been reshaping Shanghai's urban patterns.
8.2 Pudong and the Lujiazui Central Finance District (LCFD)
Pudong was originally a geographical concept referring to a triangular area to the east of
the Huangpu River. Although it is immediately opposite the Bund and its areas
alongside the river administratively belonged to city districts, it was long regarded by
local people as a countryside area composed of farm land, low density industry and
associated residential areas. It was designated Pudong New Area - an administrative
district under SMG in early 1990s after the deveJopment of Pudong was officially
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launched. Pudong New Area was initially 350 km2 in size and later expanded to
incorporate 522 km2 (1.5 times the size of urban Shanghai) (see Figure 8.1).




























Source: adapted from Yeh (1996: 280)
Within such a large area, there are four special development zones: Waigaoqiao Free
Trade Zone, the Jinqiao Export-Processing Zone, the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone,
and the Thangjiang High-tech Park. The Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone - the only
one entitled "financial and trade zone" among the thousands of development zone set up
in coastal China is the most important sub-area in Pudong (see Figure 8.2). It is planned
to become the "international finance and trade centre in the 21 century" for China and
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Figure 8.2 The Location of the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone
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Figure 8.3 The Location of the Key Development Subzones of Lujiazui Finance &
Trade Zone
Source: adapted from http: www.shld.com/brief
 zone function_g.htm
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the whole Asia-Pacific region. While the whole zone is 28 km2 in size, the main function
of the fmancial and trade centre will be in one sub- zone, i.e. Lujiazui Central Finance
District (LCFD) (see Figure 8.3). Immediately opposite to the colonial-era Bund, the
LCFD covers an area of 1.7 sq. km
 with a planned total floor space of 4.2 million sq. in.
As the most elaborately planned area in China, it is divided into 68 parcels of land where
dozens of super high-rise towers will be located.
8.3 The role of the state and international capital in the development of
Pudong
8.3.1 The changing attitude of the central government
As early as 1984, the SMG proposed the development of Pudong as one of strategies to
revitalise Shanghai (Yeh, 1996). Up to 1990, although the SMG had been keen to
translate the plan into reality, it failed to get the substantive support from the central
government which was focusing on the development of the southern provinces. Without
the endorsement of the central government, the Pudong project was stalemated in the
planning and research stage and its influence scarcely reached beyond the city.
The Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, though pulling back China's reform policy, turned
out to be the turning point for Shanghai's development. In its wake, Shanghai's Party
Secretary Jiang Zeming was selected to take the position of General Secretary of the
CCP when the Party leader Zhao Ziyang was purged. To shore up its political base in
Beijing, Jiang recruited his former colleagues into the Central government, the most
prominent of them was Zhu Rongji who was promoted to vice premier from Shanghai's
Party Secretary in 1991 and later became premier. Long associated with Shanghai
(Mayor 1985-1988, Party Secretary 1987-1989), Jiang was more sympathetic to
Shanghai's appeal for the development of Pudong (Cheung, 1996).
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In the aftermath of the Tiananmen tragedy, China faced the prospect of international
isolation and the process of reform was halted. Similar to the opening of Guangdong and
Fujian in 1979, China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping attempted to use Shanghai to
relaunch the economic reform process. By choosing Shanghai as the launching pad for
the 1990s, he hoped that the wave of economic reform could be pushed from the Pearl
Delta into the Yangzi Delta and spread further into the whole of China. Internationally,
it was intended to demonstrate his determination to cariy out the reform and open door
policy. It was also argued that Deng contemplated using Shanghai to replace the
increasingly recalcitrant Hong Kong (Cheung, 1996). Distrustful of Hong Kong due to
its huge demonstrations of popular support for the democracy protests in Beijing, he
believed that Shanghai would make a safer powerhouse for Chinese development,
because it could be more easily controlled.
In sum, as China remains a unitary party-state, the top-down approach is still the most
important way to open the doors for bold economic reform. Initiatives by the central
government (more precisely the top leaders) play a decisive role in the development of
mega-projects like the development of Pudong. The launch of development of Pudong
New Area serves as an excellent example to show how politics, rather than simply
economic considerations, have been the key to the city's future.
With the full support from the central government, the pace of reinvigorating Shanghai
as a world class city, in which the development of Pudong was a core project, was
dramatically quickened. On 18 April 1990, then Premier Li Peng officially declared the
development of Pudong in Shanghai. Ten preferential policies for Pudong were
announced on 30 April. Among these preferential policies, some such as the setting up
of foreign bank branches, the operation of retailing activities of foreign enterprises and
the establishment of Shanghai Stock Exchange were specially tailored and applicable
only to Pudong. The central government's preference for Shanghai was further
evidenced at the 14th Party Congress held in October 1992, in which Shanghai was
designated as the "dragon head and three centres" to lead the Yangzi River Basin and
China at large into the 21 century (Report of the 14th Chinese Communist Party
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Congress, 1992). The three centres refer to Shanghai as an economic centre, a financial
centre and a trading centre. In 1995, Pudong was given another package of incentives to
further its development. In 1998, Pudong became the first place in China in which
foreign banks were allowed to do RMB business with the foreign-invested enterprises
(see Box 8.1).
Box 8.1 - Major Preferential Policies for the Development of Pudong
Given by the Central Government
1990	 • Income tax of foreign-invested enterprises is at a reduced rate of 15
per cent. Enterprises due to operate for 10 years or more are exempted
from tax in the first two profit-making years and allow a 50 per cent
reduction over the following three years.
• Foreign investors can remit their share of profits out of the country
without paying the income tax.
• Foreign investors are allowed to invest in infrastructure projects.
• Foreign investors are allowed to engage in retail sales.
• Foreign banks are allowed to open foreign branches in Shanghai,
including Pudong New Area.
• There will be a free trade zone in Pudong New Area.
• Land leasing will be for 50 to 70 years. Foreign investors may
contract large tracts of land for development.
• Pudong New Area can keep the revenue for further development.
1995	 • Shanghai is allowed to issue construction bond worth 500 million
RMB per year for Pudong.
• The Central government will arrange for Pudong per year: a loan of
RMB 400 million; a loan of US$ 300 million; a loan of RMB 300
million for technology upgrading; a state appropriation of RMB 300
million.
• Shanghai is allowed to issue an extra RMB 100 million A-share and
US$100 million B-share per year for the purpose of developing
Pudong.
1996	 • Foreign banks are allowed for the operation on RMB business with
the foreign-invested Enterprises in Pudong.
Source: collected from various governmental documents.
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8.3.2 The enthusiastic local government
Supported by the central government, the enthusiasm of the SMG for developing
Pudong rapidly developed. First, it pumped in massive investment to build up the
modem urban infrastructure. Ten major infrastructure projects for Pudong were
constructed to improve the transport, communication and public facilities of the area
(see Table 8.1). At a total cost of RMB 12.8 billion, these ten projects laid a foundation
of a modem urban infrastructure in Pudong.
Table 8.1 The First Ten Major Infrastructure Pro ects in Pudong _________
Projects	 Main feature	 Construction	 Investment
_________________ _____________________________ period 	 (10 RMB)
Nangpu Bridge	 Cross Huangpu River, six lanes, 5,346	 1988.12-1991.5	 8.2
meterlong.	 _________________ ____________
Yangpu Bridge	 Cross Huanpu River, six lanes, 8,354	 1991.5-1993.10	 11.5
_____________________ meter long.
	 _________________ ____________
Yanggao Road	 Six lanes, 24.5 km long, designed speed:	 11992.1-1992.12	 7.1
Expansion Project	 80 km/h.	 ________________ ___________
Waigaoqiao Deep	 Four 10,000 ton class deep water berths, 	 1991.7-1993.7	 9.5
Water Berths	 annual handling capacity of 2.4 million
_______________________ tons 	 __________________ ____________
Waigaoqiao Power	 1.2 million kw capacity. 	 Finished in 1996 56.8
Plant(l phase)	 _____________________________________ _________________ ____________
Linggiao Water Plant 	 200,000 tons daily water supply. 	 1993-1994.6	 12.5
Sewage Treatment	 Covers 70.57 km1	 988.8-1993	 16
Project(l phase)	 _________________________________ _______________ ___________
Telecommunica-tion	 A net increase of 300,000 telephone	 Completed in
	 0.12
Project	 lines.	 1992	 ___________
Pudong Gas Works (2' An increase of 1,000,000 m 3/day.	 Completed in	 2.12
phase)	 _________________________________ 1992
	 ___________
Inner Ring Road	 6 lanes, 7,000 meter long, designed 	 1993.1-1993.11	 4.6
(Pudong section) 	 speed: 80km/h.	 _______________ ___________
aource: auapea irom iissociauon oi omprenensive rconormcs 01 runong ew area (jtrri W) i I
This first round of ten projects was followed by a new round of massive infrastructure
investment in mid-I 990s (see Table 8.2). This second round was even more ambitious.
The first phase of Pudong International Airport alone cost nearly RMB 11 billion. When
it was opened to the landing of charted planes flying in world CEOs for the "Fortune
Shanghai: Global Forum" at the end of September 1999, Shanghai became the first
Chinese city that has the two civil airports.
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Table 8.2 The Second Round of Ten Major Infrastructure Projects in Pudong
Project	 Main feature	 Construction Investment
__________________ _____________________________ period 	 (10 RMB)
Pudong International	 Capacity of 20 million passengers and	 1996-1999	 109.7
Airport (1L phase)	 500,000 tons cargo per year.	 ___________ ___________
Pudong International	 State of art telecommunication centre. 	 N.A.	 30
InformationPort 	 __________________________________ ___________ ___________
Pudong International Deep Capacity of 1.4 million TEU per year. 	 N.A.	 46.6
Water Harbour (1' phase) _________________________________ __________ __________
Outer Ring Road (Pudong 100 metre wide and 50.17 km long	 1996-	 N.A.
section)	 ______________________________________ ____________ ____________
No.2 Metro Line (15t	 17.6 km long with the Pudong section 	 Completed	 105
phase)	 about 7.9 km long, 	 in 1999.	 ___________
Pudong Light Railway	 25.4 km long, capacity of 64.23 million	 1998.10-	 21.94
Transitpassengers per year.	 __________ __________
Waigaoqiao Power Plant 	 A net increase of capacity of 1.8 million	 1996-	 1.7 billion
(2d phase)	 kw	 __________ USD
Sewage Treatment project Treatment capacity of 3.69 million m 3 per 1997-	 N.A.
(2" phase)	 day	 ____________ ____________
Crossing -Huangpu	 645 meter long	 Completed	 4.9
PedestrianTunnel	 __________________________________ in 1999	 ___________
East China Sea Natural	 Capacity of 1.2 million m3 per day.	 N.A.	 64.2
GasProject	 __________________________________________ _____________ _____________
Source: adapted trom AUU'N W (I 99).
Apart from being a major investor, the SMG is also the organiser of the Pudong project.
The Pudong government - Pudong New Area Administration (PNAA) was established
in January 1993 and a vice-Mayor of Shanghai was appointed as the chairman of the
Administration. Meanwhile, four development corporations were set up to co-ordinate
infrastructure are land development, real estate and project investment, and the
development and operation of services in the respective four major development zones.
They were all capitalised and allocated land by the SMG in 1990 and 1991. The SMG
and later together with the PNAA was keen to promote the Pudong project on the
international stages in order to attract more international capital which was targeted to be
one of the major fmancial resources for the development of Pudong.
8.33 Inflow of international capital
Needless to say, the cost of the Pudong project is enormous. It has been estimated that
according to the government's three stage plan, by the time the whole project is
complete, a minimum of US$ 70-80 billion will be needed. The SMG hopes that at least
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half of the total cost of developing Pudong will be covered by foreign investment flows
(Sender, 1994: 56). Foreign investment has played an important role in Pudong's
development. From 1990-1996, foreign investment in fixed asset investment amounted
to 25.7 billion RMB, accounting for 19.7 percent of the total of RMB 130.4 billion (see
Table 8.3).
Table 8.3 Fixed Asset Investment in Pudong by Resource: 1990-1996
Investment (billion RMB) Per cent (%)
State budget appropriate	 1.6	 1.2
Domestic loan	 33.4	 25.6
Foreign investment	 25.7	 19.7
Self-raised fund	 51.9	 39.8
Other	 17.8	 13.6
Source: ACEPNW (1998: 169)
What is more, while internal investment from the SMG and other provinces led the way
initially, the share of the foreign investment has been increasing dramatically. In 1996,
the foreign fixed asset investment reached 9.4 billion RMB (23.8%), up from 0.15
billion RMB (10.6%) in 1990 (ACEPNW, 1998).
International capital flows are of course profit-motivated. With its population of 1.3
billion, China is potentially one of the biggest markets that none of TNCs can afford to
ignore. With its strategic location at the mouth of the Yangzi River Delta and its colonial
past, Shanghai is always seen by overseas investors as a springboard to tap the vast
market of China. In a survey of the investment environment conducted in 1994, by
counting the frequencies of mention by the respondents, Nyaw Mee-Kan (1996: 256)
found that "huge market potential in China" was the top motivating factor for investment
in Shanghai, with the second motivating factor "lower wage levels of Shanghai workers"
trailing by 21 points (see Table 8.4).
With the massive influx of capital, Pudong achieved exceptionally rapid economic
growth. In 1990, Pudong's GDP was about RMB 6 billion, accounting for 8% of
Shanghai's total GDP. By 1999, Pudong's GDP had increased dramatically to RMB 80
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billion, accounting for 20% of Shanghai's total GDP (calculated from Statistical
Yearbook of Shanghai, 2000).
Table 8.4 Motives for Investment in Shanghai (n = 81)
Motives/reasons	 Frequencies of mention' Ranking
Huge market potential in China	 51	 1
Lower wage levels of Shanghai workers	 30	 2
High technical skills of workers	 25	 3
High technological capabilities 	 25	 3
Low recoupment period of investment	 20	 5
Being a Shanghainese	 17	 6
Convenience of transportation 	 16	 7
Low price of raw materials 	 16	 7
Quick access to information 	 16	 7
Sound investment laws and regulations	 15	 8
Help in developing Shanghai 	 13	 9
High efficiency of administrative bureau	 13	 9
Good factoty facilities 	 11	 10
Good infrastructure 	 8	 11
Ease of raising funds	 3	 12
Low investment fees	 2	 13
Note: 1 Respondents may choose more than one reason.
Source: Nyaw Mee-Kan (1996: 256).
The transformation of Pudong's landscape was even more astonishing. Taken in 1990,
1996 and 2000 respectively from the same angle, Picture 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 show the process
of Pudong's striking landscape transitionS. In 1990 (see the picture 8.1), Shanghai's
landscape was dominated by the western-style buildings located in the Bund (the near
side of the Huangpu River), and Pudong (the far side of the river) was an area of flat
land with few high buildings. Ten years later, a completely new landscape with dozens
of super high-rising buildings has emerged in Pudong (see the picture 8.3). The Bund
has been dwarfed by the soaring buildings located in the LCFD where we can see the
468-metre-high Oriental TV Tower (the world third tallest TV tower) and the American-
style 88-storey Jin Mao Building (the world third tallest building). Taken inside the
LCFD, Picture 8.4 shows an astonishing resemblance to American big cities. No visitors
Unless otherwise stated, all pictures are courtesy of Mr. Yao Jiangliang, a photography in the Shanghai
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to Shanghai would not be impressed by its rapid landscape transition in such a short
period of time.
Such a rapid development would have been impossible without joint efforts made by the
three major actors - the central government, the SMG and international capital. With
different motivations, these three major actors play their respective roles in the
development of Pudong. The Pudong project is one endorsed by the central government,
organised by the SMG and increasingly driven by international capital. In the process of
developing Pudong, an intriguing phenomenon is that the SMG and international capital
that is represented by foreign investors have formed an interactive relationship in which,
as the following section will show, both sides have been learning how to deal with each
other.
8.4 The interactive relationship between international capital and local
state
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One thing that China's reform and open door policies have brought about is a changing
behaviour pattern of the Chinese government at both the central and the local level. With
the deepening of reform, the Chinese government has increasingly realised that
government itself needed to be changed in order to deal properly with foreign investors.
For communist cadres, the reform brought them the first opportunity in 30 years to deal
face to face with international capital which had been regarded as toxic to socialism. It
took a great deal of time and efforts for the bureaucratic system to adjust itself to the
coming of international capital. The case of the establishment of the Shanghai Foreign
Investment Working Commission (SFIWC) on 10 June 1988 shows how the local
government learned to adjust itself to cater to foreign investment which has become
increasingly important for the city's development.
In the beginning, foreign investors had to go through a daunting bureaucratic procedure
which the Chinese went through in order to start business, and which was designed to
cater for a centrally planned economy. For example, in order to get approval for an
investment project, foreign investors needed to go through 5 commissions and offices,
and 20 bureaux of the government (or at least 40 official seals and a maximum of 126
official seals!) (Tsao, 1996). In an interview with Sun Yell, a veteran official in the
SMG who later became the deputy director of The Economic and Trade Bureau of
Shanghai Pudong New Area, he recalled foreign investors' complaints on the lengthy
bureaucratic procedure:
This was one of the major areas that foreign investors complained about. In almost
every meeting, they were asking the municipal government to cut short the lengthy
bureaucratic procedure. In some cases, foreign investors complained that they did
not know which governmental department they needed to go in the first place for an
investment project.
With the increasing pressure from foreign investors and growing competition with other
Chinese cities for foreign investment, the SMG decided to establish a new governmental
development - the SFIWC to manage and coordinate all matters involved with foreign
investment. The intention of this institution-building effort was to provide a "one
window, one tape" service for foreign investors. The newly created commission
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consisted of four components to promote administrative authority and institutional
effectiveness. The SMG attached great importance to the SFIWC, which was reflected
by the fact that Mayor Thu Rongji held concurrently the directorship of the Commission.
Committee members included vice-directors of the Planning Commission, Foreign
Economic and Trade Commission, Economic Commission and the Construction
Commission. New investment regulations were also issued to clarify the investment
procedures and to make the process more transparent.
Under the new procedure, the SFIWC was the first place for foreign investors to visit.
The SFIWC, according to the different projects, would then direct foreign investors to
go through the necessary bureaucratic procedures at the end of which stood the SFIWC.
Finally, the SFIWC would issue an official seal to approve investment applications. The
establishment of the SFIWC and the new investment regulations that came with it cut
substantially the red-tape and bureaucratic layers, which in turn enhanced institutional
effectiveness. An effective governmental system - the major component of "soft
investment environment" - helped greatly to attract foreign investors. Before the
establishment of the SFIWC, direct foreign investment grew 44% annually from 1985 to
1987. The 1988 figure, however, increased by 72% in comparison with the 1987 data.
Other forms of foreign investment such as foreign loans also increased dramatically, 55
times more in 1988 as compared with 1987 (SSB, various years).
The SMG has since made continuous efforts to improve bureaucratic efficiency. In early
1990s when I was working in the Pudong government, a phrase that often appeared in
official documents and party controlled mass media was "to do things in accordance
with international rules". Sun told me that
In terms of setting up a company, the international rule is the registration rather
than approval system, i.e., to set up a company, barring those prohibited by the law,
what you need to do is just to go and register with the local authority. You don't
have to go through the lengthy application procedure. In America, it takes 3 days to
set up a company. In Hong Kong, it takes a week. It takes 3 months in China.
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It will be a long way for China to go from an approval system to a registration system,
due to China's gradual reform from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented
one. But growing international exchange was given the Chinese opportunities to learn
ways of dealing with international investors from mature market economies. The SMG's
efforts to improve Shanghai's soft investment environment did not go unrecognised
among foreign investors. Albert K. Ng, the general manager of Andersen (Shanghai)
Business Consulting Co. Ltd., was very impressed by Shanghai's relatively good soft
investment environment. Established in 1991, Andersen (Shanghai) Business Consulting
Co., Ltd. was the first wholly foreign owned consulting firm to be registered in Pudong,
Shanghai. A senior member of British Accounting Association and of Hong Kong
Accounting Association, Ng was appointed as the general manager of Anderson
(Shanghai) Business Consulting Co. Ltd. in 1994. As an expert on China's investment
environment, Ng compared Shanghai's soft investment environment with other Chinese
cities':
One of the strengths that Shanghai has is the rules and regulations here are more
transparent and better enforced and followed in Shanghai than anywhere else that I
see in China.
Ng complimented the SMG on its efforts to improve Shanghai's investment environment:
The SMG has been trying to create a more level playing field, more equal status for
foreign-invested enterprises as well as local Chinese enterprises. Because the ways
the rules and regulations are implemented to foreign-invested enterprises are quite
restricted in terms of what they can do, and to Chinese enterprises are quite flexible,
and sometimes flexible to the point of beyond what I think it is intended within the
existing regulations. What I see happening is that as laws change it has become
more transparent and easier for foreign invested enterprises to cooperate and at
same time I think the Chinese companies are finding that they have to follow more
transparent rules also.
Ng's assessment on Shanghai's investment environment was supported by Pan Ruihua,
the Deputy Secretary General of the Shanghai Pudong New Area Association of
Enterprises With Foreign Investment (PAEFI). As a semi-official organisation, the
PAEFI has over 3000 registered members of foreign invested enterprises including those
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funded by investors from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao. Pan supposed that Shanghai's
good investment environment was one of the major reasons that many Taiwanese
industrialists switched their operations from the South China to Shanghai in the second
half of 1990s:
In the second half of 1990s, there was a wave of Taiwanese industrialists switching
their operations from Guangdong province to Shanghai. Many of these Taiwanese
industrialists were small and medium investors, who came to invest in Guangdong
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They opted to invest in Guangdong in the first
place for they were attracted by the flexibility shown by the Guangdong
government in its policy implementation while Shanghai was rigid in policy aspects.
Since the importance of preferential policies in attracting external investment was
receding, more and more Taiwanese industrialists moved to Shanghai because they
felt that rules and regulations were more transparent and better enforced, and thus
their interests were better protected. The Yangzi Delta area with Shanghai as its
centre has now the biggest Taiwanese community in mainland China with a
population of some 300,000.
While relatively transparent and efficient governmental system is one of Shanghai's
advantages in competing with other Chinese cities for foreign investment, Shanghai's
strategic position in the Chinese market is the most important factor for attracting
foreign investment in Shanghai. All of the representatives of foreign investors I
interviewed (see Chapter 1 for the list of interviewees) pointed to Shanghai's strategic
position of gateway to the Chinese market - potentially the world biggest market as the
top motivating factor for their investment in Shanghai. The finding is consistent with
similar researches done by other scholars (see Table 8.3). Among interviews I conducted,
the case of Eastman Kodak Company's moving its regional headquarter from Hong
Kong to Shanghai showed that Shanghai had become an increasingly important node in
many INC's global restructuring of production and marketing.
In an interview with Warren Wisnewski, Vice President of Eastman Kodak Company for
the Greater China Region, he told me how the company made the decision of relocating
its regional headquarter. Eastman Kodak used to have its regional headquarter for East
Asia located in Hong Kong. With the rapid growth of its business in China, Kodak
established the Greater China Region with its headquarter also located in Hong Kong in
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1995, which was responsible for the company's business in mainland China, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Macao. In 1997, Kodak moved its headquarter for the Greater China
Region from Hong Kong to Shanghai. And in 1999, its regional headquarter for East
Asia was moved to Shanghai too. Asked why the company relocated its headquarters,
Wisnewski said,
I think for people who are unfamiliar with China, Hong Kong may seem like an
easier place to start. For people who are familiar with China and familiar with
where it headed, Shanghai is the place to be. If China is the most important market
for Kodak in the future, and clearly it is the most important market for the region,
then our regional headquarter should be located here. I believe that both the central
government as well as the Shanghai government, it is their vision that Shanghai
will become the commercial centre of China. So I think our wision is consistent
with that.
While the Chinese were learning hard from interaction with foreign investors, there was
a levelling process taking place in foreign investors' side. Isolated from the world
capitalist economy for 30 years, China was attractive but rather mysterious to foreign
investors. Warren Wisnewski commented that many foreign investors thought that
If you have been to China once, you come back and you consider yourself expert. If
you have been there a long time, you realise you have so much more to learn. The
longer you are in China, the more you realise how little you understand and you
have to continue to learn.
Thirty years' centrally planned economy had a profound impact on China's bureaucratic
procedure and officials' mentality. China's gradual reform means there will be a long
transition period in which the old and the new coexist. It could take a long time for the
new systems including regulations, rules and procedures to be established and well
coordinated and for the old to be abandoned. It takes even longer for people to change
their attitude and mentality towards the new system. In the transition period, therefore, it
is not surprising that many foreign investors, when they came to China, found
regulations unclear and difficult to follow, and sometimes found a big difference
between the words and the reality. In dealing with the Chinese government, however,
foreign investors learned how things go in China. Wisnewski told me how he learned the
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difference between the regulations on wholly foreign owned companies and the reality
in China:
.rules and regulations would say that you, as a 100% foreign owned company,
should be able to come in and participate in a particular market. And every
regulation would suggest that is true. Come in and set up your own operation and
go into business. In reality, though, there are a lot of facts out there that would
impede. Even though there are not laws suggesting this, there would be
organisations, individuals and bureaus that could make it difficult for you as a
wholly foreign owned company to do business ... You can make a choice... You
cay say, that is OK, I am going to continue to prove that I can do it this way. Or you
may choose to, you learn over time, instead of fighting the system, you want to
make it easier for yourself, and yield to the system if you will, accept working with
a local partner, eliminate theoe elements that would be in the way of your being
successflil by yourself, you can be more successful and more quickly. That is
something that I think takes time to learn here in China.
Among three types of foreign direct investment in China - equity joint ventures,
cooperative joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, the former two types
were more acceptable to the Chinese government because of the involvement of Chinese
partners, while the latter was treated differently for fear of losing control of the economy.
Compared with equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures, wholly foreign-
owned enterprises were only allowed in few specially chosen economic sectors. Even in
these sectors, as Wisnewski has learned, wholly foreign-owned companies would
experience many difficulties doing business in reality mainly because of officials'
attitude and mentality. Many foreign investors would like to set up wholly foreign-
owned enterprises for it allowed them to make strategic arrangements in their global
organisation of production and management and to protect their own technologies and
expertise. However, due to the suspicion of the Chinese government, many foreign
investors chose to work with local partners, i.e., to set up equity joint ventures in the first
decade of China's accepting foreign investment
Take Pudong for example. In 1990, the number of equity joint venture approved
accounted for 78.6% of the total number of foreign funded enterprises approved, while
wholly foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 14.3%. The dominant position of equity
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joint venture did not change until the mid-1990s when China became increasingly
integrated with the world economy and the Chinese government slackened its control of
wholly foreign-owned enterprises. In 1995, the number of wholly foreign-owned
enterprises approved in Pudong reached 455, surpassing that of equity joint ventures
which was 340. By 1999, the share of wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the total
number of foreign funded enterprises approved increased to 83.9% (Wang, 2000).
Wisnewski's narrative of how he learned the subtle difference between the words and
the reality in China via dealing with the Chinese government was echoed by Dr. Hans J.
Geelhaar, the general manager of Shanghai Gaoqiao-BASF Dispersions Co. Ltd. A
German company, BASF is one of the biggest foreign investors in China's chemical
industiy with capital investment totalling more than US$ 600 million. Shanghai
Gaoqiao-BASF Dispersions Co. Ltd., established in 1988, was a joint venture between
BASF and Shanghai Gao Jiao Petrochemical Corporation, in which BASF holds 50%
share. In the interview, Dr. Geetharr told me how he learned to understand the real
meaning of the term "industry" in China:
Our definition of industry is anybody who participates. Any company, foreign,
local, state-owned, privately-owned, collectively-owned, whatever. That defines the
industry. In China, at least from the governmental standpoint, when you say
industry, technically, I won't say all, but most government officials have a very
different defmition of industry, that industry is state-owned industry, primarily.
When you talk about development of the industry, again for a foreign company
coming in, the western view is that, of course, they should be welcomed, because
they create jobs, the tax revenue, etc. ... But there are some government officials
that view industry development, first and foremost, should be to develop state-
owned industry. And secondly, to develop the overall industry. And you are getting
complex, sometimes, as a result of that. So the two have to go in balance.
Dr. Geelharr provided an excellent example showing the resilience of Chinese officials'
mentality which was inherited from China's centrally planned system and which treated
enterprises differently in accordance with their ownership. Under the centrally planned
system, the economy was divided into various industries and every industry had its own
ministry as the top regulator. The central government managed the economy through
these ministries, which could number dozens. Unlike in the market economy where
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resources were allocated to different economic sectors by the "invisible hand" of the
market, resources were allocated through these visible hands (ministries) to different
enterprises in the centrally planned economy. In allocating resources, ministries treated
enterprises differently with the priority given to the state-owned over the collectively-
owned. And within the state-owned enterprises, the priority descended administratively
from the central to the local. There was no place for the private-owned enterprises in this
matrix of resource allocation, let alone foreign companies. It is, therefore, not surprising
that Chinese officials view of industry, which had been entrenched in three decades of
China's centrally planned economy, was reluctant to include foreign companies.
China's gradual refonn means that it would take a long time for the Chinese government
system to catch up with the international way of doing things. But foreign investors
learned the situation quickly in their dealings with the Chinese government. What is
more, some foreign investors learned how to make use of the system in order to get
things done in China.
Michael Gotschlich, the General Manager of The German Centre Shanghai, an
enterprise wholly owned by Bayensche Landesbank to help German small and medium
companies gain their quick and effective entry into the Chinese market place, gave me
an example of how German representative offices worked with the local authority to get
round the regulation and achieved a win-win situation.
Many foreign companies, particularly those in service sectors such as finance, insurance,
legal, consultant, etc., where full foreign operation was not allowed, tended to set up
representative offices as the first step to enter the Chinese market. According to the
regulation, representative offices, although relative easily established, can do little more
than look at the local market, provide information back home and liaise with the Chinese
government. "But many representative offices do much more than that," Gotschlich said,
particularly consulting jobs. Because representative offices do not have invoices,
they do business here in Shanghai but bills are sent from Germany or elsewhere.
The Shanghai government accepts this although representative offices are not
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allowed to do business in China. They say: "OK, you can do this way. But you
make money here, so you have to pay tax." But without invoices representative
offices don't have income. If you don't have income, how can you pay tax? The
two sides worked out a solution to this problem, that is, representative offices can
do business in Shanghai by writing invoices in places other than China. Meanwhile,
representative offices will pay tax and the tax will be paid on the basis of expenses
that representative offices spend. The reason behind this is: the more business you
do, the more expenses you spend, and the more money you make. Of course, it is
not as precise.
Both the representative offices and the Shanghai government are happy with the solution.
Representative offices can do businesses in Shanghai, which is not allowed according to
the regulations. The Shanghai government does not violate the regulations because
representative offices do not get invoices from the government. At the same time, the
Shanghai government can have the tax revenue from businesses done by representative
offices.
The Chinese government made many regulations to manage and control the activities of
international capital that was attracted by the opening of the Chinese market. However,
these regulations were geared up with China's existing governmental system, which was
basically centrally controlled. There was a big gap between these regulations and the so-
called "international rules" which were developed from western market economies. The
increasing exchange between the Chinese government and foreign investors made both
sides realise this difference and try to close the gap. Sometimes when there was
convergence of interest both sides could work together to get a solution to their mutual
satisfactions. The above example shows such a case. Some foreign companies, who
understand the Chinese way of doing things after many years' experiences in China, can
do even more than working with the local authority. They can, if necessary, take over
responsibilities that were supposed to be undertaken by the Chinese government in order
to get things done.
In an interview with Frank Wang, the deputy general manager of Delphi Automotive
Systems (China) Holding Co. Ltd., he told me how his company took two Chinese local
governments to reach an agreement on a reorganisation of its three subsidiary companies
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in China. An American company, Delphi Automotive is one of the biggest supplies of
automotive components and systems. With the annual profit of US$ 1,062 million, it is
ranked by "Fortune" the thirteenth largest company within the industry of motor
vehicles and parts in the world (Fortune, F-19, July 23, 2001). Delphi has invested more
than US$ 400 million in China. With Delphi Automotive Systems (China) Holding Co.
Ltd. which is located in Pudong, Shanghai as its headquarter in China, Delphi now has
offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Changchun and operates more than a dozen joint
ventures and wholly-owned ventures. Delphi China achieved US$ 370 million in sales in
1999.
In early 2001, Delphi China wanted to reorganise three of its subsidiary companies into
one company that would be located in Pudong, Shanghai. These three companies were
located in three different provinces in China - Delphi Packard Electric Baicheng Co. Ltd.
was located in Beicheng, Jilin province, Delphi Packard Electric Shanghai Co. Ltd. in
Shanghai and Delphi Packard Electric (Guangzhou) Co. Ltd. in Guangzhou, Guangdong
province. The Shanghai government welcomed the reorganisation proposal, as the new
company - Delphi Packard Electric System (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. would be located in
Pudong, which would create new jobs and tax revenues. The Guangzhou government
gave a go-ahead for the proposal, as Delphi Packard Electric (Guangzhou) Co. Ltd. was
newly established and had little impact on the local job market and tax revenues. The
Baicheng government was, however, against the proposal, as Delphi Packard Electric
Baicheng Co. Ltd. was a quite big company in Baicheng and the reorganisation would
cost over a hundred jobs and hundreds of thousands of RMB in tax revenues.
In order to maintain good relations with local governments, which were regarded as an
important factor in Delphi's successful operation in China, Frank Wang, who was in
charge of the reorganisation, made shuttle travels negotiating with and mediating
between the Shanghai and Baicheng governments. After 5 months hard negotiation and
mediation, Delphi China fmally got these two local governments to reach an agreement
on its reorganisation. The core of the agreement was that the Shanghai government
would return a portion of local tax revenues from the new company to the city of
233
Baicheng every year as the compensation to the closure of Delphi Packard Electric
Baicheng Co. Ltd. after the reorganisation. The amount of tax returned would be based
on that that the Delphi Packard Electric Baicheng Co. Ltd. paid to the city of Baicheng
at the time when the agreement was signed. It seemed that Delphi China had done what
was supposed to be done by the central government, that is, rto get two local
governments to reach a cross-provincial agreement on a company's internal
reorganisation. "As far as I am concerned," said Frank,
it is the only case in China that a foreign company has done this. Looking back, we
were a bit surprised that we could get the reorganisation done this way. It may be
incredible in America or other countries. But it is China. There is a saying among
foreign investors here: "In China, everything is possible. But if you don't try,
nothing is possible".
From general understanding of how things go in China to working together with the
local government to get things done to mediating among local governments to reach a
cross-provincial agreement, foreign investors learned, and learned quickly from their
increasing interaction with the Chinese government. There has been a learning process
in both sides of the Chinese government and foreign investors. The above cases show
that both sides have the ability to learn as well as the desire to learn from the growing
exchange. When both learn there is an interest convergence, they can work together to
achieve their common goals. The following section shows further how the SMG and
foreign investors, driven by the common interests of growth, formed what can be called
an implicit, project-based pro-growth coalition in the development of Lujiazui Central
Finance District.
8.5 The development of Lujiazui Central Finance District (LCFD)
LCFD is the SMG's pet project which is intended to become tbe symbol of 2 1
century's Shanghai - the Chinese equivalent of Manhatten in New York, Shinjuku in
Tokyo and La Defense in Paris. LCFD would also serve as an important symbol and
image of the results of reform and the success of the open door policy. This can be
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evidenced by the fact that China's top leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zeming,
Li Peng and Zhu Rongji all paid inspection visits to this area, and some visited several
times. During his visit in March 1998, Jiang even inscribed for the Lujiazui Finance and
Trade Zone: "Endeavour to build Lujiazui into an internationally-oriented modern
finance and trade zone" (Lujiazui Today', June 1998). An inscription from the top leader
is highly regarded in China as a firm endorsement from the central government. With the
full support from the Central government, the SMG showed great enthusiasm, intending
to bulldoze the whole area and build up a brand new urban form studded with gleaming
skyscrapers which would represent Shanghai on the global stage. For this purpose, the
SMG made painstaking efforts focusing on the following three aspects.
8.5.1 World class planning
In 1992, the SMG invites four internationally renowned architectural and planning firms
- Richard Rogers from Britain, Massimiliano Fuksas from Italy, Toyo Ito from Japan,
and Dominique from France, together with one local Shanghai team, to consult and
submit conceptual proposals for LCFD. All of these four foreign firms had worked on
international projects in Paris, other European cities, North America and Japan. It was
the first time in China that a group of elite international architects regarded as the
physical agent of contemporary globalisation processes, were involved in the design of
such a large and important area.
Indeed, the involvement of these firms itself was a good indicator that not only global
capital but the ideas and images that were developed out of experiences in advanced
western cities and globalised in the development of globalisation started to penetrate into
China. These four foreign firms were international experts who understand the nature of
the interconnection between global flows and urban development processes, rather than
the specificity of local systems. They were dealing with Shanghai the same way they did
A magazine that is irregularly published by the Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development
(Group) Co., Ltd.
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with Tokyo, London, Pans and Rome where they had worked for may years. It is of
course exactly what the SMG wanted.
In October 1992, the five conceptual proposals for LCFD were submitted and reviewed
by a technical committee set up by the SMG and the French government.* A summaiy
from the evaluation report pointed out the common feature of the five conceptual master
plans:
They have a certain number of aspects in common in particular concern for
having a global vision for the project to be created. The development of such a
district cannot be reduced to simply placing edifices on isolated pieces of land.
Such a development must be based on a certain "concept" of a city in the 21
century. The parts of the city must be examined in relation to this concept:
infrastrncture, networks, public services, business districts, residential areas, etc.
(cited in Olds, 1995: 306-307).
Clearly, the global vision was in the mind of all architects invited to take part in the
consultant. It is designed not for Shanghai or China alone, as the general manager of
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development (Group) Co., LTD (SLDC),
Wan Ande (1998) said, "we are going to set up a stage where Chinese companies as well
as MNCs from all over the world come to play" (Lujiazui Today, June 1998). In 1993,
the SMG fmally chose the one that incorporated some ideas from all of the proposals
with the existing plan developed by a local institute in 1991. As a result of 17 rounds of
improvements over three years, the master plan was boasted as "a collection of world
wisdom" with the theme of "Man and Nature in Harmony" (Luiazui Finance & Trade
Zone: 2l century international finance & trade centre, a company introduction
brochure by SLDC). The revised master plan for LCFD will permit 69 buildings, with a
total buildable area of 4.18 million sq. m. Seventy-five per cent of the total buildable
area is devoted to fmance, business and trade, office and hotel buildings, 16 % to
shopping malls, 6.6% residential and 2.4% culture and entertainment (see Figure 8.4 for
The consultation process was supported by the French government and organised by a special Franco-
Chinese committee. For detail, see Olds, 1995.
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the division of lands prefixed with English alphabet). Thirty-four per cent of the total
land is devoted to open space and green area (Olds, 1995).






Source: adapted from Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone: 21st Century International
Finance & Trade Zone (a company brochure by the SLDC)
Apart from the master plan, other specific plans also involved international expertise
(Lujjiazui Finance & Trade Zone: 2f' century international finance & trade centre; and
my interviews with Yang Jianyi, Manager of Planning Division, SLDC in 2000). In
1994, following international tendering, Oscar Faber TPA from Britain presented a
unique transportation system design for LCFD, which includes river-crossing facilities,
inter-district traffic organisation system and public transportation system. In 1995, FSC,
a well-known Canadian planning company, was entrusted to conduct the higher-level
design work for LCFD, which is designed to supplement, improve and upgrade the
original urban plan and architectural design.






















In 1998, the French Charpentier-La Defense company was entrusted to work out the
landscape design for the Centuiy Boulevard. The Centuiy Boulevard is supposed to be a
symbolic landscape avenue as a part of Shanghai's West-East Development Axis
connecting the Hongqiao International Airport and the Pudong International Airport. Its
unique layout of asymmetric lanes and the integration of lanes with 8 botanical gardens
embodies the planning trend of cities in the 21 century which aim at sustained
development.
8.5.2 The establishment of Shanghai Lujiazul Finance and Trade Zone
Development Company (SLDC)
While the SMG is in charge of the overall planning of LCFD, it set up the Shanghai
Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development Company to co-ordinate the physical
development of the site, particularly the development of property, and leasing of land.
The company was capitalised by the SMG in 1990 via the injection of 1.51 sq. km of
land in the zone at a price of RMB 100 per sq. m. Of the total 1.51 sq. km , the company
controlled 0.56 sq. km of prime site in LCFD (Olds, 1995a).
The company generated most of its revenue from selling land. Its developmental strategy
is based on so-called "rolling development", i.e., changing the "unripe land" into "ripe
land" and acquiring more land by the money from selling the "ripe land" (My interviews
with Kang Huijun, General Manager of SLDC, and Yang Jianyi in 2000). "Unripe land"
refers to the land occupied by the work units or tenants, which is unsaleable in the land
market. Because the whole LCFD is a built-up urban area, the company has to make the
land conveyed by the SMG into "ripe land" by clearing and levelling the land and
providing it with the necessary facilities such as electricity, water, telephone lines,
sewage pipes and so on. The revenue from selling the "ripe land" in the secondary land
market allows the company to acquire more "unripe land" from the SMG who
monopolises the primary land market.
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By "rolling development", it now controls 6.8 sq. km of land in the Lujiazui Finance and
Trade Zone. In December 1997, the company was transformed and renamed as Shanghai
Lujiazui Development (Group) Co., Ltd. With a registered capital of 1.74 billion yuan,
the group company has total assets of 11.6 billion yuan and net assets of 5 billion yuan.
It consists of 22 firms, including Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone
Development Co., Ltd, which has the fourth largest market capitalisation among all the
listed companies in China (Lu?/iazui Finance & Trade Zone: 21 st century international
finance & trade centre).
8.5.3 The relocation of the existing occupants in LCFD
In translating the plan of LCFD into reality, the most difficult job involved may have
been the relocation of the existing occupants. Unlike inner city redevelopment in
western cities which is extremely prolonged by the privately-owned land system, urban
renewal in China is much quicker thanks to the state-owned land system though the
relocation involved is a daunting and time-consuming job. In Chinese cities, the local
state has the power to forcibly relocate residents from their housing and community.
According to the "Regulations on Management and Implementation of Urban House
Dismantling" promulgated by the SMG in July 1991, if the development project is
deemed by the urban authority to be conducive to the urban renewal and in accordance
with urban plans, the existing occupants, be they SOE or individual residents, have to
move out in a given period (Shanghai Housing and Land Authority, 1997).
Based on the Regulation, four types of relocation can be found in the urban
redevelopment in Shanghai: 1) Relocation is organised by the local government, that is,
the local government itself is the relocator. This type of relocation is mainly employed
when the project involves the construction of urban infrastructure and public amenities.
If a project is classified by the authority as an urban infrastructure construction, existing
occupants will face a draconian rule: developers can bulldoze the land according to the
project plan and leave all disputes to be settled later on. 2) Relocation conducted by
developers. In this case, developers are supposed to apply to the local authority for the
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relocation permission. However, due to the complicated issues involved in the relocation,
developers tend to adopt the third type of relocation. 3) Most relocation involved in
Shanghai's urban redevelopment is conducted by companies specialised in relocation.
Usually set up by the housing authority, these companies have full support from local
government in dealing with issues arising from relocation. 4) Relocation involved in
developing large tracts of land such as the LCFD. Companies set up by the SMG in
charge of development of the land in large tracts (like the SLDC) assume part of
governmental functions and are responsible for the relocation in their land.
Despite these four types of relocation, the daunting job of relocation is in practise left to
the city or sub-city government, because developers would be simply overwhelmed by
the complex issues involved in the relocation even they want to do it. In the negotiation
with the local government who is the defacto land owner, developers tend to take the
easiest way -- they ask for a cleared land -- in return offering a high price. In fact, it has
become a format that what the government offer on the table is the cleared land. With
the money paid by developers, the local government would then hire the companies
specialised in relocation (My interviews with numerous government officials and
managers in SLDC confirm this format).
One of the most complicated issues involved in the relocation is how to compensate the
displaced occupants including state work units and residents. in the case of residents,
they can be compensated by three ways: property exchange, monetised compensation,
and the combination of these two (Shanghai Housing and Land Authority, 1997). It is
further complicated by two housing ownership that exist in today's urban China --
private owned and public owned. In the case of private-owned houses (note that the land
is still state-owned), the developer needs to negotiate a compensation deal with the
owner, based on factors of size, quality and location of houses. However, the housing in
Shanghai is mainly publicly-owned -- the legacy of the state socialism, and the most
houses that are demolished in the urban redevelopment are those classified as the
"shanty and old-lane houses" (Gu and Liu, 1997).
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In order to streamline the relocation process, the SMG issued on 8 December 1997 a
policy especially for the relocation involving shanty houses - "Temporary Regulation on
Compensation for Relocating Shanty Houses" (Shanghai Housing and Land Authority,
1997). According to the Regulation, displaced households that opt for relocation in
public housing that is usually located in the edge of city will be compensated by
increased living space. The increasing percentage depends on the location of the
demolished housing and the housing provided (see Table 8.5). The land in Shanghai is
classified into six classes in accordance with the location (see Figure 7.6 for the land
classification in Shanghai) (ibid.). Moving from Class 1/2/3 to Class 4, 5, 6 will get an
increase of 20%, 40% and 80% in the living space respectively. And moving from Class
4 to Class 5, 6 will get an increase of 20% and 40% respectively.
Table 8.5 Increase of Living Space for Displaced Households
The location of	 The location of housing provided




Class 5	 Class 6
Class 1,2,3	 --	 20%	 40%	 80%
Class 4	 --	 -	 20%	 40%
Source: Shanghai Housing and Land Authority (1997: 43).
For those opting for monetised compensation, they get an amount of money calculated
by the following equation: The monetised compensation = the average per square metre
selling price of housing located in the Class 4 land x the living space they should be
given in the Class 4 land x 80% (Shanghai Housing and Land Authority, 1997: 44). To
ensure that everyone should better off in terms of living space if not the location, the
SMG set a minimum starting point of living space at 10 square metre per person, i.e.,
those whose living space is below 10 square metre will be offered a starting point of 10
square metre in the calculation of compensation (ibid.).
Although replacement housing is normally bigger in size and self-contained in style, it is
generally located on the edge of the city where the land is cheaper, and where urban
amenities and public services are very underdeveloped. While residents are normally
provided with replacement housing, they have no formal power in defming when the
relocation process will take place, how much information is available about the process,
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what type of housing they will receive (size, services available, etc.), and where the
housing is located. They are also not necessarily relocated along with their neighbours to
ensure the continuity of local community.
As an area where most occupants have been relocated, the LCFD represents a case that
is very indicative of the relocation in Shanghai that has been taking place on an
unprecedented scale and pace. Prior to the development of Pudong, there were 595
enterprises, some of which were run directly by central ministries, and 27,300
households in 1.7 sq. km LCFD (interview with Yang Chuancai, General Manager of
Shanghai Lujiazui Urban Construction and Development Company, in 2000). Such a
large scale relocation which involved different governmental departments both at central
and local level and hundreds of state work units with tens of thousands of tenants, was
obviously beyond the reach of any commercial company, and indeed only the local
government or the empowered companies like SLDC was capable of handling such a
complicated job.
The relocation of the existing occupants in LCFD was conducted by two methods. The
first method was relocation through projects. When a piece of land was contracted, the
SLDC would apply for relocation permission from the government and clear the land for
the investors. By this way, the SLDC could clear the land piece by piece. In order to
speed up the process of relocation, the SMG would also intervene directly and organise a
large scale relocation. This was the case particularly when the relocation involved many
state work units. Take the relocation for Binjiang Avenue (Riverside Avenue) for
example (see Figure 8.4). The construction of Binjiang Avenue which is 1500 meters
long, surrounding the whole LCFD from west, was very important for the LCFD and
was regarded as one of key "image projects". However, it would involve the relocation
of many existing occupants among which were the so-called "big ten" (see Table 8.6)
As shown in Table 8.6, among these "big ten", The Xinxin Machinery Factory was run
directly by the Aero Industry Ministry. The Shanghai United Woollen Mill was the first
joint venture set up in Shanghai, and The Shanghai Association of the Roman Catholic
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Church was a religion housing. Other enterprises were run by six different municipal
bureaus.
Table 8.6 The Big Ten Occupants Relocated in the LCFD
Occupant	 Ownership	 Ground	 Built	 Contract Compensation Date that the
floor	 area (m2) time	 fee (RMB	 land was
area (m2)	 10,000)	 cleared
Shanghai Lixin	 Shanghai Sea	 40,510	 37,210	 1993	 18,000	 1996.10
Shipyard	 Transportation
Bureau








Shanghai Casing	 Shanghai External	 22,969	 25,490	 1993	 5,000	 1997.12
Factory	 Economic and Trade
Committee
Shanghai Lihua	 Shanghai Light	 43,842	 10,600	 1993	 25,000	 1996.9
Paper Mill	 Industry Bureau
Shanghai Xinxin	 The Ministry of Aero 61,000 	 63,000	 1996.5	 19,980	 1997.12
Machinery	 Industry
Factory
Shanghai United	 Joint Venture	 26,126	 34,301	 1996.5	 12,000	 1997.12
Woollen Mill
Shanghai No.10	 Shanghai Texile	 70,667	 57,160	 1996.5	 24,800	 1997.12
Cotton Mill	 Bureau
Shanghai	 Religion housing	 2,883	 4,206	 1997	 It was given a	 1997.12
Association of the 	 new housing
Roman Catholic	 built by the
Church	 SLDC
Shanghai No.1	 Shanghai	 6,640	 5,092	 1997	 921	 1997.12
Lock Factory	 Management Bureau
of Collective Assets
Total	 409,118	 330,081	 134,701
Source: The material was collected from the fieldwork in 2000.
In order to relocate these occupants quickly, in May 1996, the SMG set up a steering
team headed by a vice director of the PNAA to organise and implement the relocation.
Negotiations were difficult, particularly when it dealt with the compensation fee. The
steering team had to negotiate compensation fees with these big occupants according to
their different ownership. In the case of the centrally-mn Shanghai Xinxin Machinery
Factory, the final deal was thrashed out between the SMG and the Aero Industry
Ministry. The total amount of compensation fee for the "big ten" except the Shanghai
Association of the Roman Catholic Church whose compensation was paid by in the form
of new housing was about RMB 1.35 billion (approximately £100 million) which was
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paid by the SLDC. Despite daunting negotiations, with the aid of direct intervention of
the SMG and the PNAA, the "big ten" with the total ground floor area of 409,118 sq. m.
were all relocated by the end of 1997.
8.5.4 The rapid development of LCFD
With the direct and strong intervention of the SMG, the relocation of LCFD was swift,
and even astonishing to foreigners. Focusing on the LCFD from the same bird's-eye
perspective, Picture 8.5 (taken in 1993) and Picture 8.6 (taken in the summer of 2000)
show the complete spatial transformation of the LCFD. In 1993, the LCFD was basically
a mixture of residential and industrial areas. The centre was a highly populated area with
27,300 households, while the surrounding riverside was occupied by factories. By the
time I did my fmal fieldwork in summer 2000, only 10 enterprises and 1,100 households
which are located in N sites (those 5-6 storey apartments behind the tallest Jin Mao
Building) were left in LCFD. On the cleared land, 31 projects (buildings) had been
contracted, among which 18 buildings had been completed in accordance with the mater
plan (see Table 8.7, and for location of the site of land plot, see Figure 8.4). Picture 8.7
shows a close up view of some of the completed high-rising buildings.
Among these 31 high-rises, 23 buildings involved investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan
and other countries. Ten buildings including Aquarium in B 5-4 (Singapore), Shanghai
Senmao International Building in D 1-1 (Japan), Chia Tai Riverfest in X 1-2 (Thailand),
Shangri-la Hotel in X 1-3 (Malaysia), and Shanghai World Financial Centre in Z 4-1
(Japan) were wholly foreign-invested. In designing buildings, the involvement of foreign
and Hong Kong architects were even more significant. A total of 26 buildings were
designed or jointly designed by foreign or Hong Kong architects including
internationally renowned American architects SOM, KPF, SHCL, Canadian WZMH,
German ABB OBERMEYER and Japanese Nikken Sekkei.
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Picture 8.5 Bird's-eye View of the LCFD in 1993
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All the buildings were built for offices or hotel use with luxurious facilities. With
selling price ranging from US$ 1,800 3,500 per sq. m., it may be still relatively
cheaper compared with the real estate market in London, New York or Hong Kong,
but it is expensive enough to scare away the normal Chinese companies. The MNCs,
foreign banks, and the large Chinese companies are the targeted would-be occupants
for these luxurious buildings, which the list of occupants in Jiamao Building is vely
illustrative of (see Table 8.8).
Jingmao Building is arguably the most famous building in China by virtue of its height
and distinctive design style (see Picture 8.8). Developed by 18 National Foreign Trade
Companies owned by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the
Jingmao Building was designed by Skidmore, Owing & Merrill LLP(SOM) - an
internationally renowned American architect specialised in super high-rise buildings.
With a height of 420.5 metre, this 88-storey building is divided into three parts: Floors
1-52 are designed for office use, Floors 53-87 is the self-boasted world highest deluxe
hotel --5 star Grand Hyatt Hotel, and the 88th floor is for sightseeing. As shown in the
Table 8.8, fifty companies have moved in Jingmao Building. Among these 50
companies, 33 are foreign-funded companies including 6 American, 6 German and 5
Japanese.
Ten years on, a brand new financial district has emerged in a place that used to be a
mixture of industrial and residential area. Such a rapid development would have been
impossible without great efforts made by an implicit pro-growth coalition between the
local government and international capital which was formed in the process of
development. The following case of the would-be world tallest building (Shanghai
World Financial Centre) at the site Z 4-1 of LCFD is very illustrative of the formation
of this pro-growth coalition.
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Table 8.8 The List of Occupants in Jin Mao Build
Floor	 Company	 Country or region of
the company
3-6	 Shanghai Diamond Exchange	 China, Israel
7	 Shanghai un Mao Property Management Co., Ltd.	 China
8	 China Jin Mao Group Co., Ltd.	 China
9-10	 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.	 China
16	 Shanghai AIAL Information Company Ltd.	 Germany
16	 CLSA Ltd. Shanghai Representative Office 	 France
17	 Yamaha Motcr (Shanghai) Trading Co. Ltd. 	 Japan
17	 Binhai Golf Club	 Hong Kong
17	 Gerling Kredit Pruefung GMBH Co. 	 Germany
19	 Sinochem Pudong Trading Co., Ltd.	 China
19	 Seasonproof Garment & Down Inc. 	 America
20	 The Asahi Bank Ltd. Shanghai Branch	 Japan
20	 Shanghai Jiamao Constracution & Decoration Co., Ltd. 	 China
20	 Health Pharmaceuticals (China) Ltd., Shanghai Branch 	 Hong Kong
21	 Manulife-Sinochem Life Insurance Company Ltd.	 China, Canada
22	 Overseas Union Bank Ltd., Shanghai Branch 	 Singapore
22	 Shanghai Sinochem Trading Co., Ltd.	 China
22	 China Technology Ventures Inc. 	 America
23	 Shanghai RSMT Investment & Management Consulting Co., Ltd. China
23	 Lynton John & Associates 	 China
23	 Haarmann Hemmelrath & Partner Shanghai Office 	 Germany
23	 Haarmann Hemmelrath Management Consultants Shanghai Office Germany
23	 Shanghai Golden Investment & Development Co., Ltd. 	 China
23	 Shanghai Mitsubishi Elevator Co., Ltd.	 China, Japan
23	 Beijing Tianyuan Law Firm Shanghai Office 	 China
23	 China Venture Capital (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.	 China
23	 Rainbow Bridge Law Firm	 China
25	 Allbright Law Offices	 China, America
25	 Vista Media International	 China, America
25	 Shanghai Moririn Trading Co., Ltd.	 China
25	 Zhongquan Assets Management Co. Ltd.	 China
25	 Elkem International Trade (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 	 China, Norway
25	 Dow Jones Company Inc., Shanghai Representative Office 	 America
26	 Tomen (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 	 Japan
26	 Tomen Agroecology Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 	 Japan
26	 Tomen Kayaru Chemical Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 	 Japan
26	 Zamil Steel Buildings (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 	 Saudi Arabia
26	 Zamil Steel Buildings Co., Ltd., Shanghai Representative Office 	 Saudi Arabia
26	 Shanghai Jinchuang Investment Management Co. Ltd.
	 China
27	 Shanghai Jumps Forward Asset Management Co., Ltd. 	 China
28	 ABN-AMRO Bank Shanghai Branch	 Netherlands
28	 ABN-AMRO Asia Ltd.	 Netherlands
29	 Shanghai World Trade Syber Co., Ltd. 	 China
31	 Regus Business Services (Shanghai) Ltd. 	 Britain
36	 Compaq e-Cominerce Competency Center	 America
36	 Compaq Telecommunications Competency Center 	 America
39	 Redas GmbH Shanghai Office	 Germany
39	 Dresdner Bank AG Shanghai Branch 	 Germany
44	 Shanghai Shi Mao Real Estate Co., Ltd.
	 China, Hong Kong
44	 Cat Electric Sound (Shanghai) Co., Ltd	 China, Germany
Source: Collected from fieldwork in summer 2000
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Picture 8.8 Jin Mao Building
Source: Courtesy of China Shanghai Foreign Trade Centre Co. Ltd.
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8.6 The case of Shanghai World Financial Centre
During my fieldwork in July 2000, the general manager of SLDC, Kang Huijun gave
me an account of investment by Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. in the site D 1-I and the site
Z 4-1, which, for him, demonstrated achievement of SLDC in attracting foreign
investors, but for me, reflected how the SMG and foreign investors, driven by the
common interests, worked together to develop the LCFD. The building on the site D
1-1, named as "Shanghai Senmao International Building", was built in 1998 by
Shanghai Senmao International Real Estate Co. Ltd., which is wholly owned by Forest
Overseas Co. Ltd. In November 2000, the building was renamed as HSBC Tower. In
an interview with Tomoshige Yamada, General Manager of Shanghai Senmao
International Real Estate Co. Ltd., I was given an account of the development of the
site D 1-1 and Z 4-1, which was similar to that given by Mr. Kang. The following
narrative of the case of Shanghai World Financial Centre is based on these two
interviews.
The mother company of the Forest Overseas Co. Ltd., Forest Building Co. Ltd. is the
largest real estate company in Japan. The owner of the company, Minoru Mori, was
named in 1992 as "the richest man in the world" by Fortune for his personal fortune of
US$ 14.8 billion. The development of Pudong caught the attention of Mr. Moti who
was considering a new strategy of overseas investment in the wake of the collapse of
the Japanese real estate market in the early 1990s. In his first visit to Pudong in
November 1993, he expressed strong interest in the site D 1-1 and particularly the site
Z 4-1 which would be the tallest building (96 storey) in the LCFD according to the
plan. Realising that Minoru Mon would be a heavy-weight figure in the development
of LCFD, leaders of the Shanghai government were keen to promote these two sites. In
his second visit to Shanghai in February 1994, Mr. Mon was met by the vice Mayor of
Shanghai, Zhao Qizhen who was concurrently the Director of the PNAA, the standing
vice Mayor of Shanghai, Xu Kuangdi and Mayor Wong Ju. When Xu Kangdi was
253
promoted to the Mayor of Shanghai in the spring of 1994, his first letter was sent to
Minom Mon. In the letter, Xu expressed the hope that the SMG would fully support
and co-operate with Mr. Mon in making the projects in the site D 1-1 and Z 4-1
successful.
In September 1994, the SLDC and Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. which was financed by
Forest Building Co. Ltd. and dozens of Japanese financial institutions signed a
contract of land lease for the site D 1-1 and Z 4-1. According to the contract, the Forest
Overseas Co. Ltd got 50 years use right of the site D 1-1 and Z 4-1 at the price of US$
500 per sq. m. and US$ 540 per sq. m. of the buildable area respectively. Ten percent
of the cost was paid upon signing of the contract. The rest would be paid in September
1995 for the site D 1-1 and at the end of 1995 for the site Z 4-1 on the condition that the
land would be cleared on time. As foreign investment, the projects would enjoy all
preferential policies given by the Chinese goverrnnent, among which was the tariff
waiver for materials imported for the purpose of building construction. Since these
two projects were two super-rising buildings, this policy of tariff waiver was very
significant in the company's budget plan. In addition, the SMG pledged a reduced rate
of 15 per cent income tax for the projects. Income tax at a reduced rate of 15 per cent
was one of the preferential policies given to foreign invested enterprises in Pudong by
the central government, but this was for enterprises in the manufacturing sector only.
Obviously, as an important international real estate company, Forest Overseas Co. Ltd.
obtained a major concession from the SMG.
According to the contract, the SLDC would make these two pieces of land ready for
use by September 1995 and by the yearend of 1995 respectively, providing the land
with "seven connections and one clearance". "Seven connections and one clearance",
the usual standard for the land leasing in China, means that the land is connected with
"nmning water pipes, drainage, sewage, electricity, gas, telephone lines and roads",
and all attachments to the land are cleared with existing residents relocated. The most
difficult job involved was the relocation of residents. In the interview with Yang
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Chuancai, the general manager of Pudong Lujiazui Urban Construction Company a
subsidiaiy of the SLDC which is in charge of the land clearance, he outlined the
relocation of the site Z 4-1.
On the site Z 4-1, there were 834 households and 41 work units. Picture 8.9 shows
rows upon rows of 70s style residential flat buildings in the site Z 4-1. In October 1997,
Minoru Mon came to see the progress of land clearance which wasjust started a month
ago. He doubted very much that the SLDC would complete in three months what
would take years (even decades) in Japan. In company with Minoru Mori, the then
general manager of the SLDC Wang Ande assured Mr. Mon that the land clearance
would be finished as scheduled or the SLDC would pay RMB 380,000 for each day
delayed in accordance with the contract. The majority of residents were very
cooperative except one man who was forced out by the court in 10 December 1995. A
miracle maybe in Mon's eye, the clearance of the site Z 4-1 was completed on 22
December 1995. A cleared Site Z-1 is shown in the Picture 8.10 (the lawn next to the
Jingmao Building). In the interview with Mr. Yamada, he highlighted how surprised
he was by the swift clearance of the site Z 4-1: "It would take 500 years in Japan to
relocate the residences and clear the land." Seeing I was surprised by the words "500
years", he stressed:
"I am serious. It needs 500 years in Japan. That is one thing I think Japan needs to
learn from Shanghai. When I came back to Tokyo, I said many times to my
friends and proposed to the government that there are many things we should
learn from Shanghai, and urban renewal is one of them."
Starting in the mid-1 990s, there was an objective that the special treatment towards
foreign investment would be gradually replaced by policies that treat national
enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises equally. In September 1995, the Chinese
Customs Authority issued a policy whereby the old policy that foreign-invested
enterprises could import self-use materials with zero tariff would end by the end of
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Picture 8.9 Site Z-1 Before the Relocation
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1995. This meant a huge increase of cost in the construction of the super high-rise
building in the site Z 4-1, which would rely heavily on imported materials and
facilities. Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. immediately sent a letter to the SMG asking that
the project could enjoy the tariff-waiver policy till the completion of building as
written in the contract between Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. and the SLDC. Considering
the importance of this 96-storey building, the SMG tried its best to cooperate with the
company. Because it was beyond the power of the SMG, the SMG made a direct
request to the State Council asking for a special consideration. Finally, Premier Thu
Rongji, who was the mayor of Shanghai before being promoted to the central
government, made a personal instruction allowing Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. to
continue enjoying the tariff-waiver policy. Meanwhile, the PNAA signed again an
agreement with Forest Overseas Co. Ltd. assuring that the project would enjoy the
preferential policies pledged by the SMG.
8.7 The project-based, implicit pro-growth coalition
In the development of LCFD, we have seen that there is a convergence of interests
between the local government and international capital. The SMG is keen to revitalise
Shanghai as China's major financial centre by launching the development of LCFD,
and international developers such as the Japanese Forest Building Company, attracted
by China's potential market, switch their capital into the property development in
LCFD. Both interests rely on the growth of LCFD. In pursuing this common objective,
they form what can be called a project-based, implicit pro-growth coalition.
This Chinese-style "interest coalition" of the local government and international
capital is different from American-style "growth machine" politics. In America, local
business communities are well organised. They are "mobilised interests" (Fainstein,
Fainstein, and Armistead, 1983: 214). Local business people are the major participants
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in urban politics, particularly business people in property investment, development,
and real estate financing (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Through continuous interaction
with local politicians including substantial political campaign contributions, their
interests are well integrated in the decision-making procedure of urban development.
Often, the leading politicians come from the local business community (ibid.). In
China, politics are still monopolised by the Communist Party. Local social
organisations independent from the Communist Party are barely allowed. International
capital, although very influential, is not institutionalised into China's urban politics.
Therefore, unlike the American-style pro-growth coalition that is formal, official and
well integrated, the interest coalition found in the LCFD is project-based, informal and
temporary.
However, this implicit coalition, once formed, is very powerful and even more so than
its American counterpart. In the case of LCFD, we have seen that this coalition
demonstrated its formidable ability and performed very well in transforming the urban
form of LCFD. The SMG organised the planning consultation process which involved
four internationally renowned firms with "global vision" in mind. To implement the
plan, the SMG and the PNAA managed to raze the whole area, relocate hundreds of
enterprises and tens of thousands of households, clear the land and provide a modern
infrastructure. International investors, attracted by China's huge market potential,
stepped in. Dozens of international standard office buildings which are mainly funded
by Hong Kong, Taiwanese and foreign developers and designed by internationally
renowned architects have sprung up in the LCFD. This model of urban redevelopment,
exemplified by the case of LCFD, is very illustrative of a general pattern of interaction
between the state and capital which underlay hundreds of redevelopment projects
across Shanghai in l990s (see section 7.3.2). It is this project-based pro-gmwth





In this thesis, Shanghai's dramatic urban restructuring in the post-reform era has been
examined within a revised theoretical framework of Urban Political Economy - one
that treats the role of the state as an independent factor in shaping urban patterns
rather than derivative of economic processes (capital accumulation) - a view held by
many urban political economists. From the perspective of this urban political
economy, the thesis has attempted to constmct an explanation of Shanghai's urban
change combining the two underpinning factors - the state and capital. This
explanation has been established by focusing on the interaction of the state and
capital -- the state-capital relationship that has underlain Shanghai's urban change to
date. The introduction of the state-capital relation led to an understanding of
Shanghai's urban change in a broader context both historically and geographically.
Historically, the development of Shanghai has been traced back to the 1 840s when
Shanghai was forced to open to western trade and residence. Geographically, the
understanding of Shanghai's urban change has been approached in terms of both the
national and international settings.
The thesis started by proposing four key questions in the chapter of Introduction. To
conclude, I would like to sum up the main findings under the heads of these four
questions.
1. Why is the state-capital relationship the most appropriate approach to the
understanding of Shanghai's urban development?
Shanghai's development can be ultimately attributed to two factors: state activities
and capital dynamics. These two factors have for more than a century been
inextricably interrelated in shaping Shanghai's urban patterns. In many ways, the
259
history of Shanghai's urban development is a one of conflict between the state and
capital over the control of Shanghai. With the year of 1949 as the watershed,
Shanghai's modern history can be divided into two broad eras. Prior to 1949,
Shanghai's urban pattern was basically shaped in accordance with capitalist logic
with an increasing challenge from the Chinese state. Since 1949, Shanghai's
development has been basically determined by state activities with the growing
importance of capital dynamics. Based on the waxing and waning of the role of the
state and capital, the thesis identified six key relationships of the state and capital
which underlay Shanghai's urban development in six different historical periods.
One intriguing finding from the analysis of these six periods is quite anti-state-
intervention, that is, the less state intervention, the more rapid Shanghai's urban
development. The golden age of Shanghai in the early 20th century was brought in
by capital, particularly international capital with virtually no intervention of the
Chinese state. Shanghai's vitality was subsequently strangled and its position as the
major economic centre in the Far East was lost under state socialism when the state
alone was responsible for Shanghai's urban development. The revitalisation of
Shanghai since 1978 resulted from the rise of the new state-capital relationship -- the
retreat of the state and the reintroduction of international capital. This new state-
capital relationship was carefully ushered in by the Chinese government. The state is
still in control of Shanghai's urbanisation process, and state activities are the decisive
factor in shaping Shanghai's urban pattern.
The dominant role of the state in Shanghai's urban redevelopment, shown in
Shanghai's mega-project of the development of Pudong New Area, challenges the
widely accepted theory of urban entrepreneurialism, which views (global) private
capital playing an increasingly dominant role in the shaping of urban development
while the local state is reduced to a subordinated and disadvantaged position. This
theory of a subdued state in recent urban restructuring driven by global capital
imperatives rests mainly on studies of Anglo-American cities. Critics of the theory
have focused on the fact that many of these studies treat city governments as no more
than economic agents responding to the intensifying inter-city competition and they
fail to consider the capability of the local state in resisting the pressure of global
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economic forces as well as its role in shaping national urban systems and urban
competitiveness.
The theory of urban entrepreneurialism is particularly limited in interpreting
Shanghai's current urban restructuring. Like many Asian economies such as South
Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, the developmental state in China (both central
and local) introduced by reform policies has been playing a key dominant role in
promoting economic growth and shaping Shanghai's urban patterns. This can be seen
in the design and planning of Shanghai's urban development strategies, organisation
of the large scale urban spatial planning, setting up of state-owned land development
corporations like SLDC, and the massive relocation of urban residents in city core
areas.
China's market-oriented reforms have substantially changed the dynamics
underpinning Shanghai's urbanisation process. State-centred approaches that exclude
capital imperatives have been insufficient in understanding Shanghai's urban
transformation. However, capital-focused approaches like the urban
entrepreneurialism perspective that suggests a homogenous entrepreneurial city
emerging mechanistically from global economic forces are equally inappropriate in
interpreting urban restructuring of a city where the state has been dominant for
decades. Being increasingly integrated with the world capitalist economy, Shanghai
has felt the power of global capital that expands relentlessly to engulf the whole
world - a phenomenon referred to as globalisation since the 1970s. However,
globalisation does not produce homogenous urban patterns across the world as some
urban researches suggested. Global economic forces have to be mediated by varying
local factors and conditions such as different national regulation systems and local
political cultures before they are manifested in the urban landscape.
Neither state-centred approaches nor capital-focused approaches are sufficient in
interpreting Shanghai's current urban restructuring. An approach combining two
ultimate factors in determining Shanghai's urban development state policies and
capital dynamics	 is needed to understand appropriately the production of
Shanghai's new urban landscape. This approach	 termed the state-capital
relationship approach in the thesis views Shanghai's current urban restructuring as
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neither solely internally induced as it was in the pre-reform era nor solely externally
driven by global capital, but the outcome of the interaction of the state and capital,
and of the interaction of global and local processes. This state-capital approach is
historical. It provides an excellent theoretical framework for the understanding of the
urban change of a city like Shanghai that has experienced a variety of different
political economy systems. It is also culturally sensitive, because it focuses on the
human dynamics and social relations in understanding the formation of Shanghai's
urban growth coalitions.
2. How has the emergence of the new relationship between the state and capital
transformed the dynamics of Shanghai's urban development in the post-reform
era?
The emergence of the new state-capital relationship rendered by China's market-
oriented reforms since late 1978 has been analysed in the thesis within the
framework of developmental state theory. The market-oriented reforms have brought
China closer in many ways to the developmental state model that was originated and
well developed in East Asian newly industrialised economies such as South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Twenty years on, China's ownership stmcture
has been changed to the extent the Chinese economy is now virtually a mixed
economy in which the state sector continues to decline. In 1998, China's private
sector contributed 33°o of Chinese GNP while state sector contributed 37% and the
mixed-owned sector 30%. Fundamental changes occurred in the balance between
state planning and markets. By the early I 990s, China's price reform based on the
dual-track approach had been successful. While the plan had been phased out for
production and allocation of most goods, a market-based price system had been
successfully established. The state has retreated considerably from the economy, and
state agencies became more likely to behave in the way their western counterparts
did.
China's reform is, however, gradual and partial. While it has changed the state-
capital relation (the developmental aspect of the state), the state-party relation (the
political aspect of the state) remains intact China is still a one-party state in which
the Communist Party monopolises politics. The partiality of China's reform gave rise
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to what has been referred to as a "half-way house" in which the new and the old
developmental states and economic systems are intertwined.
Associated with the changing relationship between state and economy has been a
major shift of economic power within the state: the decentralisation of power from
central to local government at the provincial level and below. Since reform, local
governments have been given more autonomy, among which fiscal reforms have
been particularly important in redefining central-local relationships. Fiscal reforms,
both the revenue-sharing system (RSS) and the tax-sharing system (TSS), gave local
governments more power over their revenue and spending, and perhaps more
importantly, gave them a great incentive to develop local economies and the
wherewithal to do it. Meanwhile, local governments now enjoy property rights in the
management of state-owned enterprises and local land. City governments are the de
facto owner of the land under their jurisdiction.
Shanghai's relation to the national government is historically unique and decisively
important in Shanghai's urban development. The city's prosperity and well-being in
the pre-1949 era throve on its relative independence from the Chinese national
government. The communist victory in 1949 ushered in a new era of Shanghai's
relation to the central government, in which Shanghai was gripped tightly by the
central government due to its importance in China's political economy. The situation
did not change even in the 1 980s when the policy of decentralisation proceeded
nationwide. In 1980, when the fiscal reform of RRS was introduced, Shanghai was
treated differently. While Beijing and Tianjin were allowed to keep about 30% of
their revenue for local spending, Shanghai was only able to retain a little over 10% of
its revenue. To a great extent, Shanghai's rearguard position in China's reform
strategy and the Centre's tight grip of Shanghai resulted in Shanghai's rather modest
growth in I 980s, when southern China, particularly Guangdong, surged ahead in
economic development.
Shanghai's reinvigoration did not come until 1990 when the central government
chose Shanghai as the launching pad for furthering China's reform. The role of
Shanghai in China's reform strategy was changed from a rearguard into a forefront
player. In April 1990, Shanghai received a package of special policies from the
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Centre for the development of Pudong a mega-project having been lobbied hard by
the municipal government to get the Centre's endorsement. Soon afterwards,
Shanghai was given an official mission to develop as a "dragon head and three
centres" to lead the Yangzi River Basin and China at large into the twenty-first
century.
The emergence of China's new state-capital relationship, and Shanghai's shifting
relation to the Centre that goes with it, have had a profound impact on the dynamics
of Shanghai's urban development. The impact has been analysed in the thesis from
three interrelated aspects: I) investment source; 2) development organisation; and 3)
urban planning system.
The sources of finance for Shanghai's urban development have been dramatically
diversified since the reform. The state budgetary appropriation, which used to be the
main source of finance, has decreased rapidly, while self-raised funds (SRF) and
foreign investment have increased their proportions drastically. In 1997, SRF and
foreign investment accounted for 46.1% and 15.8% of Shanghai's total investment in
fixed assets respectively, while the share of the state budgetary appropriation was
only l.4°o.
SRF is collected and used outside the control of conventional economic planning.
The fund-raisers - usually local governments and enterprises - can decide the use of
the funds without the approval of the Central Planning Commission (CPC). Thus, the
dramatic increase of SRF means the shrinkage of the "plan track" economy and the
rise of local government as the key player in urban development.
In the pre-reform era, associated with the centrally planned economy, China's urban
land development was sectoral based, project-specific development. The reform has
transformed this system into a market-oriented, horizontally-controlled one by
introducing a de facto land market. Along with the market-oriented reforms, the
Chinese government introduced a paid transfer system of land use rights, in which
the land use right was separated from the ownership of land per se. While the state
remain the owner of land, use rights of land can be sold, assigned and transferred. In
practice, city governments were empowered as the de facto managers of state land
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under their jurisdiction, who managed the pragmatic land leasing system. The city
governments that used to have little say on their own land allocation could exert
decisive influences in the shaping of urban patterns.
The introduction of the land leasing system effectively created a defacto land market
system across the country's urban areas, in which Shanghai was a pioneer in many
ways. Since then, a high proportion of land in Shanghai has been put onto the market.
The new method of land development, i.e., market-based real estate development has
risen rapidly to take the place of the sectoral based, project-specific development,
although the latter is still the major way of acquiring urban land for governmental
sectors and SOEs.
Associated with the diversification of finance sources and the reorganization of urban
land development is the rise of the new role of urban planning. Prior to the reform,
the project-specific land development resulted in the subordinate role of urban
planning to the top-down economic planning. This status of urban planning has been
changed by a series of government policies and legislative measures since the reform,
among which the Regulation of Urban Planning issued in 1984 and the Urban
Planning Act (UPA) in 1989 were the most significant. According to the UPA, all
development projects must first submit their proposals to the municipal planning
authority for "site selection permissions". City governments have since had the real
power in the process of urban planning, and urban planning has become the cities'
physical control apparatus, whose main function has been to serve their economic
development.
3. What aspects of Shanghai have been restructured since the new urban
development dynamics was brought in by the Chinese reforms?
The Chinese reforms, and the new urban development dynamics that they brought in,
have been rapidly restructuring Shanghai's economic base, spatial morphology and
social fabric. Closely associated with Shanghai's general economic development,
two periods can be identified in terms of the pace of Shanghai's urban restructuring
with 1990 as the turning point. Prior to 1990, Shanghai's urban restructuring was
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modest. Its pace has been dramatically quickened since 1990 when Shanghai was
brought to the forefront of the Chinese reform by the central government.
The restructuring of Shanghai's economy has been mainly reflected on its ownership
structure and its sectoral structure. In terms of ownership structure, Shanghai has
been transformed from a state-ownership dominated economy into a mixed economy
with a rapid expansion of the non-state sector, particularly the foreign-funded sector.
In 1998, Shanghai's GDP reached RMB 368.8 billion of which 283.8 billion was
turned out by the state sector (including the collective sector) and 85 billion by the
non-state sector. While state sector's share of Shanghai's GDP has shrunk rapidly,
the non-state sector's share has increased dramatically from just 1% in 1978 to
23.1% in 1998. Within the non-state sector, the expansion of the foreign-funded
enterprises has been the most significant. In such economic sectors as the industry,
the foreign-funded enterprises have become the biggest sector in terms of gross value
of industrial output.
Alongside the transformation of Shanghai's ownership structure, Shanghai's
economic has been restructured from an industry-dominated one towards a more
service-oriented one. In the period 1978-97, the growth of Shanghai's tertiary sector,
compared with that of other economic sectors, was the most rapid with its annual
growth rate of l4.3°. As a result, the tertiary sector's share of GDP increased from
21.1% in 1980 to 45.5% in 1997, while the industry's share dropped from 75.7% to
52.2%.
A profound change in Shanghai's economic restructuring has been the rapid rise of
producer services within the tertiary sector. Shanghai's tertiary sector used to be
dominated by consumer services such as the wholesale, retail, catering and the like.
This consumer service oriented tertiary sector has changed dramatically since the
reform. Producer services those produced mainly for firms rather than individuals
such as banking, insurance, real estate, legal services and so on expanded rapidly,
while consumer services continuously contracted in relative terms. The banking and
insurance sector the core components of producer services grew into the biggest
sector in value terms within Shanghai's tertiary industry with its share increasing
from 11.9°o in 1980 to 30°o in 1997. The rapid rise of producer services had
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profound implications for Shanghai's economic development. The producer service
sector produces the economic control capability. The rapid development of producer
services indicates that Shanghai's capability of controlling economic activities has
been greatly strengthened, and so has its position as a regional economic centre.
FDI has played an increasingly important role in Shanghai's economic development
as well as the transformation of Shanghai's economic structure. Foreign-funded
enterprises have become the most vibrant part of Shanghai's economy. The influx of
FDI into producer services since 1990 has contributed greatly to the transformation
of Shanghai's tertiary sector.
Spatially, Shanghai has undergone even more dramatic transformations. Market-
oriented reforms transformed the way the city's land was developed, the emergence
of a land market gave rise to a land rent gradient, which made possible urban spatial
differentiation. The mixed land use pattern was broken down and a new spatial
structure based on the market system started to emerge. Work-unit based, self-
contained communities stemming from the project-specific development method
gave way to commercial housing built in clusters, which were differentiated from
industrial areas. Factories that used to be located in the city centre could no longer
afford the rising price of land use right and moved out into the edge of city, where
tracts of land were available. In place of factories and mn-down areas, modem,
stylish office buildings and luxury housing sprouted. Hundreds of skyscrapers
clustering in Shanghai's prestigious areas such as the newly developed LCFD has
dominated Shanghai's skyline.
Given the fact that only housing built on the leased land can be sold on the market,
the development of land leasing system determines, to a great degree, the pace of
Shanghai's spatial restructuring and the extent to which Shanghai's urban patterns
have been reshaped. The land lease scheme was initiated in 1988. At the beginning,
only the foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs) needed to lease the land, while SOEs still
enjoyed the privilege of free land allocated administratively. The pace of land leasing
has been dramatically quickened since sub-city governments were empowered to
manage the leasing of land located in their districts in 1992. Meanwhile, more and
more domestic enterprises including SOEs were required to acquire the land through
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the market channels. By the end of 1998, a total of 4581 pieces of land with an area
of 145 million square metres had been leased. Of these 145 million square metres,
some 117 million square metres (more than 8000 of the total area of land leased)
were leased to the FFEs. The figure points to the increasingly important role of FDI
in the restructuring of Shanghai's spatial morphology.
Two decades of Chinese reforms have also led to a dramatic restratification of
Shanghai's social fabric. With the ditching of socialist egalitarianism, Shanghai's
income structure has become increasingly polarised. The growing income inequality
has been closely related to Shanghai's economic restructuring. The rapid expansion
of the non-state sector (particularly the FFEs) has made the market-based wage
system the norm while the old egalitarian-based wage system has been phased out
with the shrinking of state sector. Economic sectoral restructuring has, on the one
hand, led to the rise of producer services with a professionalised workforce whose
income has been growing the most rapidly compared with those in other sectors. On
the other hand, sectoral restructuring has downgraded traditional industries such as
textiles where people's real earnings have contracted.
One intriguing fmding of Shanghai's social restratification is that both the richest and
poorest are non-Shanghainese (not officially registered local residents) who are
excluded from official statistics. On the one hand, we have seen that the extremely
high paid transnational elite", most of whom are foreigners alongside those from
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, have come to form Shanghai's top social spectrum.
On the other hand, we have seen that millions of domestic migrants now occupy the
bottom of Shanghai's social spectrum.
4. How does the new state-capital relationship man ffest itself in the concrete
process of Shanghai's urban redevelopment?
The reforms have been changing the relationship of the SMG and non-public sectors.
Although public ownership is till one of the main forms in Shanghai's economy, the
non-public sectors, particularly the foreign-funded sector, have been growing rapidly.
The ownership restructuring of Shanghai's industry is a case to the point. By 1997,
foreign-funded enterprises had become the biggest part of Shanghai's industry with
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its share of total gross output value reaching 38.9°c, comparing with SOEs' 3O.l0o. It
is clear that the public sector no longer dominates production in Shanghai. The
municipal government has to seek partners from non-public sectors in making
development decisions. As a result, a pro-growth coalition composed mainly of the
local government and international investors has emerged. While this pro-growth
coalition bears similarities to the one in the United States in many aspects, the
difference between these two coalitions are significant due to different political
economic systems.
The similarities lie mainly in the economic dimension of coalition building. Over
twenty years market-oriented reforms have transformed Shanghai's economic system
into a market-based one, and the non-public sector has become the major part of
Shanghai's economy. As its American counterpart, the SMG has to build partnership
with the rapidly growing non-public sector that holds significant economic resources.
The most important difference between coalition building in the United States and
China lies in the political dimension of coalition building. In liberal democratic
societies such as the US, political legitimacy is achieved through public election and
shown in public power. Business communities are well organised in liberal
democratic countries, and more often than not, they are the most influential interest
groups in shaping the local political contour because of their role as the resource
controllers. It is politically necessary for local politicians to build coalitions with
business groups in order to win public elections. China's reform is gradual and
asymmetrical. With its socialist political institutions unchanged, public election is
not the way to give legitimacy to the government. Chinese officials, from the
president to mayors, are not elected but rather are assigned through a complicated
political system that is controlled by the Communist Party. As a result, the political
dimension of pro-growth coalition building is weak in Chinese cities, which contrasts
to the practice in U.S. cities. International capital, although very influential
economically, is not institutionalised into China's urban politics.
China's unchanged authontarian system has also led to a weak community power in
urban politics. Although community power is weak in U.S. cities due to the lack of
control over resources, the public election gives it a political leverage whereby it can
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affect voters' choice, and as such, indirectly gain its influences in the decision-
making of urban development. In urban redevelopment, various groups such as
environmentalist organisations, racial organisations and community organisations
against displacement contribute to prevent the "growth machine" from going too fast,
although they are often unsuccessful. With no election power to leverage government
officials, community groups have never been members of the pro-growth coalition in
Chinese cities. In fact, social orgamsations independent from the Communist Party
are barely allowed. Party politics is virtually absent in Chinese society, and civic
society is still in an inchoate state. As a result, while the vast majority of the
populace is united by the goal of growth, the opposition voice is silenced.
In a word, the new state-capital relationship induced by China's reforms is
manifested in a form of pro-growth coalition in Shanghai's concrete process of urban
development. It is a pro-growth coalition with Chinese characteristics. Unlike the
American-style pro-growth coalition that is formal, official and well integrated, the
Chinese-style pro-growth coalition found in Shanghai is informal, implicit and
project-based.
However, this implicit coalition, once formed, is even more powerful than its
American counterpart. Apart from the political situation, which prevents people from
opposing the pro-growth strategy, the strength of this pro-growth coalition lies also
in China's peculiar land ownership system. The Chinese reforms separated the use
right of land from land ownership per se. This separation enabled the establishment
of a quasi land market while keeping the state ownership of land intact. Thanks to the
state-owned land system, the SMG, empowered as the defacto manager of the land
under its administration, can forcibly remove the existing residents from their
housing and communities in order to clear the land for urban renewal. Land
clearance is usually the most daunting and time-consuming job confronting inner city
redevelopment in western cities, due to the privately-owned land system. With the
problem of land clearance being solved relative easily by the SMG, Shanghai's urban
redevelopment, funded increasingly by foreign investors, is much quicker than that in
western cities and the displacement involved is much more intense.
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A central aim of the thesis has been to explore the ways in which the relationships
between state and capital were established and dynamised in the concrete process of
Shanghai's urban redevelopment. Drawing in part on interviews, the thesis shows
that specific cultures of interaction and patterns of engagements between the SMG
and foreign investors can be characterised by a process of learning.
The Chinese reforms introduced international capital into Shanghai's urban
development that had so far been driven solely by the Chinese state. Having not met
for three decades, foreign investors and the SMG quickly formed an interactive
relationship, in which both sides were keen to learn how to deal with each other.
Foreign investors learned hard in order to get things done in Shanghai - a city which
was administrated by a communist regime and which had been widely regarded as
the gateway of the Chinese market. Separated from the world capitalist economy for
30 years, the SMG made great efforts to learn how to do things in accordance with
international rules in order to attract more foreign investment, which had became
increasingly crucial for the local economic development. When both learned there
was an interest convergence in such urban redevelopment project as the development
of LCFD, they could work together and form a pro-growth coalition.
In the case of LCFD, we have seen that this pro-growth coalition demonstrated its
formidable ability and performed very well in transforming the urban form of LCFD.
The formation of this pro-growth coalition, exemplified by the case of LCFD, is very
illustrative of a general pattern of interaction between the state and capital in
hundreds of redevelopment projects across Shanghai in 1990s. It is this pro-growth
coalition that has been rapidly and relentlessly reshaping Shanghai's urban patterns.
9.2 Implications for future research
Urban change is a research subject that involves a range of issues whose full
understanding demands an approach that is highly interdisciplinary. Four years
research (one year in Hong Kong and three years in London) may have only allowed
me to tackle the tip of an iceberg. However, four years work on this research have
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also enabled me to realise how big this "iceberg" is and identify a future research
agenda that includes various issues each of which can be an independent research
subject.
1) Nationalism and urban development
Shanghai's unique histoiy of urban development (from colonialism to capitalism to
socialism to post-socialism) makes it an excellent place to explore the relationship
between nationalism and urban development. Nationalism played a veiy important,
and sometimes critical role in the formation of every state-capital relationship which
underlay Shanghai's urban development in different historical periods. Shanghai's
fate has been closely related with the development of the Chinese nationalism since
Chinese nationalism set its modern roots in Shanghai.
Paradoxically, Shanghai's development has appeared to be at odds with nationalism.
The colonialist "Shanghai model" contained at its outset a fatal seed - the Chinese
nationalism which grew up with the development of Shanghai and finally destroyed
the very model that had transformed Shanghai so successfully from an imperial town
into a cosmopolitan city. While colonialism is morally unacceptable, what this model
stands for - the maximum relation to the world capitalist economy and minimum
state intervention - has proved crucial for Shanghai's development. From 1949-1978
when Chinese nationalism descended into a form of xenophobia and when Shanghai
had a minimum relation to the world capitalist economy and maximum state
intervention, Shanghai was transformed into little more than China's industrial centre
and lost its position as a major economic centre in the Far East.
Shanghai's rapid development in the post-reform era has take place precisely because
the reforms have taken Shanghai back to the essence of the "Shanghai model". The
difference, it seems to me, lies in the fact that this time the Chinese took the crucial
step by themselves rather than it being imposed by the external force.
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2) Political implications
The historical review of Shanghai's development and particularly of the state-capital
relationship has significant policy implications for Shanghai's urban development in
the years to come. China's market-oriented reforms and open door policies have led
to the emergence of a new state-capital relationship, which underpinned Shanghai's
post-reform revitalisation. China's reform has been gradual and partial, which
resulted in a half-way house situation in terms of political economy. In spite of this
half-way house situation in which a completely new state-capital relationship
remains to see, Shanghai's rapid development has shown that the direction of
China's reform - the retreat of the state and the introduction of capital is revitalising
the city. Shanghai's post-reform resurrection bore testimony to the success of the
historical "Shanghai model" in promoting Shanghai's development and prosperity,
despite the differing political situations.
The establishment of a state-capital relationship that will be fundamentally
conducive to Shanghai's urban development requires further redefinition of the
Chinese state, particularly its political aspect. This will be a greater challenge facing
the Chinese government, which has embraced full integration with the world
capitalist economy while reluctant to undertake political refonn in fear of the
political instability. To a great extent, China can be seen to have moved from a plan-
ideological state to a plan-rational/developmental state in terms of Dicken's four
categories model. Differing from other developmental states, whose plan-rational
economies are guided by market-rational political institutions, China's economy is
controlled by a government that is still dominated by the communist party. Where
China will go from a plan-rational state will depend on its political reforms, which
have been speculated widely both at home and overseas. Although the political issue
is not the focus of this research, the thesis has shown that significant polilical
implications can be explored from the history of Shanghai's urban development. It
will be of great interest to explore the direction of the national political and economic
reforms by mvestigating a city's history of urban development.
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3) Theoretical application
The thesis has shown that neither state-centred approaches nor capital-focused
approaches are sufficient in interpreting urban restructuring of a city in a transitional
society such as Shanghai. It has also shown that the state-capital relationship
approach that combines both state policies and capital dynamics provides an
excellent theoretical framework for the understanding of Shanghai's urban changes.
Whereas Shanghai's urban development is a special case, its application to other
cities is worthy of further study. While it can be argued that the state-capital
approach is more or less applicable to other Chinese cities due to the same political
economy, empirical evidence is needed to support this argument. International
application of the state-capital approach would be an even more interesting research
agenda. Cities with a similar colonial past in the third world such as Saigon, Bombay
and Hong Kong appear to fit in this state-capital inquiry. The application of this
approach to cities in transitional economies such as East European countries would
be of particular interest because of the comparability between them and Shanghai.
4) Social space
The social implications of Shanghai's urban restructuring are less explored in the
thesis. Among these, social space is of particular interest. A new form of social space
in urban China has gradually developed alongside the rise of socio-economic
inequalities entailed by China's market-oriented reform. Although it is a very much
under-explored area in China artly due to the sensitive issues involved, partly due
to the lack of statistics which makes this empirically-demanding research more
difficult), scholars (eg. Cui and Wu, forthcoming) have started to look into such
issues as spatial segregation and residential differentiation. Shanghai's post-reform
social restratification has been inevitably translated into urban space. Since 1990,
Shanghai has seen the re-emergence of spatial segregation, with suburban villas and
upper class housing near the central business district, on the one hand, and marginal
neighbourhoods of the urban poor and migrants, on the other. Apart from the cause
of this spatial segregation, an empirically-intensive approach would enable us to
identify the social characteristics of these two groups - education, occupation,
earning, gender, age and so on.
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5) Changes in the urban system
Shanghai's rapid development has raised implications for the urban system at the
regional, national and international level. Has Shanghai's increasing integration with
the world economy strengthened Shanghai's position as the regional economic centre?
If so, to what extent and in which ways? To what extent has the rapid rise of
Shanghai affected the national urban system? And with the reinvigorating of
Shanghai, a frequent question is whether Shanghai will overtake and replace Hong
Kong - a question that drew wide attention years before Hong Kong's return to China
in 1997. Two contrasting positions may be summarised concerning the relative roles
of Shanghai and Hong Kong in the years ahead.
One group of scholars focus on Shanghai's advantages: an unrivalled geographical
position in the Yangzi River Basin and beyond, a huge hinterland, a strong science
and technology base stemming from its numerous universities and research institutes,
and a diversified and balanced economy. They assert that Hong Kong's position will
be replaced by Shanghai (e.g. Robwer, 1995; W. H. Chan, 1993). Among these
assertions, Robwer's (1995) vision of Shanghai's future is clear
Sometimes in the first decade of the 21 centuly it (Shanghai) will displace
Hong Kong as China's main financial-service centre and shortly after surpass
Tokyo as the most sophisticated and open fmancial market in the East Asian
time zone - and so join London and New York as one of the indispensable big
three of world finance.
While some of Hong Kong's functions may be taken over by Shanghai, Robwer's
assertion is probably an overly optimistic projection of Shanghai's future. Hong
Kong has advantages that Shanghai lacks: a natural and deep-water port, highly
developed fmancial institutions, world-wide trading connections, and a sound legal
system. Taking into account two cities' distinctive strength and weakness, another
group of researchers have come to a more realistic assessment of Shanghai's future
in relation to Hong Kong (e.g. Wong, 1996; Sung, 1996). Sung (1996), for example,
foresees Hong Kong as China's foremost port and a centre of foreign trade for a long
time to come, and Shanghai as the domestic financial centre of China, with Hong
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Kong remaining a regional and international financial centre. Rather than seeing one
city replacing the other, some people perceives Shanghai and Hong Kong
metaphorically to be like the eyes of a dragon, which will spearhead China's rapidly
growing economy into the 21 century (e.g. Lee, 1994; J. Z. Huang, 1995). This
metaphor of the eyes of a dragon has been adopted by the Chinese government as its
official position regarding the question of Shanghai vis-à-vis Hong Kong in the years
to come.
9.3 The future of Shanghai
On 11 November 1994, the Shanghai Municipal Government sponsored an
international conference called "Shanghai Towards the 21St Century". The strategies
of developing Shanghai into the international economic and financial centre of China
in the 21st century were discussed and a report under the same title was published
(Cai, 1995). The report highlights the key development objectives to be achieved by
the municipality by the year 2010. They are:
• A total urban area of 6,300 sq. m. with a multiple-centre, multiple-
function megalopolis.
• A GDP of RMB 150, 000 per capita is to be achieved by 2010, with an
average annual growth rate of 11.4% between 1995 and 2000, and 9.8° o
for the first decade in the next century. This will bring to fruition the
targeted GDP of RMB 2,000 billion.
• A tertiary-oriented economy with an emphasis on finance, trade,
information exchange, the service sector and attracting multinational
corporations to set up regional headquarters in Shanghai.
• A total population of 14 million (with an additional 4-5 million "floating
population"), meaning an urbanisation level of more than 8O°o.
• Restructuring urban land use with a 5 sq. km new City Business Centre
which spans the Bund and the Lujiazui area.
• Infrastructure development that includes a modem highway system, port
facilities and a new international airport at Pudong. (Chan, 1996: 306)
These targets were regarded as essential for Shanghai to catch up with other
international metropolitan cities in East and Southeast Asia in the coming decade.
Since then, Shanghai has fared quite well in terms of achieving these targets. From
1995-1999, it achieved an average 12°c annual growth rate of GDP (SSB, 2000). In
1999, its GDP reached RMB 403.5 billion. Meanwhile, Shanghai's economy has
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become increasingly tertiary-oriented. In 1999, the added value of tertiary industry
reached RMB 200.1 billion with its share of GDP surpassing that of secondary
industry for the first time (49.6 : 48.4). The finance and insurance sector has become
the most important sector within tertiary industry and its share has increased to 290o.
The year 1999 was very special for Shanghai. Fifty years ago, Shanghai was
"liberated" from bureaucratic capitalism, imperialism and its compradores by the
People's Liberation Army and became "a truly prosperous new peoples' city" (China
Digest, August 10, 1949: 10, cited in Murphey, 1953: 27). Fifty later, it was chosen
by Fortune magazine as the place for its annual Fortune Global Forum. Lavishly
opened by Chinese President Jiang Zhemin in the newly completed Shanghai
International Convention Centre located in the LCFD, the Forum on the theme of
"China: the Future 50 years" was claimed as "the most successful global CEO
conference in our history" (Fortune, 8 November, 1999). Over 60 CEOs from
Futune-listed World Largest Corporations attended the Forum, including Jack Welch
of GE, Jacques Nasser of Ford, Doug Ivester of Coca-Cola and Roger Enrico of
PepsiCo. International celebrities like Henry Kissinger, Lee Kwan Yew, Bobert
Rubin, Michael Dell and Ted Turner addressed the conference. Shanghai seemed to
return to its golden age of the early 20 century when it attracted international
capitalists from all over the world. However, "Shanghai has not come full circle", as
Murphey (1988: 181) reminded us in the late 1980s:
The revolution has made a permanent change, but the radical decades are
over, and the city's character and function are again being shaped by
circumstances, location and vital role it can perform for the new China.
Murphey was right. Shanghai's dramatic transformations in the past two decades
have been due to new circumstances bought in by China's reform and open door
policies, in which the city's favourable location and vital role in China has been
utilised by the Chinese state and international capital. While the future of Shanghai is
still an open question, it is beyond doubt that the three major actors - the central
government, the local government and international capital will continue to play
decisive roles in shaping the future of Shanghai.
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Appendix 1
With great thanks, I list below the people I interviewed in Shanghai in 1999 and
2000. However, the list is not complete because it excludes those who wish to remain
anonymous.










Secretaly to General Manager
Manager of Planning Division
Deputy Director of General Office
Deputy Manager of Business Division
Business Division
GIS Officer, Business Division
Photographer
2. Shanghai Lujiazui Urban Construction and Development Company
Yang Chuancai General Manager
Wang Ning	 General Office
3. The Economic and Trade Bureau of Shanghai Pudong New Area
Sun Yeli	 Deputy Director
Sun Yongqiang Deputy Director of General Office
Liu Kui	 General Office
Wu Jiwei	 Director of Division of Development Zones
Yang Xiaohua Division of Development Zones
Zhang Han	 Deputy Director of Division of Investment Promotion
Wang Xinling	 Deputy Director of Division of Investment Promotion
4. Academia
Ning Yueming Professor, The Institute of Western European and Northern
American Geography, East China Normal University (ECNU)
Mei Anxing	 Professor, Department of Geography, ECNU
Gu Donghui	 Lecturer, Department of Sociology, Fudan University
Lu Hanlong	 Director, The Institute of Sociology, Shanghai Social Science
Academy
Chen Fang	 Researcher, The Institute of Sociology, Shanghai Social Science
Academy
Duan Gang	 Editor, Shanghai Social Science Newspaper, Shanghai Social
Science Academy
Xiao Gongqin	 Professor, Department of History, Shanghai Normal University
Wu Fulong	 Lecture, Department of Geography, University of Southampton
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5. Miscellaneous peopk
Cheng Fan	 Secretary to Deputy Director of Pudong New Area Administration
Wang Zhong	 Shanghai Jin Mao Property Management Co. Ltd.
Zheng Xiaoxing Editor, Shanghai Business News
Liao Mingtao	 Shanghai General Trade Union
Wang Dezhong Research Office, Shanghai Municipal Government
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Appendix 2
Letter of Interview Request
Dear Sir or Madam,	 11 May 2001
Re: interview for m y PhD thesis
I am a PhD student in King's College London, currenfly writing my dissertation titled
"The State, Capital and Urban Restructuring in Post-Reform Shanghai". One
objective of my thesis is to find out how the Chinese local state (in my case,
Shanghai government) and international capital interact, and how this interaction
underlines Shanghai's urban restructuring in the post-reform era. In order to fmd out
the nature of this interaction, I need to interview some foreign investors to
investigate their experiences in dealing with the Shaxghai govermnent. Shanghai
Pudong New Area Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment (PAEFI), of
which your company is a member, recommended your company for my interview. I
hope that you will agree to my request for an interview.
Attached, please find the outline of interview. The interview will take about a half
hour. I would like to stress that the confidence of the interview, and if you wish, your
anonymity will be guaranteed. Given the permission, the interview can take place at
the place and time of your choice. I can be contacted via PAEFI or directly by my
mobile phone: 13916007179.
I hope that my research will contribute to the mutual understanding of the Chinese
local state and international investors. Your kind help will be of great significance in
completing my research.




The Outline of Interview
The interview will focus on the following four areas:
1.Locational choice
1) Why did you choose Shanghai to set up your enterprise?
(potential market, cheap labour, infrastructure, preferential policies, business service,
etc.)
2.Pre-negotiation period
1) How did you begin your search? Were you directed to Shanghai or did you choose
it? (through consultant company, internet, promotion activities, etc.)
2) Did you experience any difficulties searching for the information on investing in
Shanghai?
3.Negotiation period
1)What were you seeking in Shanghai?
2) What procedures did you go through for setting up enterprise in Shanghai?
3) Who did you deal with?
4) In dealing with the local authorities, did you get everything you wanted?
5) What help did they offer you?
6) Did you find the way of dealing with the Shanghai government different from that
in your country?
7) Did you experience any problems (or flifficulties) dealing with the local
government? If so, how were they resolved?
8) If you have other operations in China, did you fmd the experience in Shanghai
easier than elsewhere in China?
4.Post-negotiation period
1)Are you happy with your decision to locate in Shanghai/Pudong?
2) Knowing what you know now, would you make the same decision again?
3) Have you tried to expand your existing plant? If so, any problem?
4) Did you find it easier to deal with the local government than it used to be?
5) Anything you want to be improved in Shanghai? (Could the local government be
more helpful?)
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